If you find these notes helpful, feel free to
check out my tutoring profile here :D
https://www.mytutor.co.uk/tutors/1007961
3/
Qualia
- Qualia are intrinsic, phenomenal, non-intentional aspects of mental states
that are introspectively accessible.
- This means that they are inseparable from the mental states they are a part
of (intrinsic)
- Qualia are introspectively accessible - we have direct, first-person awareness
of them (a form of ‘internal observation’).
- They have no physical form and refer to "what it is like" to have that mental
state (phenomenal)
- They do not point to anything external beyond themselves and are not
"about" anything (non-intentional).
Intentionality
- Intentionality denotes the inherent quality of mental states to point beyond
themselves and be directed towards objects and properties.
- Accordingly, intentionality emphasizes that mental states are always "about"
something
- This semantic "aboutness" means that our mental states carry internal
meaning and actively represent the world around us
- Brentano used the example of a person thinking about a particular chair.
- In this case, the mental state of thinking is directed towards the chair as an
object, illustrating that mental states intrinsically orientate towards
something external.
, - Compare this to the biophysical description of a neurone firing when you
think about a chair: ion channels open causing voltage changes. As such,
neurotransmitters are released causing a spike to occur.
- Nothing in that description is "about" the chair.
- Consequently, physics and biology describe what the brain is doing, but they
fail to capture what the mind is thinking.
- So, mental states fundamentally differ from physical brain states due to their
unique property of intentionality.
Substance dualism
- For Descartes, a substance is a thing that exists independently and depends
on nothing else for its existence.
- Descartes distinguishes between physical substance (bodies, chairs, planes
all examples of one continuous physical substance) and mental substances
(mind, soul, self are all different mental substances).
- Every substance has one principal attribute that is an essential property
which determine what kind of substance something is
- The principal attribute which determines physical substance is extension
- The principal attribute which determines mental substance is thought
- A mode is a specific property, quality, or way in which a principal attribute of
a substance exists and is modified
- Modes of extension include physical properties such as shape, size, motion,
and rest (which manifest as measurable dimensions like length, width, and
height)
- Modes of thinking include: sensations, beliefs, mental images
- Therefore, the mind is an immaterial, non-extended, and non-spatial thinking
substance (res cogitans). Its thoughts manifest as specific mental modes,
including beliefs, desires, and mental images.
- Conversely, the physical body is a corporeal, space-occupying, and
non-thinking extended substance (res extensa). Its extension manifests as
specific physical modes, including shape, size and motion
- So, the mind and body are ontologically distinct substances
, - Therefore, to Descartes because the mind and the body are ontologically
distinct substances, the mind and the body can exist independently of each
other.
- Substance dualists claim that all mental properties are non-physical
properties of mental substance whereas all physical properties are
properties of physical substance
Property dualism
- Property dualism posits that the only substance that exists is physical
substance. So, property dualists do not claim that there are mental
substances.
- However, while there may not exist two ontologically distinct substances,
there exist two ontologically distinct kind of properties - (1) physical
properties (or at least properties that are reducible to or supervenient upon
physical properties) and (2) mental properties which are neither reducible to
nor logically supervenient upon physical properties (though they may
contingently supervene on physical properties).
- Claiming that mental properties are not reducible to physical properties
means that mental properties cannot be fully explained with physical
properties because they are “over and above them”
- Claiming that mental properties are not logically supervenient upon physical
properties means that a change in mental properties does not necessarily
require a corresponding change in physical properties. Mental properties do
not logically depend upon physical properties. This means that identical
physical properties could, in principle, be accompanied by different mental
properties (e.g P-Zombies)
- Claiming that mental properties are contingently supervenient upon physical
properties means that, in this possible world, mental properties actually
depend on physical properties, but they cannot in every possible world
,The indivisibility argument for substance dualism (Descartes)
- P1: All physical objects are divisible
- This is because Descartes can conceive of them being divided
- This is because any corporeal thing can conceivably be divided into
parts in thought (e.g arm can be divided into the hand, wrist forearm
etc.)
- This is possible because the principal attribute which determines
physical substance is extension
- P2: All minds are not divisible
- This is because Descartes cannot conceive of them being divided
- The “faculties of willing, of understanding, of sensory perception and
so on” are not conceivably parts of the mind, since it is a single, united
and complete mind that wills, understands and perceives.
- They are not parts of the mind, because they are properties or powers
of it.
