Edrftgyihu jiuh
ST TU
Strategy: An Introduction to
UV V
S
Game Theory, 3rd Edition
INSTRUCTOR'S
IAIA
MANUAL
?_?_
AAP
Joel Watson
Comprehensive Instructor's Manual
PPPR
for Instructors and Students
ROOV
||| ||| || ||| || | || ||| | || ||| |
9780393918380
VE D
© Joel Watson. All rights reserved. Reproduction
E
or distribution without permission is prohibited.
D? ?
?
© MEDGEEK
,ST TU
Contents
UV V
S
I General Materials 7
II Chapter-Specific Materials 12
1 Introduction 13
IAIA
2 The Extensive Form 15
3 Strategies and the Normal Form 18
?_?_
4 Beliefs, Mixed Strategies,
and Expected Payoffs 21
5 General Assumptions and Methodology 23
AAP
6 Dominance and Best Response 24
7 Rationalizability and Iterated Dominance 27
8 Location, Partnership, and Social Unrest 29
PPPR
9 Nash Equilibrium 32
10 Oligopoly, Tariffs, Crime, and Voting 34
11 Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium 35
ROOV
12 Strictly Competitive Games
and Security Strategies 37
13 Contract, Law, and Enforcement
in Static Settings 38
VE D
14 Details of the Extensive Form 41
E
15 Sequential Rationality
and Subgame Perfection 43
D? ?
16 Topics in Industrial Organization 45
17 Parlor Games 46
?
3
Instructor's Manual for Strategy: Copyright 2002, 2008, 2010, 2013 by Joel Watson.
An Introduction to Game Theory For instructors only; do not distribute.
,ST TU CONTENTS 4
18 Bargaining Problems 48
UV V
19 Analysis of Simple Bargaining Games 50
S
20 Games with Joint Decisions;
Negotiation Equilibrium 52
21 Unverifiable Investment, hold up,
Options, and Ownership 54
IAIA
22 Repeated Games and Reputation 56
23 Collusion, Trade Agreements,
and Goodwill 58
?_?_
24 Random Events and
Incomplete Information 60
25 Risk and Incentives in Contracting 63
AAP
26 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
and Rationalizability 65
27 Lemons, Auctions,
and Information Aggregation 66
PPPR
28 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 68
29 Job-Market Signaling and Reputation 70
ROOV
30 Appendices 71
III Solutions to the Exercises 72
2 The Extensive Form 73
VE D
3 Strategies and the Normal Form 76
E
4 Beliefs, Mixed Strategies,
and Expected Payoffs 79
D? ?
6 Dominance and best response 80
7 Rationalizability and Iterated Dominance 81
?
Instructor's Manual for Strategy: Copyright 2002, 2008, 2010, 2013 by Joel Watson.
An Introduction to Game Theory For instructors only; do not distribute.
,ST TU CONTENTS 5
8 Location, Partnership, and Social Unrest 83
UV V
9 Nash Equilibrium 86
S
10 Oligopoly, Tariffs, Crime, and Voting 89
11 Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium 95
12 Strictly Competitive Games
IAIA
and Security Strategies 102
13 Contract, Law, and Enforcement
in Static Settings 103
?_?_
14 Details of the Extensive Form 108
15 Sequential Rationality
and Subgame Perfection 110
AAP
16 Topics in Industrial Organization 114
17 Parlor Games 117
18 Bargaining Problems 119
PPPR
19 Analysis of Simple Bargaining Games 121
20 Games with Joint Decisions;
Negotiation Equilibrium 123
ROOV
21 Unverifiable Investment, Hold Up,
Options, and Ownership 127
22 Repeated Games and Reputation 131
23 Collusion, Trade Agreements,
VE D
and Goodwill 135
24 Random Events and
E
Incomplete Information 138
D? ?
25 Risk and Incentives in Contracting 140
26 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
and Rationalizability 142
?
Instructor's Manual for Strategy: Copyright 2002, 2008, 2010, 2013 by Joel Watson.
An Introduction to Game Theory For instructors only; do not distribute.
