Reason as the origin of our moral principles
- Kant is a rationalist and thus argues that we can gain synthetic (moral)
knowledge, a priori - through the application of reason.
- Thus Kant defends moral rationalism - the view that reason allows us to
understand the moral law, which sets the standard our actions should follow.
- This moral law isn’t invented by humans but discovered, in the same way we
discover laws of nature.
- Kant argues that moral principles must be universal and necessary to apply
to all rational agents equally
- Therefore, Kant argues that we should not rely upon an external authority
like the government to decide what is morally right or wrong for us.
- Moreover, we should not rely upon our feelings to determine the moral law
as our emotions are variable, heteronomous and uncontrollable, and thus
they cannot be praised as the basis of our moral motivation.
- Whereas, acting from reason is autonomous and thus can be morally praised
- Thus, reason is best source of universal and necessary moral laws which
apply equally to everyone
- We can use reason to discover duties through the Categorical Imperative
- For Kant, the maxims on which it would be morally permissible to act will be
rational and therefore universalisable and also require us to treat other
rational beings as ends in themselves, not merely as means.
Emotions as the origin of our moral principles
- Hume is an empiricist and thus argues that synthetic, moral knowledge is not
a priori (derived from reason) but a posteriori - derived specifically, from our
emotions or sentiments.
- Hume argues that reason alone cannot motivate action.
- Reason is limited to discovering matters of facts (what is the case) and
relations between ideas, but it cannot tell us what we ought to do - it cannot
determine matters of value.
- Moreover, Hume argues that if moral judgments were objective,
mind-independent facts, they would motivate action through reason alone -
but since only passions (not reason) actually motivate us, this seems unlikely.
, - Therefore, it is more plausible that moral judgments are rooted in subjective
emotions rather than objective facts.
- Therefore, Hume famously claims that “reason is the slave of the passions”,
meaning that reason serves our desires and emotions rather than directing
them.
- Thus, Hume defends moral sentimentalism - the meta-ethical theory that our
moral judgments and distinctions are fundamentally rooted in human
emotion and sentiment, rather than pure reason.
- It argues that we determine right and wrong by observing our own feelings of
approbation or disapprobation, rather than discovering objective truths
through reason.
Society as the origin of our moral principles
- Hobbes argues that moral laws are not objective truths but are constructed
by society as part of the social contract.
- Hobbes imagines a hypothetical “state of nature” - a world where there is no
state or society and thus every man pursues what benefits them. It is a “war
of every man against every man” where life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish,
and short."
- In the state of nature, everyone lives in continuous fear for their life and
safety.
- Because of this, Hobbes argues that it is not rational to want to live in this
civilisation as there are no advantages compared to living in a society
governed by rules and social order.
- As rational and self-interested beings, individuals recognise that their own
survival is better secured through cooperation rather than conflict. This leads
them to agree to a social contract, in which they collectively give up some of
their natural freedoms and accept certain rules. These rules - such as
prohibitions against killing or stealing - form the basis of morality.
- Moral rules are created by society because they are necessary for social
order.
, - They are binding, not because they are inherently true but, because rational
individuals recognise that following them is in their own self-interest, as it
allows them to escape the dangers of the state of nature.
The distinction between cognitivism and non-cognitivism about ethical language.
- Cognitivism is the view that moral judgments express propositions about
reality which are capable of being truth-apt.
- This means that they are either true or false in the world.
- A cognitivist would say that the statement "murder is wrong" is a declarative
statement which presents truth-hood or false-hood
- Whereas, non-cognitivism is the view that moral judgements do not express
propositions that are truth-apt.
- A non-cognitivist would object that the statement "murder is wrong" is (a) a
proposition and (b) that it can be true or false.
- Instead, for example, an emotivist might suggest that when you utter
“murder is wrong” you are really referring to your emotional response of
disapproval to the judgment e.g "Boooooo murder!" which is neither
truth-apt or a proposition
Moral naturalism
- Moral naturalism presupposes cognitivism. Cognitivism is the view that moral
judgments express propositions about reality which are capable of being
truth-apt. This means that they are either true or false in the world.
- Moral naturalism also presupposes moral realism. Moral realism is the view
that mind-independent, objective moral properties/facts exist in the world.
When we use moral terms we refer to these properties/facts.
- Ethical naturalists claim that moral properties are just natural properties and
can be examined as such. They relate to something we can examine through
sense experience and science.
- Reductive moral naturalism claims that the things in one domain - moral
properties of goodness - are identical with some of the things in the other
domain.