- The mind cannot be divided as it is an immaterial, non-extended, and
non-spatial thinking substance (res cogitans)
- P3: x = y (x and y are numerically identical - ie are the exact same thing) if and
only if they have the exact same properties (Leibniz’s Law)
- C: Therefore minds are not identical to bodies or to parts of bodies.
The conceivability argument for substance dualism (Descartes)
- P1: I can conceive of my mind existing without my extended physical body
existing.
- A situation is conceivable if its description does not entail a
contradiction
- This premise is derived from the cogito. When he exclaims “I think
therefore I am”, Descartes claims he has indubitable knowledge that
his non-physical mind exists whilst doubting the existence of anything
mind-independent (including his own physical body).
- This does not entail a contradiction and thus is conceivable
- P2: Anything that I can ‘clearly and distinctly’ conceive of is metaphysically
possible
- This is because Descartes believes that ‘God could make it so’.
, - Metaphysical possibility refers to the possibility that something could
exist in a possible world (as long as it is consistent with the essential
nature of reality) - even if it violates the actual physical laws of our
world
- C1: Therefore, my mind existing without my extended physical body is
metaphysically possible.
- P3: If it is metaphysically possible for X to exist without Y then X is not
identical to Y.
- According to Kripke, all identities are necessary, so if X is identical to Y
then there is no possible world in which X and Y are distinct.
Therefore, if there is a possible world in which X and Y are distinct then
X and Y are distinct in all possible worlds, including the real one.
- The metaphysical possibility of their separation demonstrates the
impossibility of their substantial identity and demonstrates their
distinct natures
- Therefore, if there is a possible world in which mind and body are
distinct then mind and body are distinct in all possible worlds,
including the real one.
- C2: Therefore, my mind is not identical with my extended physical body.
The ‘philosophical zombies’ argument for property dualism (David Chalmers)
- P1: If phenomenal properties (e.g qualia) were identical or reducible to
physical properties of the human body, then it would be metaphysically
impossible for those physical properties to exist without phenomenal
properties also existing
- Something is metaphysically impossible if it is something that cannot
exist in any possible world because it violates the essential nature of
reality
- Claiming that mental properties are reducible to physical properties
means that mental properties can be fully explained with physical
properties because they are nothing “over and above them”
- A possible world in which the physical properties exist without the
phenomenal properties would therefore contradict the claim that the
phenomenal properties are fully reducible to, and nothing over and
check out my tutoring profile here :D
https://www.mytutor.co.uk/tutors/1007961
3/
Qualia
- Qualia are intrinsic, phenomenal, non-intentional aspects of mental states
that are introspectively accessible.
- This means that they are inseparable from the mental states they are a part
of (intrinsic)
- Qualia are introspectively accessible - we have direct, first-person awareness
of them (a form of ‘internal observation’).
- They have no physical form and refer to "what it is like" to have that mental
state (phenomenal)
- They do not point to anything external beyond themselves and are not
"about" anything (non-intentional).
Intentionality
- Intentionality denotes the inherent quality of mental states to point beyond
themselves and be directed towards objects and properties.
- Accordingly, intentionality emphasizes that mental states are always "about"
something
- This semantic "aboutness" means that our mental states carry internal
meaning and actively represent the world around us
- Brentano used the example of a person thinking about a particular chair.
- In this case, the mental state of thinking is directed towards the chair as an
object, illustrating that mental states intrinsically orientate towards
something external.
, - Compare this to the biophysical description of a neurone firing when you
think about a chair: ion channels open causing voltage changes. As such,
neurotransmitters are released causing a spike to occur.
- Nothing in that description is "about" the chair.
- Consequently, physics and biology describe what the brain is doing, but they
fail to capture what the mind is thinking.
- So, mental states fundamentally differ from physical brain states due to their
unique property of intentionality.
Substance dualism
- For Descartes, a substance is a thing that exists independently and depends
on nothing else for its existence.
- Descartes distinguishes between physical substance (bodies, chairs, planes
all examples of one continuous physical substance) and mental substances
(mind, soul, self are all different mental substances).
- Every substance has one principal attribute that is an essential property
which determine what kind of substance something is
- The principal attribute which determines physical substance is extension
- The principal attribute which determines mental substance is thought
- A mode is a specific property, quality, or way in which a principal attribute of
a substance exists and is modified
- Modes of extension include physical properties such as shape, size, motion,
and rest (which manifest as measurable dimensions like length, width, and
height)
- Modes of thinking include: sensations, beliefs, mental images
- Therefore, the mind is an immaterial, non-extended, and non-spatial thinking
substance (res cogitans). Its thoughts manifest as specific mental modes,
including beliefs, desires, and mental images.
