Spēd Sfpc: All Areas Questions And Correct Answers

SPĒD SFPC: ALL AREAS QUESTIONS
AND CORRECT ANSWERS
PrincipleA2incident/
eventsA2requiredA2toA2beA2reportedA2toA2DoDA2counterintelligenceA2(CI)A2organizationsA2-
A2Ans--espionage,A2sabotage,A2terrorism,A2cyber


IndicatorsA2ofA2insiderA2threatsA2-A2Ans--
1.A2FailureA2toA2reportA2overseasA2travelA2orA2contactA2withA2foreignA2nationals

2.A2SeekingA2toA2gainA2higherA2clearanceA2orA2expandA2accessA2outsideA2theA2jobA2scope

3.A2EngagingA2inA2classifiedA2conversationsA2withoutA2aA2needA2toA2know

4.A2WorkingA2hoursA2inconsistentA2withA2jobA2assignmentA2orA2insistenceA2onA2workingA2i
nA2private

5.A2ExploitableA2behaviorA2traitsA2

6.A2RepeatedA2securityA2violations

7.A2AttemptingA2toA2enterA2areasA2notA2grantedA2accessA2to

8.A2UnexplainableA2affluence/livingA2aboveA2one'sA2means

9.A2AnomaliesA2(adversaryA2takingA2actionsA2whichA2indicateA2theyA2areA2knowledgeableA
2toA2information)


10.A2IllegalA2downloadsA2ofA2information/files

ElementsA2that
shouldA2beA2consideredA2in
identifyingA2CriticalA2Program
InformationA2-A2Ans--ElementsA2whichA2ifA2compromisedA2could:A2
1.A2causeA2significantA2degradationA2inA2missionA2effectiveness,
2.A2shortenA2theA2expectedA2combat-effectiveA2lifeA2ofA2theA2system
3.A2reduceA2technologicalA2advantageA2
4.A2significantlyA2alterA2programA2direction;A2orA2
5.A2enableA2anA2adversaryA2toA2defeat,A2counter,A2copy,A2orA2reverseengineerA2theA2tech
nologyA2orA2capability.

asset,A2threat,A2vulnerability,A2risk,A2countermeasuresA2-A2Ans--ElementsA2thatA2a
securityA2professionalA2should

,considerA2whenA2assessingA2and
managingA2risksA2toA2DoDA2assets

TheA2threeA2categoriesA2of
SpecialA2AccessA2ProgramsA2-A2Ans--
acquisition,A2intelligence,A2andA2operationsA2andA2support

ThreeA2differentA2types
ofA2threatsA2toA2classified
informationA2-A2Ans--
InsiderA2Threat,A2ForeignA2IntelligenceA2EntitiesA2(FIE)A2andA2CybersecurityA2Threat

TheA2conceptA2ofA2anA2insiderA2threatA2-A2Ans--
AnA2employeeA2whoA2mayA2representA2aA2threatA2to
nationalA2security.A2TheseA2threatsA2encompassA2potentialA2espionage,A2violentA2actsA2a
gainstA2theA2GovernmentA2orA2theA2nation,A2andA2unauthorizedA2disclosureA2ofA2classified
A2information,A2includingA2theA2vastA2amountsA2ofA2classifiedA2dataA2availableA2onA2interc
onnectedA2UnitedA2StatesA2GovernmentA2computerA2networksA2andA2systems.

TheA2purposeA2ofA2the
ForeignA2VisitorA2ProgramA2-A2Ans--
ToA2trackA2andA2approveA2accessA2byA2aA2foreignA2entityA2toA2informationA2thatA2isA2classi
fied;A2andA2toA2approveA2accessA2byA2aA2foreignA2entityA2toA2informationA2thatA2isA2unclas
sified,A2relatedA2toA2aA2U.S.A2GovernmentA2contract,A2orA2plantA2visitsA2coveredA2byA2ITA
R.

SpecialA2Access
ProgramA2-A2Ans--AA2programA2establishedA2forA2aA2specificA2classA2of
classifiedA2informationA2thatA2imposesA2safeguardingA2andA2accessA2requirementsA2thatA2
exceedA2thoseA2normallyA2requiredA2forA2informationA2atA2theA2sameA2classificationA2level
.

