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Idealism
- Idealism is an anti-realist theory and thus argues that (1) a mind-independent
external world (and its objects and respective properties) does not exist
- (2) We immediately perceive mind-dependent objects (collections of ideas)
rather than mind-independent objects and their properties.
- Therefore, to be is to be perceived
- (3) These ideas do not represent a mind-independent reality, they are reality
- (4) These ideas are not caused by a mind-independent reality, they are reality
- (5) Berkeley argues for God as the cause of our (non-hallucinatory) sensory
ideas based on their coherence and consistency (Berkeley rules out our own
minds and other ideas as possible causes).
- He comes to this conclusion via an abductive argument where he considers
three explanations for the coherence and consistency of ideas: ideas, my
own mind, another mind
- It cannot be ideas themselves because ideas are passive and cannot produce
or cause other ideas.
- It cannot be my own mind because if I were creating my own perceptions, I
would be able to choose and control what I experience.
- Therefore, the cause of my perceptions must be another mind.
- Since my perceptions are so complex, orderly, varied, this other mind must
be far greater than our own - God’s mind.
- God’s mind contains ideas when they are not currently perceived by us.
- God maintains the laws of nature.
- God is an ontological guarantor (he guarantees the existence of objects
which exist independent of our individual minds).
, - God is an epistemological guarantor (he guarantees that our beliefs about
the world can be true in so far as they reflect the world that is independent
of our individual minds).
Berkeley’s attack on the primary and secondary quality distinction
- According to Locke, primary qualities are intrinsic properties (properties
something has in virtue of how it is regardless of how anything else is) and
therefore mind-independent properties (as they are what they are
irrespective of how they are related to any minds).
- Thus, primary qualities ought to be exist objectively - independently of any
individual's conscious mind
- However, Berkeley noted that primary qualities change depending on the
observer's perspective
- A single limb of that mite will appear completely tiny and almost invisible to a
human.
- However, to the mite itself, its foot is a massive, extended body.
- Since the same physical limb cannot simultaneously have incompatible
primary qualities of being tiny and massive in the mind-independent,
external world, size must be a subjective perspective in the mind, not an
intrinsic property of the object.
- Moreover, Berkeley challenged people to try and mentally separate a primary
quality from a secondary quality - such as trying to imagine an object's
primary qualities of shape or size without visualising any secondary qualities
such as color.
- He posits that it is impossible to imagine an object with only the primary
qualities of shape, size, movement, etc
- Therefore, the two types of qualities are inseparable in our minds
- It follows that they must exist together.
- Indirect realists accept that our ideas of secondary qualities are mind-
dependent.
- It therefore follows that our ideas of primary qualities are also mind-
dependent.
, Berkeley’s “Master” Argument
- The ‘Master’ argument is an argument in favour of idealism, the position that
the immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent objects (collections
of ideas), and that all that exists are minds or mind-dependent objects.
- It is therefore an argument against perceptual realism (the claim that a
mind-independent external world (and its objects and respective properties)
exists).
- To set up the argument, Philonous asks Hylas to try to conceive of a sensible
object which exists independent of any mind (e.g ‘a tree or house existing by
itself, independently of and unperceived by any mind,’).
- In doing so, the sensible object is being conceived by Hylas.
- Therefore, the object is in his mind and not independent of any mind after all
- it is dependent on the perceiving mind of Hylas .
- ‘To conceive of the unperceived’ is therefore a contradiction analogous to
‘seeing an unseenthing’
- So it is a contradiction to talk of a thing which is unconceived
- Therefore, it is impossible for any sensible object to exist independently of
the mind.
- Therefore, perceptual realism is false
The argument from illusion/hallucinations
- The phenomenal principle states that if it appears that there is an object x
with perceptible quality f, then there must be some object x that possesses
perceptible quality f.
- Therefore, if it appears that, during a non-veridicle perceptual event, an oar
is bent in water, then there must be something that possesses the property
of bentness.
- Idealism would posit that there exists some mind-dependent object made up
of a collection of ideas including the idea of “bentness”.
