PLS1502 The African Philosophy Reader 2nd edition.

PLS1502The African Philosophy Reader 2nd edition. The African Philosophy Reader Second edition A text with readings EDITED BY P.H.COETZEE AND A.P.J.ROUX First published in Great Britain in 1998 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane London EC4P 4EE Second edition published in 2003 by Routledge 29 West 35th Street New York, NY 1001 Second edition published in Great Britain in 2003 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane London EC4P 4EE Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group. This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eB”. By arrangement with Oxford University Press of Southern Africa. Published in Southern Africa in 2003 by Oxford University Press of Southern Africa PO Box 12119, N1 City, 7463, Cape Town, South Africa © 2002 Oxford University Press of Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd All rights reserved. No part of this work covered by the copyright hereon may be reproduced or used in any form or by any means—graphic, electronic, or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, taping or information storage and retrieval system—without the written permission of the Publisher. While every precaution has been taken in the preparation of this book, the Publisher and Authors assume no responsibility for errors or omissions, or for damages resulting from the use of information contained herein. In no event shall the Publisher and the Authors be liable for any loss of profit or any other commercial damage, including but not limited to special, incidental, consequential, or other damages. All reasonable efforts have been made to trace the copyright holders. Should any outstanding copyright holders exist, the Publisher would be grateful to be notified. It undertakes to amend the omission in the event of a reprint. Cover design by Brigitte L’Estrange Reproduction by Castle Graphics Cover reproduction by The Image Bureau Cataloging-in-Publication data is available from the Library of Congress ISBN 0-203-49322-2 Master e-book ISBN ISBN 0-203-57926-7 (Adobe e-Reader Format) ISBN 0-415-96809-7 (Print Edition) CONTENTS Preface vii Preface to the first edition xii Acknowledgements xv Copyright acknowledgements xvi Chapter 1 Discourses on Africa 1 Chapter 2 Trends in African philosophy 115 Chapter 3 Metaphysical thinking in Africa 192 Chapter 4 Epistemology and the tradition in Africa 259 Chapter 5 Morality in African thought 321 Chapter 6 Race and gender 402 Chapter 7 Justice and restitution in African political thought 541 Chapter 8 Africa in the global context 641 Index 763 PREFACE The second edition of this book is a celebration of the success that the Department of Philosophy at the University of South Africa has had with its efforts to advance the cause of African Philosophy in South Africa after the Apartheid Era. The University of South Africa has generously funded the manuscript preparation of the first and the second editions. This is a demonstration of several things. In the first instance, it is a sign of the University’s determination to reform its academic curricula. It is also, secondly, a demonstration of the role the University plays in informing the philosophical community in South Africa and elsewhere of philosophical endeavour in Africa. And, thirdly, in a wide sense, it is a demonstration of the University’s commitment to our South African society. In this regard this edition, like the first, celebrates African culture, thus contributing towards the fulfilment of the University’s social obligations. The second edition is a venture by the editors, Pieter Coetzee and Abraham Roux, from the University of South Africa, and colleagues from elsewhere, including the historically disadvantaged universities in South Africa and universities in Botswana, Ghana, Nigeria, the Benin Republic, Malawi, Kenya, and the Gold Coast. Echoing among the viewpoints of the contributors that come from the length and breadth of the continent and the diaspora are a number of Africa’s most powerful voices, Léopold Senghor, Steve Biko, Kwasi Wiredu, Paulin Hountondji, Abiola Irele, Henry Odera Oruka, Tsenay Serequeberhan, Ngugi Wa Thiong’o, Lucius Outlaw, Kwame Anthony Appiah, Ali Mazrui and, Wole Soyinka. Of the 37 contributors 33 are black Africans speaking for themselves on the topical issues of: • decolonization • Afrocentrism in conflict with Eurocentrism • the struggle for cultural freedoms in Africa • the historic role of black consciousness in the struggle for liberation • restitution and reconciliation in the context of Africa’s post-colonial situation • justice for Africa in the context of globalization • the pressures on the tradition of philosophy in Africa engendered by the challenges of modernity • the reconstitution of the African self in its relation to changing community • the African epistemological paradigm in conflict with the Western • the continuity of religion and metaphysics in African thought. The second edition