, PLEASE USE THIS DOCUMENT AS A GUIDE ONLY
1. Write an essay where you discuss whether Gyekye’s moderate communitarian framework
would protect freedom of speech in the South African context. To support your argument, refer
to one real example of the exercise of freedom of speech you have seen on social media (e.g., a
tweet, Facebook post, or X thread) that, in your view, Menkiti’s radical communitarianism
would be unlikely to support and protect. Defend your answer.
Gyekye's Moderate Communitarianism and the Protection of Freedom of Speech in South
Africa
Introduction
The debate between radical and moderate communitarianism in African philosophy raises
fundamental questions about the relationship between individual rights and community values. This
essay argues that Kwame Gyekye's moderate communitarian framework provides a more suitable
philosophical foundation for protecting freedom of speech in South Africa than Ifeanyi Menkiti's
radical communitarianism. Using the recent case of social media commentator Musa Khawula, who
was imprisoned for defamatory statements made on X (formerly Twitter), I demonstrate how
Gyekye's framework would protect such expression under certain conditions, while Menkiti's radical
communitarianism would be unlikely to do so.
Understanding Menkiti's Radical Communitarianism
Ifeanyi Menkiti's radical communitarianism posits that personhood is not an inherent quality but a
social status achieved through integration into the community. Menkiti argues that "the community
defines the person as person" and that "personhood is something which has to be achieved, and is not
given simply because one is born of human seed."¹ Under this view, an individual's identity is
primarily constituted by their community membership, and the community takes ontological
precedence over the individual.
For Menkiti, the cultural community with its norms and rules takes precedence over the individual
human being because "the community gives the individual her identity and the language she
speaks."² Consequently, the community is best suited to define what counts as a person, not
individual properties such as rationality or will. This understanding has significant implications for
individual rights—according to Menkiti, "priority is given to the duties which individuals owe to the
collectivity, and their rights, whatever these may be, are seen as secondary to their exercise of their
duties."³
Gyekye's Moderate Communitarianism
Kwame Gyekye critiques Menkiti's position as unnecessarily radical, arguing that it gives the
community "an all-engulfing moral authority to determine all things about the life of the individual
person."⁴ Gyekye maintains that while the human person is indeed a communal being, the individual
"possesses other essential attributes" including rationality, moral capacity, and the ability to make
judgments and choices.⁵
¹ Kwame Gyekye, "Person and Community in African Thought," in P.H. Coetzee and A.P.J. Roux (eds.), Philosophy from Africa: A Text
with Readings, 2nd ed. (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 2002), 304.
² Gyekye, "Person and Community in African Thought," 305.
³ Gyekye, "Person and Community in African Thought," 306.
⁴ Gyekye, "Person and Community in African Thought," 308.
⁵ Gyekye, "Person and Community in African Thought," 309.
1. Write an essay where you discuss whether Gyekye’s moderate communitarian framework
would protect freedom of speech in the South African context. To support your argument, refer
to one real example of the exercise of freedom of speech you have seen on social media (e.g., a
tweet, Facebook post, or X thread) that, in your view, Menkiti’s radical communitarianism
would be unlikely to support and protect. Defend your answer.
Gyekye's Moderate Communitarianism and the Protection of Freedom of Speech in South
Africa
Introduction
The debate between radical and moderate communitarianism in African philosophy raises
fundamental questions about the relationship between individual rights and community values. This
essay argues that Kwame Gyekye's moderate communitarian framework provides a more suitable
philosophical foundation for protecting freedom of speech in South Africa than Ifeanyi Menkiti's
radical communitarianism. Using the recent case of social media commentator Musa Khawula, who
was imprisoned for defamatory statements made on X (formerly Twitter), I demonstrate how
Gyekye's framework would protect such expression under certain conditions, while Menkiti's radical
communitarianism would be unlikely to do so.
Understanding Menkiti's Radical Communitarianism
Ifeanyi Menkiti's radical communitarianism posits that personhood is not an inherent quality but a
social status achieved through integration into the community. Menkiti argues that "the community
defines the person as person" and that "personhood is something which has to be achieved, and is not
given simply because one is born of human seed."¹ Under this view, an individual's identity is
primarily constituted by their community membership, and the community takes ontological
precedence over the individual.
For Menkiti, the cultural community with its norms and rules takes precedence over the individual
human being because "the community gives the individual her identity and the language she
speaks."² Consequently, the community is best suited to define what counts as a person, not
individual properties such as rationality or will. This understanding has significant implications for
individual rights—according to Menkiti, "priority is given to the duties which individuals owe to the
collectivity, and their rights, whatever these may be, are seen as secondary to their exercise of their
duties."³
Gyekye's Moderate Communitarianism
Kwame Gyekye critiques Menkiti's position as unnecessarily radical, arguing that it gives the
community "an all-engulfing moral authority to determine all things about the life of the individual
person."⁴ Gyekye maintains that while the human person is indeed a communal being, the individual
"possesses other essential attributes" including rationality, moral capacity, and the ability to make
judgments and choices.⁵
¹ Kwame Gyekye, "Person and Community in African Thought," in P.H. Coetzee and A.P.J. Roux (eds.), Philosophy from Africa: A Text
with Readings, 2nd ed. (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 2002), 304.
² Gyekye, "Person and Community in African Thought," 305.
³ Gyekye, "Person and Community in African Thought," 306.
⁴ Gyekye, "Person and Community in African Thought," 308.
⁵ Gyekye, "Person and Community in African Thought," 309.