- Similarly, if it appears that, during a vertical perceptual event, an oar is
straight in water (e.g you perceived the tactile idea of “straightness” by
touching the oar), then there must be something that possesses the property
of straightness.
check out my tutoring profile here :D
https://www.mytutor.co.uk/tutors/100796
13/
Idealism
- Idealism is an anti-realist theory and thus argues that (1) a mind-independent
external world (and its objects and respective properties) does not exist
- (2) We immediately perceive mind-dependent objects (collections of ideas)
rather than mind-independent objects and their properties.
- Therefore, to be is to be perceived
- (3) These ideas do not represent a mind-independent reality, they are reality
- (4) These ideas are not caused by a mind-independent reality, they are reality
- (5) Berkeley argues for God as the cause of our (non-hallucinatory) sensory
ideas based on their coherence and consistency (Berkeley rules out our own
minds and other ideas as possible causes).
- He comes to this conclusion via an abductive argument where he considers
three explanations for the coherence and consistency of ideas: ideas, my
own mind, another mind
- It cannot be ideas themselves because ideas are passive and cannot produce
or cause other ideas.
- It cannot be my own mind because if I were creating my own perceptions, I
would be able to choose and control what I experience.
- Therefore, the cause of my perceptions must be another mind.
- Since my perceptions are so complex, orderly, varied, this other mind must
be far greater than our own - God’s mind.
- God’s mind contains ideas when they are not currently perceived by us.
- God maintains the laws of nature.
- God is an ontological guarantor (he guarantees the existence of objects
which exist independent of our individual minds).
, - God is an epistemological guarantor (he guarantees that our beliefs about
the world can be true in so far as they reflect the world that is independent
of our individual minds).
Berkeley’s attack on the primary and secondary quality distinction
- According to Locke, primary qualities are intrinsic properties (properties
something has in virtue of how it is regardless of how anything else is) and
therefore mind-independent properties (as they are what they are
irrespective of how they are related to any minds).
- Thus, primary qualities ought to be exist objectively - independently of any
individual's conscious mind
- However, Berkeley noted that primary qualities change depending on the
observer's perspective
- A single limb of that mite will appear completely tiny and almost invisible to a
human.
- However, to the mite itself, its foot is a massive, extended body.
- Since the same physical limb cannot simultaneously have incompatible
primary qualities of being tiny and massive in the mind-independent,
external world, size must be a subjective perspective in the mind, not an
intrinsic property of the object.
- Moreover, Berkeley challenged people to try and mentally separate a primary
quality from a secondary quality - such as trying to imagine an object's
primary qualities of shape or size without visualising any secondary qualities
such as color.
- He posits that it is impossible to imagine an object with only the primary
qualities of shape, size, movement, etc
- Therefore, the two types of qualities are inseparable in our minds
- It follows that they must exist together.
- Indirect realists accept that our ideas of secondary qualities are mind-
dependent.
- It therefore follows that our ideas of primary qualities are also mind-
dependent.
, Berkeley’s “Master” Argument
- The ‘Master’ argument is an argument in favour of idealism, the position that
the immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent objects (collections
of ideas), and that all that exists are minds or mind-dependent objects.
- It is therefore an argument against perceptual realism (the claim that a
mind-independent external world (and its objects and respective properties)
exists).
- To set up the argument, Philonous asks Hylas to try to conceive of a sensible
object which exists independent of any mind (e.g ‘a tree or house existing by
itself, independently of and unperceived by any mind,’).
- In doing so, the sensible object is being conceived by Hylas.
- Therefore, the object is in his mind and not independent of any mind after all
- it is dependent on the perceiving mind of Hylas .
- ‘To conceive of the unperceived’ is therefore a contradiction analogous to
‘seeing an unseenthing’
- So it is a contradiction to talk of a thing which is unconceived
- Therefore, it is impossible for any sensible object to exist independently of
the mind.
- Therefore, perceptual realism is false
The argument from illusion/hallucinations
- The phenomenal principle states that if it appears that there is an object x
with perceptible quality f, then there must be some object x that possesses
perceptible quality f.
- Therefore, if it appears that, during a non-veridicle perceptual event, an oar
is bent in water, then there must be something that possesses the property
of bentness.
- Idealism would posit that there exists some mind-dependent object made up
of a collection of ideas including the idea of “bentness”.
- Similarly, if it appears that, during a vertical perceptual event, an oar is
straight in water (e.g you perceived the tactile idea of “straightness” by
touching the oar), then there must be something that possesses the property
of straightness.
