MULTIPLE CHOICE QUESTIONS
1 Complete the maxim: Nemo pro parte …
(a) heriditas damnosa pro parte hereditas iacens decedere potest;
(b) testatus pro parte testatus decedere potest;
(c) intestatus pro parte succession in universitatem decedere potest;
(d) testatus vel per testamentum caltis comitiis decedere potest;
(e) testatus pro parte intestatus decedere potest.
2 In his will A bequeaths all his assets to B. In his will B bequeaths all his assets to C. D is A’s sole intestate heir
and E is B’s sole intestate heir. A and B both die in a plane accident and the Court finds that they died simultaneously. A’s
assets will be inherited by:
(a) B;
(b) C;
(c) D;
(d) E;
(e) D & E.
3 In the third and fourth parentelae an intestate estate is divided:
(a) per stirpes by representation;
(b) per capita according to the principle “de naaste bloed erf de goed”;
(c) per capita according to the principle “de bloedige hand neemt geen erf”;
(d) per stirpes according to the principle “de naaste bloed erf de goed”;
(e) per stirpes according to the principle “de bloedige hand neemt geen erf”.
4 The Court in Spies v Smith 1957 (1) SA 539 (A) confirmed that undue influence of a testator will cause:
(a) a displacement of the intention of the testator;
(b) a delegation of the testamentary capacity of the testator;
(c) a disruption of the intention of the testator;
(d) a amendment of the intention of the testator;
(e) none of the above.
5 The capacity to sign a will as a witness is known as:
(a) testamenti factio activa;
(b) testamenti factio relativa;
(c) testamenti factio passiva;
(d) testamenti factio signandi;
(e) testamenti factio attestandi.
,6 The pro forma certificate in Schedule 1 of the Wills Act 7 of 1953 makes provision for acknowledgment by the certifying
officer of the following:
(a) his/her capacity;
(b) the identity of the testator;
(c) that the will concerned is indeed the will of the testator;
(d) (a), (b) and (c);
(e) none of the above.
7 The following document(s) will (most probably) not be condoned by the Court in terms of s 2(3) of the Wills Act 7 of
1953 to be a valid will:
(a) a document drafted by deceased’s attorney but not signed by the deceased;
(b) a document drafted by the deceased as a “Word” document on his computer, thereafter printed out but not signed
by the deceased;
(c) a document drafted by the deceased’s daughter and signed by the deceased;
(d) a document drafted by the deceased but not signed by the deceased;
(e) (c) and (d).
8 Section 4A of the Wills Act 7 of 1953 does not disqualify the following person from being a beneficiary in terms of a will:
(a) witness;
(b) commissioner of oaths;
(c) writer of the will in his/her own handwriting;
(d) amanuensis;
(e) spouse of the witness.
9 The nomination of which of the following is not regarded as a benefit to be received by the nominee for purposes of
disqualification through participation in the execution of a will under s 4A(3) of the Wills Act 7 of 1953:
(a) a curator;
(b) an executor;
(c) a trustee;
(d) a guardian;
(e) none of the above.
10 In terms of the Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965 the will of a deceased must be handed in at:
(a) the High Court;
(b) the Attorney General;
(c) the Deeds Office;
(d) the Master of the High Court;
(e) the Registrar of the High Court.
, LONG QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Can a person who would be enriched by his or her crime, be allowed to inherit?
Discuss with reference to case law.
No, a person who would be enriched by his or her crime is not allowed to inherit in terms of the law of
succession. However, this rule is only applicable where there is a causal link between the crime and
the enrichment. In other words, the consequences of a person’s crime may not result in the
enrichment of that person. The test for a causal link was set out in the case of Ex parte Steenkamp
and Steenkamp (briefly state facts of the case).
The test is as follows: is the enrichment the direct result of the crime or, put differently, is it what one
could have reasonably foreseen as a natural result of the crime?