- Conversely, the physical body is a corporeal, space-occupying, and
non-thinking extended substance (res extensa). Its extension manifests as
specific physical modes, including shape, size and motion
- So, the mind and body are ontologically distinct substances
, - Therefore, to Descartes because the mind and the body are ontologically
distinct substances, the mind and the body can exist independently of each
other.
- Substance dualists claim that all mental properties are non-physical
properties of mental substance whereas all physical properties are
properties of physical substance
Property dualism
- Property dualism posits that the only substance that exists is physical
substance. So, property dualists do not claim that there are mental
substances.
- However, while there may not exist two ontologically distinct substances,
there exist two ontologically distinct kind of properties - (1) physical
properties (or at least properties that are reducible to or supervenient upon
physical properties) and (2) mental properties which are neither reducible to
nor logically supervenient upon physical properties (though they may
contingently supervene on physical properties).
- Claiming that mental properties are not reducible to physical properties
means that mental properties cannot be fully explained with physical
properties because they are “over and above them”
- Claiming that mental properties are not logically supervenient upon physical
properties means that a change in mental properties does not necessarily
require a corresponding change in physical properties. Mental properties do
not logically depend upon physical properties. This means that identical
physical properties could, in principle, be accompanied by different mental
properties (e.g P-Zombies)
- Claiming that mental properties are contingently supervenient upon physical
properties means that, in this possible world, mental properties actually
depend on physical properties, but they cannot in every possible world
,The indivisibility argument for substance dualism (Descartes)
- P1: All physical objects are divisible
- This is because Descartes can conceive of them being divided
- This is because any corporeal thing can conceivably be divided into
parts in thought (e.g arm can be divided into the hand, wrist forearm
etc.)
- This is possible because the principal attribute which determines
physical substance is extension
- P2: All minds are not divisible
- This is because Descartes cannot conceive of them being divided
- The “faculties of willing, of understanding, of sensory perception and
so on” are not conceivably parts of the mind, since it is a single, united
and complete mind that wills, understands and perceives.
- They are not parts of the mind, because they are properties or powers
of it.
- The mind cannot be divided as it is an immaterial, non-extended, and
non-spatial thinking substance (res cogitans)
- P3: x = y (x and y are numerically identical - ie are the exact same thing) if and
only if they have the exact same properties (Leibniz’s Law)
- C: Therefore minds are not identical to bodies or to parts of bodies.
The conceivability argument for substance dualism (Descartes)
- P1: I can conceive of my mind existing without my extended physical body
existing.
- A situation is conceivable if its description does not entail a
contradiction
- This premise is derived from the cogito. When he exclaims “I think
therefore I am”, Descartes claims he has indubitable knowledge that
his non-physical mind exists whilst doubting the existence of anything
mind-independent (including his own physical body).
- This does not entail a contradiction and thus is conceivable
- P2: Anything that I can ‘clearly and distinctly’ conceive of is metaphysically
possible
- This is because Descartes believes that ‘God could make it so’.
, - Metaphysical possibility refers to the possibility that something could
exist in a possible world (as long as it is consistent with the essential
nature of reality) - even if it violates the actual physical laws of our
world
- C1: Therefore, my mind existing without my extended physical body is
metaphysically possible.
- P3: If it is metaphysically possible for X to exist without Y then X is not
identical to Y.
- According to Kripke, all identities are necessary, so if X is identical to Y
then there is no possible world in which X and Y are distinct.
Therefore, if there is a possible world in which X and Y are distinct then
X and Y are distinct in all possible worlds, including the real one.
- The metaphysical possibility of their separation demonstrates the
impossibility of their substantial identity and demonstrates their
distinct natures
- Therefore, if there is a possible world in which mind and body are
distinct then mind and body are distinct in all possible worlds,
including the real one.
- C2: Therefore, my mind is not identical with my extended physical body.
The ‘philosophical zombies’ argument for property dualism (David Chalmers)
- P1: If phenomenal properties (e.g qualia) were identical or reducible to
physical properties of the human body, then it would be metaphysically
impossible for those physical properties to exist without phenomenal
properties also existing
- Something is metaphysically impossible if it is something that cannot
exist in any possible world because it violates the essential nature of
reality
- Claiming that mental properties are reducible to physical properties
means that mental properties can be fully explained with physical
properties because they are nothing “over and above them”
- A possible world in which the physical properties exist without the
phenomenal properties would therefore contradict the claim that the
phenomenal properties are fully reducible to, and nothing over and
