1. Considering your knowledge of disasters in commercial spaceflight and agency-driven human
spaceflight, what issues do you foresee in commercial human spaceflight?
Since the statistics for spaceflight in general (let alone human spaceflight) are far more easily
influenced negatively by disasters, the industry is going to be moving on thin ice for a long time. For
instance, although a disaster in commercial aviation is no less devastating and comes with
consequences, it can be viewed in contrast to thousands of successful flights. Since human spaceflight
does not have such an extensive history, a disaster is much more lethal for the industry. I fear that in the
conflict between cost and quality, a fatal failure resulting from a “cost effective” option will happen and
sink the future of human spaceflight, because one failure is all it will take for the thin ice to break.
2. Consider STS-51L, what mechanisms of injury were the crew subjected to?
Mechanisms of injury that the crew of STS-51L (Challenger) were subjected to were extreme
acceleration forces during impact with the ocean and possibly during the shuttle’s breakup. The crew
could have also received injuries from depressurization in the cabin.
3. Consider STS-107, NASA was aware of the foam strike, however, it occurred on the reinforced
carbon-carbon leading edge. Why was this not a concern?
A reinforced carbon-carbon leading edge was thought to be indestructible, especially against
something like foam. I was not until after the post-disaster tests of the material that NASA discovered
the severity of the damage that could be inflicted by foam.
spaceflight, what issues do you foresee in commercial human spaceflight?
Since the statistics for spaceflight in general (let alone human spaceflight) are far more easily
influenced negatively by disasters, the industry is going to be moving on thin ice for a long time. For
instance, although a disaster in commercial aviation is no less devastating and comes with
consequences, it can be viewed in contrast to thousands of successful flights. Since human spaceflight
does not have such an extensive history, a disaster is much more lethal for the industry. I fear that in the
conflict between cost and quality, a fatal failure resulting from a “cost effective” option will happen and
sink the future of human spaceflight, because one failure is all it will take for the thin ice to break.
2. Consider STS-51L, what mechanisms of injury were the crew subjected to?
Mechanisms of injury that the crew of STS-51L (Challenger) were subjected to were extreme
acceleration forces during impact with the ocean and possibly during the shuttle’s breakup. The crew
could have also received injuries from depressurization in the cabin.
3. Consider STS-107, NASA was aware of the foam strike, however, it occurred on the reinforced
carbon-carbon leading edge. Why was this not a concern?
A reinforced carbon-carbon leading edge was thought to be indestructible, especially against
something like foam. I was not until after the post-disaster tests of the material that NASA discovered
the severity of the damage that could be inflicted by foam.