- Kant is a rationalist and thus argues that we can gain synthetic (moral)
knowledge, a priori - through the application of reason.
- Thus Kant defends moral rationalism - the view that reason allows us to
understand the moral law, which sets the standard our actions should follow.
- This moral law isn’t invented by humans but discovered, in the same way we
discover laws of nature.
- Kant argues that moral principles must be universal and necessary to apply
to all rational agents equally
- Therefore, Kant argues that we should not rely upon an external authority
like the government to decide what is morally right or wrong for us.
- Moreover, we should not rely upon our feelings to determine the moral law
as our emotions are variable, heteronomous and uncontrollable, and thus
they cannot be praised as the basis of our moral motivation.
- Whereas, acting from reason is autonomous and thus can be morally praised
- Thus, reason is best source of universal and necessary moral laws which
apply equally to everyone
- We can use reason to discover duties through the Categorical Imperative
- For Kant, the maxims on which it would be morally permissible to act will be
rational and therefore universalisable and also require us to treat other
rational beings as ends in themselves, not merely as means.
Emotions as the origin of our moral principles
- Hume is an empiricist and thus argues that synthetic, moral knowledge is not
a priori (derived from reason) but a posteriori - derived specifically, from our
emotions or sentiments.
- Hume argues that reason alone cannot motivate action.
- Reason is limited to discovering matters of facts (what is the case) and
relations between ideas, but it cannot tell us what we ought to do - it cannot
determine matters of value.
- Moreover, Hume argues that if moral judgments were objective,
mind-independent facts, they would motivate action through reason alone -
but since only passions (not reason) actually motivate us, this seems unlikely.
, - Therefore, it is more plausible that moral judgments are rooted in subjective
emotions rather than objective facts.
- Therefore, Hume famously claims that “reason is the slave of the passions”,
meaning that reason serves our desires and emotions rather than directing
them.
- Thus, Hume defends moral sentimentalism - the meta-ethical theory that our
moral judgments and distinctions are fundamentally rooted in human
emotion and sentiment, rather than pure reason.
- It argues that we determine right and wrong by observing our own feelings of
approbation or disapprobation, rather than discovering objective truths
through reason.
Society as the origin of our moral principles
- Hobbes argues that moral laws are not objective truths but are constructed
by society as part of the social contract.
- Hobbes imagines a hypothetical “state of nature” - a world where there is no
state or society and thus every man pursues what benefits them. It is a “war
of every man against every man” where life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish,
and short."
- In the state of nature, everyone lives in continuous fear for their life and
safety.
- Because of this, Hobbes argues that it is not rational to want to live in this
civilisation as there are no advantages compared to living in a society
governed by rules and social order.
- As rational and self-interested beings, individuals recognise that their own
survival is better secured through cooperation rather than conflict. This leads
them to agree to a social contract, in which they collectively give up some of
their natural freedoms and accept certain rules. These rules - such as
prohibitions against killing or stealing - form the basis of morality.
- Moral rules are created by society because they are necessary for social
order.
, - They are binding, not because they are inherently true but, because rational
individuals recognise that following them is in their own self-interest, as it
allows them to escape the dangers of the state of nature.
The distinction between cognitivism and non-cognitivism about ethical language.
- Cognitivism is the view that moral judgments express propositions about
reality which are capable of being truth-apt.
- This means that they are either true or false in the world.
- A cognitivist would say that the statement "murder is wrong" is a declarative
statement which presents truth-hood or false-hood
- Whereas, non-cognitivism is the view that moral judgements do not express
propositions that are truth-apt.
- A non-cognitivist would object that the statement "murder is wrong" is (a) a
proposition and (b) that it can be true or false.
- Instead, for example, an emotivist might suggest that when you utter
“murder is wrong” you are really referring to your emotional response of
disapproval to the judgment e.g "Boooooo murder!" which is neither
truth-apt or a proposition
Moral naturalism
- Moral naturalism presupposes cognitivism. Cognitivism is the view that moral
judgments express propositions about reality which are capable of being
truth-apt. This means that they are either true or false in the world.
- Moral naturalism also presupposes moral realism. Moral realism is the view
that mind-independent, objective moral properties/facts exist in the world.
When we use moral terms we refer to these properties/facts.
- Ethical naturalists claim that moral properties are just natural properties and
can be examined as such. They relate to something we can examine through
sense experience and science.
- Reductive moral naturalism claims that the things in one domain - moral
properties of goodness - are identical with some of the things in the other
domain.