EnhancedA2securityA2requirementsA2forA2protectingA2SpecialA2AccessA2ProgramA2(SAP)A2i
nformationA2-A2Ans--WithinA2PersonnelA2Security:
•A2AccessA2Rosters;
•A2BilletA2StructuresA2(ifA2required);
•A2IndoctrinationA2Agreement;
•A2ClearanceA2basedA2onA2anA2appropriateA2investigationA2completedA2withinA2theA2lastA25
years;
•A2IndividualA2mustA2materiallyA2contributeA2toA2theA2programA2inA2additionA2toA2havingA2th
e
needA2toA2know;
•A2AllA2individualsA2withA2accessA2toA2SAPA2areA2subjectA2toA2aA2randomA2counterintellige
nceA2scope
polygraphA2examination;
•A2PolygraphA2examination,A2ifA2approvedA2byA2theA2DepSecDef,A2mayA2beA2usedA2asA2a

, mandatoryA2accessA2determination;
•A2TierA2reviewA2process;
•A2PersonnelA2mustA2haveA2aA2SecretA2orA2TopA2SecretA2clearance;
•A2SF-86A2mustA2beA2currentA2withinA2oneA2year;
•A2LimitedA2Access;
•A2WaiversA2requiredA2forA2foreignA2cohabitants,A2spouses,A2andA2immediateA2family
members.
WithinA2IndustrialA2Security:
TheA2SecDefA2orA2DepSecDefA2canA2approveA2aA2carve-
outA2provisionA2toA2relieveA2Defense
SecurityA2ServiceA2ofA2industrialA2securityA2oversightA2responsibilities.
WithinA2PhysicalA2Security:
•A2AccessA2Control;
•A2MaintainA2aA2SAPA2Facility;
•A2AccessA2Roster;
•A2AllA2SAPsA2mustA2haveA2anA2unclassifiedA2nickname/A2CodewordA2(optional).
WithinA2InformationA2Security:
•A2TheA2useA2ofA2HVSACO;
•A2TransmissionA2requirementsA2(orderA2ofA2precedence).

ResponsibilitiesA2ofA2theA2GovernmentA2SAPA2SecurityA2Officer/ContractorA2Program
SecurityA2OfficerA2(GSSO/
CPSO)A2-A2Ans--
FromA2RevisionA21A2DepartmentA2ofA2DefenseA2OverprintA2toA2theA2National
IndustrialA2SecurityA2ProgramA2OperatingA2ManualA2SupplementA2-A21A2April
2004:
•A2PossessA2aA2personnelA2clearanceA2andA2ProgramA2accessA2atA2leastA2equalA2to
theA2highestA2levelA2ofA2ProgramA2classifiedA2informationA2involved.
•A2ProvideA2securityA2administrationA2andA2managementA2forA2his/her
organization.
•A2EnsureA2personnelA2processedA2forA2accessA2toA2aA2SAPA2meetA2theA2prerequisite
personnelA2clearanceA2and/orA2investigativeA2requirementsA2specified.
•A2EnsureA2adequateA2secureA2storageA2andA2workA2spaces.
•A2EnsureA2strictA2adherenceA2toA2theA2provisionsA2ofA2theA2NISPOM,A2its
supplement,A2andA2theA2Overprint.
•A2WhenA2required,A2establishA2andA2overseeA2aA2classifiedA2materialA2control
programA2forA2eachA2SAP.
•A2WhenA2required,A2conductA2anA2annualA2inventoryA2ofA2accountable
classifiedA2material.
•A2WhenA2required,A2establishA2aA2SAPF.
•A2EstablishA2andA2overseeA2aA2visitorA2controlA2program.
•A2MonitorA2reproductionA2and/orA2duplicationA2andA2destructionA2capability
ofA2SAPA2information
•A2EnsureA2adherenceA2toA2specialA2communicationsA2capabilitiesA2withinA2the
SAPF.
•A2ProvideA2forA2initialA2ProgramA2indoctrinationA2ofA2employeesA2afterA2their