In the final instance, the court found that there was no causal relationship between the murder and
the enrichment. The court based its finding on the fact that the natural death of the child resulted in
the enrichment and not the murders of the grandparents.
(6)
The nature of the right of the fideicommissary in a fideicommissum (before the
fulfilment of the fideicommissary condition) is not altogether clear. Write a
concise note in which you explain the legal position in this regard.
Three possibilities regarding the nature of the right of a fideicommissary before the fulfilment of the
fideicommissary condition had already been raised: (i) it is merely a spes (a hope or expectation to
receive something in future); (ii) in the case of immovable property where the fideicommissum is
registered against the title deed, the fidecommissary has a real right; or (iii) the fidecommissary has a
personal right against the fiduciary. On the basis of available case law on the topic, it appears that
possibility (iii) enjoys the most support and would therefore probably be the correct option.
However, there is not agreement regarding the nature of this personal right. Here two possibilities
exist: the fideicommissary has a vested personal right, subject to a resolutive condition; or (ii) the
fideicommissary’s personal right against the fiduciary is not vested and is subject to a suspensive
condition. Both these possibilities would explan why no right will vest in the fideicommissary’s estate if
the latter dies before the fiduciary.
(5)
QUESTION 1
(a) Was the person who caused the death of the deceased in Gafin v Kavin 1980 (3) SA
1104 (W) regarded as unworthy to inherit? Explain your answer.
, In Gafin v Kavin 1980 (3) SA 1104 (W) the court found that the person in question was
not unworthy to inherit. The reason is that the court found that the person was mentally
ill and that he was consequently not accountable.
(2)
(b) T stipulates in her will: "I bequeath my house in Stellenbosch to my daughter A but she
only gets it 5 years after my death". What kind of bequest is this? When would,
respectively, dies cedit and dies venit arrive?
This is an example of a suspensive dies (term). A’s right to the house vests (dies cedit
arrives) at the time of the testator’s death, but it only becomes enforceable (dies venit
arrives) 5 years after the testator’s death.
(2)
(c) Did the court in Webb v Davis NO and Others 1998 (2) SA 975 (SCA) indicate the
contested testamentary provision as a suspensive condition or as a modus? Give any
two of the considerations which the court advanced for its view.
The court indicated the provision as a modus. The court advanced the following 4
considerations (of which you only have to mention 2): (i) the testator wanted Rodney to
register a mortgage bond over the property – something he would only be capable of doing
if he became owner of the property (in other words, received a vested right); (ii) the testator
contemplated that Rodney would continue to be involved in the running of the trading
station and that he would pay the R70 000 from the money earned in that way – and this is
inconsistent with the notion of a postponed vesting; (iii) the testator provided for payment to
be made over a lengthy period (7 years) – and it is unlikely that the testator contemplated
that Rodney would not have a vested right over the full 7 years; (iv) if any doubt remained,
there is the presumption that a provision attached to a bequest is a modus rather than a
suspensive condition.
(2)
(d) Why was it strictly speaking not necessary for the applicant in Ex parte Stranack 1974
(2) SA 692 (D) to approach the court for permission to sell the fideicommissary asset?
According to the facts of Ex parte Stranack 1974 (2) SA 692 (D) the applicant was already
the second successive fideicommissary who took transfer of the fideicommissary asset. In
terms of ss 6 and 7 of the Immvovable Property (Removal or Modification of Restrictions)
Act 94 of 1965, a fideicommissum comes to an automatic end at the transfer of the
fideicommissary property to the second successive fideicommissary.
(2)
(e) Briefly explain the difference between a “normal” fideicommissum and a
fideicommissum residui. What role does Justinian’s Novella 108 fulfil in the context of
the fideicommissum residui?