ST TU
Strategy: An Introduction to
UV V
S
Game Theory, 3rd Edition
INSTRUCTOR'S
IAIA
MANUAL
?_?_
AAP
Joel Watson
Comprehensive Instructor's Manual
PPPR
for Instructors and Students
ROOV
||| ||| || ||| || | || ||| | || ||| |
9780393918380
VE D
© Joel Watson. All rights reserved. Reproduction
E
or distribution without permission is prohibited.
D? ?
?
© MEDGEEK
,ST TU
Contents
UV V
S
I General Materials 7
II Chapter-Specific Materials 12
1 Introduction 13
IAIA
2 The Extensive Form 15
3 Strategies and the Normal Form 18
?_?_
4 Beliefs, Mixed Strategies,
and Expected Payoffs 21
5 General Assumptions and Methodology 23
AAP
6 Dominance and Best Response 24
7 Rationalizability and Iterated Dominance 27
8 Location, Partnership, and Social Unrest 29
PPPR
9 Nash Equilibrium 32
10 Oligopoly, Tariffs, Crime, and Voting 34
11 Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium 35
ROOV
12 Strictly Competitive Games
and Security Strategies 37
13 Contract, Law, and Enforcement
in Static Settings 38
VE D
14 Details of the Extensive Form 41
E
15 Sequential Rationality
and Subgame Perfection 43
D? ?
16 Topics in Industrial Organization 45
17 Parlor Games 46
?
3
Instructor's Manual for Strategy: Copyright 2002, 2008, 2010, 2013 by Joel Watson.
An Introduction to Game Theory For instructors only; do not distribute.
,ST TU CONTENTS 4
18 Bargaining Problems 48
UV V
19 Analysis of Simple Bargaining Games 50
S
20 Games with Joint Decisions;
Negotiation Equilibrium 52
21 Unverifiable Investment, hold up,
Options, and Ownership 54
IAIA
22 Repeated Games and Reputation 56
23 Collusion, Trade Agreements,
and Goodwill 58
?_?_
24 Random Events and
Incomplete Information 60
25 Risk and Incentives in Contracting 63
AAP
26 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
and Rationalizability 65
27 Lemons, Auctions,
and Information Aggregation 66
PPPR
28 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 68
29 Job-Market Signaling and Reputation 70
ROOV
30 Appendices 71
III Solutions to the Exercises 72
2 The Extensive Form 73
VE D
3 Strategies and the Normal Form 76
E
4 Beliefs, Mixed Strategies,
and Expected Payoffs 79
D? ?
6 Dominance and best response 80
7 Rationalizability and Iterated Dominance 81
?
Instructor's Manual for Strategy: Copyright 2002, 2008, 2010, 2013 by Joel Watson.
An Introduction to Game Theory For instructors only; do not distribute.
,ST TU CONTENTS 5
8 Location, Partnership, and Social Unrest 83
UV V
9 Nash Equilibrium 86
S
10 Oligopoly, Tariffs, Crime, and Voting 89
11 Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium 95
12 Strictly Competitive Games
IAIA
and Security Strategies 102
13 Contract, Law, and Enforcement
in Static Settings 103
?_?_
14 Details of the Extensive Form 108
15 Sequential Rationality
and Subgame Perfection 110
AAP
16 Topics in Industrial Organization 114
17 Parlor Games 117
18 Bargaining Problems 119
PPPR
19 Analysis of Simple Bargaining Games 121
20 Games with Joint Decisions;
Negotiation Equilibrium 123
ROOV
21 Unverifiable Investment, Hold Up,
Options, and Ownership 127
22 Repeated Games and Reputation 131
23 Collusion, Trade Agreements,
VE D
and Goodwill 135
24 Random Events and
E
Incomplete Information 138
D? ?
25 Risk and Incentives in Contracting 140
26 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
and Rationalizability 142
?
Instructor's Manual for Strategy: Copyright 2002, 2008, 2010, 2013 by Joel Watson.
An Introduction to Game Theory For instructors only; do not distribute.
