My request to the genie would be to take me back to 1988 so that I could prevent the
aviation disaster of Aloha Airlines Flight 243. On April 28 th of that year, a Boeing 737-200
operated by 6 crewmembers was scheduled to transport 89 passengers from Hilo to Honolulu,
Hawaii. Prior to this flight on the same day, the same aircraft had already completed three
nominal round-trip flights from Honolulu to Hilo, Maui, and Kauai. Similarly for Flight 243,
nothing unusual was noted during the pre-departure inspection of the aircraft (NTSB, 1989).
However, upon reaching an altitude of 24,000 feet, the aircraft experienced a structural failure
that resulted in an explosive decompression. A large section of the roof broke off, consisting of
the entire top half of the aircraft’s skin and spanning about 18 feet between the cockpit and the
fore-wing area. From the cockpit, the captain reported that he could see “blue sky where the
first-class ceiling had been” (NTSB, 1989).
Immediately following the incident, the captain applied the airbrakes and began
descending. The crew diverted the flight to Kahului Airport in Maui for an emergency landing.
Both engines ingested some of the debris that broke loose, fully disabling the left and damaging
the right for landing. There was also some uncertainty among the crew during the approach for
landing that the nose gear was not lowered correctly. However, despite these challenges with
their aircraft, the crew was able to conduct a normal landing, approximately 13 minutes after
the structural failure (NTSB, 1989). Shortly after the explosive decompression, 58-year-old flight
attendant Clarabelle Lansing, who was a veteran flight attendant of 37 years at the time, was
ejected from the aircraft while standing near the fifth-row seats. She was the only fatality that
resulted from Flight 243 and her body was never recovered. Of everyone else, 65 people were
reported injured, with 8 of them receiving serious injuries (NTSB, 1989).
, Upon inspecting the aircraft after landing in Maui, several additional areas of damage
were revealed. Besides the missing piece of fuselage (never found) and resulting from the
consequent debris, the aircraft had damaged engines, horizontal stabilizers, vertical stabilizers,
and leading edges on both wings. The aircraft was determined to be damaged beyond repair
and was dismantled on site (NTSB, 1989). One of the NTSB’s investigation conclusions (1989)
was that the accident was caused by metal fatigue exacerbated by environmental factors that
led to crevice corrosion. The aircraft was 19 years old and operated in a coastal environment,
exposed to salt and humidity. Also, although the airframe had accumulated only 35,496 flight
hours prior to the accident, those hours included around 90,000 takeoff and landing cycles,
which is more than twice the number of cycles it was designed for. This is because Aloha Airlines
operated this aircraft for much shorter flights between the islands of Hawaii. So, while flight
hours may have accumulated at a normal rate, takeoff and landing cycles accumulated much
quicker. Also revealed to investigators during an interview was that a passenger named Gayle
Yamamoto noticed a crack in the fuselage when boarding but did not raise concern with anyone
else (NTSB, 1989).
Along with the NTSB’s conclusions about the cause of the structural failure, which
constitutes as the active failure in the disaster, investigators also made several conclusions
about the latent failures that also made the disaster possible. As stated in the NTSB report
(1989), “the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the Aloha Airlines maintenance
program to detect the presence of significant disbonding and fatigue damage which ultimately
led to failure of the lap joint”. Further, “contributing to the accident were the failure of Aloha
Airlines management to supervise properly its maintenance force”, and “the failure of the FAA
aviation disaster of Aloha Airlines Flight 243. On April 28 th of that year, a Boeing 737-200
operated by 6 crewmembers was scheduled to transport 89 passengers from Hilo to Honolulu,
Hawaii. Prior to this flight on the same day, the same aircraft had already completed three
nominal round-trip flights from Honolulu to Hilo, Maui, and Kauai. Similarly for Flight 243,
nothing unusual was noted during the pre-departure inspection of the aircraft (NTSB, 1989).
However, upon reaching an altitude of 24,000 feet, the aircraft experienced a structural failure
that resulted in an explosive decompression. A large section of the roof broke off, consisting of
the entire top half of the aircraft’s skin and spanning about 18 feet between the cockpit and the
fore-wing area. From the cockpit, the captain reported that he could see “blue sky where the
first-class ceiling had been” (NTSB, 1989).
Immediately following the incident, the captain applied the airbrakes and began
descending. The crew diverted the flight to Kahului Airport in Maui for an emergency landing.
Both engines ingested some of the debris that broke loose, fully disabling the left and damaging
the right for landing. There was also some uncertainty among the crew during the approach for
landing that the nose gear was not lowered correctly. However, despite these challenges with
their aircraft, the crew was able to conduct a normal landing, approximately 13 minutes after
the structural failure (NTSB, 1989). Shortly after the explosive decompression, 58-year-old flight
attendant Clarabelle Lansing, who was a veteran flight attendant of 37 years at the time, was
ejected from the aircraft while standing near the fifth-row seats. She was the only fatality that
resulted from Flight 243 and her body was never recovered. Of everyone else, 65 people were
reported injured, with 8 of them receiving serious injuries (NTSB, 1989).
, Upon inspecting the aircraft after landing in Maui, several additional areas of damage
were revealed. Besides the missing piece of fuselage (never found) and resulting from the
consequent debris, the aircraft had damaged engines, horizontal stabilizers, vertical stabilizers,
and leading edges on both wings. The aircraft was determined to be damaged beyond repair
and was dismantled on site (NTSB, 1989). One of the NTSB’s investigation conclusions (1989)
was that the accident was caused by metal fatigue exacerbated by environmental factors that
led to crevice corrosion. The aircraft was 19 years old and operated in a coastal environment,
exposed to salt and humidity. Also, although the airframe had accumulated only 35,496 flight
hours prior to the accident, those hours included around 90,000 takeoff and landing cycles,
which is more than twice the number of cycles it was designed for. This is because Aloha Airlines
operated this aircraft for much shorter flights between the islands of Hawaii. So, while flight
hours may have accumulated at a normal rate, takeoff and landing cycles accumulated much
quicker. Also revealed to investigators during an interview was that a passenger named Gayle
Yamamoto noticed a crack in the fuselage when boarding but did not raise concern with anyone
else (NTSB, 1989).
Along with the NTSB’s conclusions about the cause of the structural failure, which
constitutes as the active failure in the disaster, investigators also made several conclusions
about the latent failures that also made the disaster possible. As stated in the NTSB report
(1989), “the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the Aloha Airlines maintenance
program to detect the presence of significant disbonding and fatigue damage which ultimately
led to failure of the lap joint”. Further, “contributing to the accident were the failure of Aloha
Airlines management to supervise properly its maintenance force”, and “the failure of the FAA