contains additional themes on gender and race—in particular feminist critiques of cultural essentialism, the invention of the ‘African’ woman, and the political morality of race—and on Africa’s place in the global context. The book is structured in the form of eight introductory essays and an accompanying cluster of ‘readings’. A kind of antiphony, a call and response technique containing dominant and discordant voices, allows white and black South African viewpoints to engage with viewpoints from francophone and anglophone Africa. This is a very complex interaction. It raises complex problems concerning the relationship between black academics and Western knowledge systems seen in the context of Africa’s challenge to the hegemony of Western philosophical notions, and the mistaken perception that the whole enterprise of philosophy in Africa is neo- rather than post-colonial. One fundamental problem is that of identity: shifting, fluctuating—the identities of writers in and of Africa may be said to be in a state of betweenness, simultaneously inhabiting two worlds. Collectively, the readings demonstrate the phenomenon of hybridity, enacting a post-colonial métissage, blending and blurring old distinctions, dismantling the cordon sanitaire of the colonial world that led to the need for reconstruction initiatives in Africa. The editors wish to restate the intention they expressed in the first edition. The second edition is intended to present the philosophical debate in Africa to a multicultural audience in such a way that it is understandable in terms of various world-views and life experiences, and so that it brings philosophical themes into play with existential problems. In this regard Biakolo’s essay ‘Cross-cultural cognition and the African condition’ is enlightening. Biakolo identifies the ethnocentrism that lies at the centre o f the European Invention’ of Africa, revealing, at the same time, the binarist mode of thought that produces stereotypical oppositions such as those between savage and civilized, prelogical and logical, oral and written, magical and scientific. Biakolo unveils the devastating implications of the Lévy-Bruhlian notion of Africans’ ‘prelogical mentality’ that underlies racist dimissals of Africa and the setting up of development models whose effectiveness is strongly disputed in the market place. Ramose’s introductory reading, ‘The struggle for reason in Africa’ picks up the point of letting Africans speak for themselves. This too is a timely reminder to any good (white) man (or woman) in Africa to be particularly circumspect when entering the domain of African thinking. Chapter 1 deals with a question raised particularly and poignantly by non-Africans. This is the question of whether or not Africans are really human beings. Non-Africans replied that Africans cannot be and are not real human beings despite their human-like appearance. The basis for this answer was Aristotle’s definition of ‘man’ as ‘a rational animal’. According to this definition to be rational was to be human. On this basis the African was excluded for centuries from the category of the rational. The African was thus not a human being. Despite the success of many ethical and scientific theories arguing against the restrictive interpretation of Aristotle, the conviction of the nonAfricans that the African is not a human being proper continues to live with us even in our time. But the African knows otherwise and has decided no longer to take the conviction of the non-Africans seriously. The readings contained in Chapter 1 testify, each in their own way, that Africans do not wish to entertain any doubt about their being human. The humanity of the African is second to none. Chapter 2 deals with trends in African Philosophy from two perspectives: On the one hand, readers are introduced to various trends as distinguished by different authors, and on the other, they are given an idea of debates on issues raised by such classifications. A central issue in African Philosophy is its definition and this forms the basis of the differentiation of trends and of the evaluation of such distinctions. Henry Odera Oruka was the first to attempt a classification. His fourfold classification (see the Oruka reading), ethnophilosophy, sage philosophy, ideological-nationalistic philosophy, and professional philosophy, is severely criticized as being either flawed or too limited. Outlaw (see the reading by him) mentions other suggested classifications. Hountondji accuses Oruka of working with an unacceptable definition of African Philosophy and in this regard he argues against ethnophilosophy as philosophy and thus as part of African Philosophy. With this criticism Hountondji started an ongoing debate about the status of African Philosophy, the status and value of ethnophilosophy, and the position of Placide Tempels in African Philosophy. In the introduction to the chapter, Moya Deacon accepts Oruka’s classification as a starting-point, paints a sympathetic picture of Tempels and evaluates