In terms of a “normal” fideicommissum a fiduciary has no power to alienate fideicommissary
assets; but in terms of a fideicommissum residui the fiduciary does have a power of
alienation. Justinian’s Novella 108 fulfils a role in circumstances where the scope of the
1 Complete the maxim: Nemo pro parte …
(a) heriditas damnosa pro parte hereditas iacens decedere potest;
(b) testatus pro parte testatus decedere potest;
(c) intestatus pro parte succession in universitatem decedere potest;
(d) testatus vel per testamentum caltis comitiis decedere potest;
(e) testatus pro parte intestatus decedere potest.
2 In his will A bequeaths all his assets to B. In his will B bequeaths all his assets to C. D is A’s sole intestate heir
and E is B’s sole intestate heir. A and B both die in a plane accident and the Court finds that they died simultaneously. A’s
assets will be inherited by:
(a) B;
(b) C;
(c) D;
(d) E;
(e) D & E.
3 In the third and fourth parentelae an intestate estate is divided:
(a) per stirpes by representation;
(b) per capita according to the principle “de naaste bloed erf de goed”;
(c) per capita according to the principle “de bloedige hand neemt geen erf”;
(d) per stirpes according to the principle “de naaste bloed erf de goed”;
(e) per stirpes according to the principle “de bloedige hand neemt geen erf”.
4 The Court in Spies v Smith 1957 (1) SA 539 (A) confirmed that undue influence of a testator will cause:
(a) a displacement of the intention of the testator;
(b) a delegation of the testamentary capacity of the testator;
(c) a disruption of the intention of the testator;
(d) a amendment of the intention of the testator;
(e) none of the above.
5 The capacity to sign a will as a witness is known as:
(a) testamenti factio activa;
(b) testamenti factio relativa;
(c) testamenti factio passiva;
(d) testamenti factio signandi;
(e) testamenti factio attestandi.
,6 The pro forma certificate in Schedule 1 of the Wills Act 7 of 1953 makes provision for acknowledgment by the certifying
officer of the following:
(a) his/her capacity;
(b) the identity of the testator;
(c) that the will concerned is indeed the will of the testator;
(d) (a), (b) and (c);
(e) none of the above.
7 The following document(s) will (most probably) not be condoned by the Court in terms of s 2(3) of the Wills Act 7 of
1953 to be a valid will:
(a) a document drafted by deceased’s attorney but not signed by the deceased;
(b) a document drafted by the deceased as a “Word” document on his computer, thereafter printed out but not signed
by the deceased;
(c) a document drafted by the deceased’s daughter and signed by the deceased;
(d) a document drafted by the deceased but not signed by the deceased;
(e) (c) and (d).
8 Section 4A of the Wills Act 7 of 1953 does not disqualify the following person from being a beneficiary in terms of a will:
(a) witness;
(b) commissioner of oaths;
(c) writer of the will in his/her own handwriting;
(d) amanuensis;
(e) spouse of the witness.
9 The nomination of which of the following is not regarded as a benefit to be received by the nominee for purposes of
disqualification through participation in the execution of a will under s 4A(3) of the Wills Act 7 of 1953:
(a) a curator;
(b) an executor;
(c) a trustee;
(d) a guardian;
(e) none of the above.
10 In terms of the Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965 the will of a deceased must be handed in at:
(a) the High Court;
(b) the Attorney General;
(c) the Deeds Office;
(d) the Master of the High Court;
(e) the Registrar of the High Court.
, LONG QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Can a person who would be enriched by his or her crime, be allowed to inherit?
Discuss with reference to case law.
No, a person who would be enriched by his or her crime is not allowed to inherit in terms of the law of
succession. However, this rule is only applicable where there is a causal link between the crime and
the enrichment. In other words, the consequences of a person’s crime may not result in the
enrichment of that person. The test for a causal link was set out in the case of Ex parte Steenkamp
and Steenkamp (briefly state facts of the case).
The test is as follows: is the enrichment the direct result of the crime or, put differently, is it what one
could have reasonably foreseen as a natural result of the crime?
In the final instance, the court found that there was no causal relationship between the murder and
the enrichment. The court based its finding on the fact that the natural death of the child resulted in
the enrichment and not the murders of the grandparents.
(6)
The nature of the right of the fideicommissary in a fideicommissum (before the
fulfilment of the fideicommissary condition) is not altogether clear. Write a
concise note in which you explain the legal position in this regard.
Three possibilities regarding the nature of the right of a fideicommissary before the fulfilment of the
fideicommissary condition had already been raised: (i) it is merely a spes (a hope or expectation to
receive something in future); (ii) in the case of immovable property where the fideicommissum is
registered against the title deed, the fidecommissary has a real right; or (iii) the fidecommissary has a
personal right against the fiduciary. On the basis of available case law on the topic, it appears that
possibility (iii) enjoys the most support and would therefore probably be the correct option.
However, there is not agreement regarding the nature of this personal right. Here two possibilities
exist: the fideicommissary has a vested personal right, subject to a resolutive condition; or (ii) the
fideicommissary’s personal right against the fiduciary is not vested and is subject to a suspensive
condition. Both these possibilities would explan why no right will vest in the fideicommissary’s estate if
the latter dies before the fiduciary.
(5)
QUESTION 1
(a) Was the person who caused the death of the deceased in Gafin v Kavin 1980 (3) SA
1104 (W) regarded as unworthy to inherit? Explain your answer.
, In Gafin v Kavin 1980 (3) SA 1104 (W) the court found that the person in question was
not unworthy to inherit. The reason is that the court found that the person was mentally
ill and that he was consequently not accountable.
(2)
(b) T stipulates in her will: "I bequeath my house in Stellenbosch to my daughter A but she
only gets it 5 years after my death". What kind of bequest is this? When would,
respectively, dies cedit and dies venit arrive?
This is an example of a suspensive dies (term). A’s right to the house vests (dies cedit
arrives) at the time of the testator’s death, but it only becomes enforceable (dies venit
arrives) 5 years after the testator’s death.
(2)
(c) Did the court in Webb v Davis NO and Others 1998 (2) SA 975 (SCA) indicate the
contested testamentary provision as a suspensive condition or as a modus? Give any
two of the considerations which the court advanced for its view.
The court indicated the provision as a modus. The court advanced the following 4
considerations (of which you only have to mention 2): (i) the testator wanted Rodney to
register a mortgage bond over the property – something he would only be capable of doing
if he became owner of the property (in other words, received a vested right); (ii) the testator
contemplated that Rodney would continue to be involved in the running of the trading
station and that he would pay the R70 000 from the money earned in that way – and this is
inconsistent with the notion of a postponed vesting; (iii) the testator provided for payment to
be made over a lengthy period (7 years) – and it is unlikely that the testator contemplated
that Rodney would not have a vested right over the full 7 years; (iv) if any doubt remained,
there is the presumption that a provision attached to a bequest is a modus rather than a
suspensive condition.
(2)
(d) Why was it strictly speaking not necessary for the applicant in Ex parte Stranack 1974
(2) SA 692 (D) to approach the court for permission to sell the fideicommissary asset?
According to the facts of Ex parte Stranack 1974 (2) SA 692 (D) the applicant was already
the second successive fideicommissary who took transfer of the fideicommissary asset. In
terms of ss 6 and 7 of the Immvovable Property (Removal or Modification of Restrictions)
Act 94 of 1965, a fideicommissum comes to an automatic end at the transfer of the
fideicommissary property to the second successive fideicommissary.
(2)
(e) Briefly explain the difference between a “normal” fideicommissum and a
fideicommissum residui. What role does Justinian’s Novella 108 fulfil in the context of
the fideicommissum residui?
In terms of a “normal” fideicommissum a fiduciary has no power to alienate fideicommissary
assets; but in terms of a fideicommissum residui the fiduciary does have a power of
alienation. Justinian’s Novella 108 fulfils a role in circumstances where the scope of the