his contribution to African Philosophy positively. In the reading by Hountondji the opposite view is expressed, whereas Outlaw, though critical, does not reject ethnophilosophy completely. In the reading by Irele views on African Philosophy in francophone Africa get attention. In this, the important contribution by Senghor, the development of Négritude is highlighted. The readers are thus drawn into a wide-ranging discussion of what African Philosophy is and how it relates to colonialism and Western Philosophy. Chapter 3 takes up issues in African metaphysics. Metaphysics concerns itself with questions and arguments about ‘ultimate reality’, that is, that which ‘exists/acts’ behind our experiences and provides the ground for such experiences. Questions such as ‘How are we to explain the fact that bad things happen to good people?’, ‘that despite changes a person remains the same person?’, ‘that there is a world?’, etc. figure here. Africans have their own ‘theories’ about all these phenomena and critical discussion of such views forms a large part of metaphysical thinking in African Philosophy. In the introduction witchcraft gets some detailed attention and this is followed up only indirectly in the readings. For instance, Sogolo distinguishes between secondary causation which comprises ordinary material causation—lightning causing a veldfire—and primary (teleological) causation where an objective (aim) comes into play. This distinction then forms a basis for an understanding of traditional health practices and beliefs about witchcraft. Oladipo shows how the categories of African metaphysics are permeated by religious ideas. Teffo and Roux warn that ‘miscommunication’ results when African concepts such as personality are dealt with in a Western way. In the reading by Gbadegesin the focus is on the concept of person in the Yoruba conceptual scheme, but the family of concepts which figure in talk about a person gets attention: God, body, mind, soul, personality, destiny. He also contrasts the Yoruba concepts in this area with those of the Akan. Okolo argues that in contrast to the Western notion of person, which centres on the individual, the African notion is community based. Chapter 4 takes up questions dealing with African epistemology. In asking whethe r there is a uniquely African form of knowing, Malherbe and Kaphagawani position themselves somewhat pragmatically between a relativist and universalist position. Eschewing the idea of a homogeneous African culture, the authors advance, instead, the notion of ‘Contemporary confluence of cultures on the Continent’, thereby subscribing to prevailing post-colonial notions of hybridity and syncretism. Cross-cultural discourse is characterized, if nothing else, by borrowing, for, as Bakhtin asserts, ‘the word in language is half someone else’s’. This observation is freshly clarified in Wiredu’s analysis of the concept of truth in the Akan language: he shows how a little knowledge can be a dangerously distorting thing in cross-linguistic exchange. In dealing with the problems of cross-cultural knowing and truth, Sogolo demonstrates that a sine qua non of understanding is the application of Davidson’s normative Principle of Charity: ‘whether we like it or not, if we want to understand others, we must count them in most matters’. Chapter 5 deals broadly with themes in the moral context. The chapter elaborates on the theme of particularity with particular reference to Wiredu’s work, developing the theme in the context of the kinship structures of the Akans of Ghana, and shows, broadly, how the opinions and needs of kin groups ultimately come to be expressed, via consensus, in the political structures of civil society. The chapter introduces the problem of the relationship between individual and community, which Wiredu and Gyekye develop, providing interesting insight into the Akan notion of kinship and the rights and obligations which arise from this, citing the example of sympathy towards foreigners who are perceived as being deprived of kinship support. This is a manifestation of what Ramose refers to as ubuntu. The role of rights and duties within the framework of a communitarian ethos is explicated by Wiredu, whose readings offer a salutary alternative to the alienated self of Western culture. Chapter 6 examines issues relating to women and race. At the time of the demise o f apartheid, South African women, assuming that they must have a common bond, made several unsuccessful attempts to find consensus for the fight against gender discrimination, However, instead of uniting the delegates, these meetings resulted in bitter recriminations and unfortunate racial divisions. Retrospective analysis of the context in which these took place reveals that the misunderstandings were based largely on an inadequate understanding of how the complex intertwining of race and gender resulted in totally different forms of oppression. This is an attempt to clarify the historical and conceptual reasons for the variation and as a result to show why gender cannot be isolated from race. In addition, once it can be seen that feminism has moved away from its early roots in middle-class mainly white academia, it is possible to appreciate that its aims, instead of marginalizing African women, have become remarkably similar to those articulated in the vision of the twenty-first century becoming the African century. Hence, feminists in South Africa should take the lead not only in ensuring reconciliation between races but also in consolidating the communal values that are embedded in the spirit of the African Renaissance. Chapter 7 deals with the question of justice for Africa. It pursues this question from the points of view of moral, legal, and political philosophy. Taking the unjustified violence of colonization as its point of departure, it questions the morality of colonization. Part of the argument in this connection is that the violence of colonization cannot be justified on the basis of the just war doctrine. In consequence, it rejects the doctrine of the ‘right of conquest’. This rejection is situated particularly within the context of historic titles in law. It is under this rubric that the moral exigencies of restoration, restitution, and compensation are underlined as questions of fundamental justice that must be answered positively and practically in favour of the indigenous conquered peoples. Without this the political mechanism of reconciliation, after the granting of defective sovereignty to the indigenous conquered peoples, shall remain hollow and problematic, as Mandaza’s reading shows. Precisely because the ‘right of conquest’ and its consequences continue to be contested by the indigenous conquered peoples, Hountondji’s reading against the view that the conqueror holds the sole, superior, and exclusive right to define the meaning of experience, knowledge, and truth is particularly pertinent. In the sphere of politics this monopolization of knowledge and truth manifests itself in many ways, as the readings of both Mazrui and Osaghae show. Cumulatively, the readings show that for as long as justice is denied to Africa, justice in Africa will remain systematically elusive. This will render world peace academic and problematical. Chapter 8 is the continuation of the theme of justice for Africa. It is a panoramic view of this theme in the light of the African experience on the global scale. Its strength lies in the fact that it problematizes the question of justice for Africa in the light of contemporary experiences. Thus the question of African identity is dealt with in the context of the meaning of cosmopolitanism. This is raised also by reference to the meaning of Négritude in so far as it has promoted or can promote the cause of justice for Africa. Alienation also comes on board in the explication of the question of justice for Africa especially in the light of the slave trade. ‘Does globalization promote or hinder justice for Africa?’ is a question that receives treatment in the set of readings comprising chapter eight. Finally, the much-publicized ‘African Renaissance’ championed by President Mbeki of South Africa also comes under the prism of critical analysis. P.H.COETZEE A.P.J.ROUX 2002 PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION This book is intended to fill a gap in the literature that is currently available to undergraduate students of African philosophy. Most texts in African philosophy are written for a professional audience—philosophers communicating with other philosophers on the nature, problems, and methods of African philosophy. Our task has been twofold: to present the professional debate to a multicultural audience in such a way that it is understandable in terms of various world-views and life-experiences, and so that it brings philosophical themes into play with existential problems. We have set about our task with certain considerations in mind. Since there are areas in Africa where regional philosophies have grown up, notably in Ghana, Nigeria, and Uganda, most of the material presented here has been drawn from these regions. The debate on the nature, problems, and methods of African philosophy is, in part, inspired by the regional contexts in which African philosophy has developed, a factor which has had considerable influence on what we have chosen to present, especially in view of the fact that each region presents its own specific existential problems. It should be pointed out here that there is no developed regional philosophy in South Africa. In South Africa philosophy has its roots largely in European traditions. Professional philosophers practise a form of neo-liberalism which draws on Western ‘continental’ (French and German) and ‘analytic’ (Anglo-American) prototypes. We have chosen one figure from South Africa, Steve Biko, to present something of the political philosophy in this country. Because the philosophical geography in Africa is very fragmented, we decided to order this fragmented picture under seven categories: 1. Culture (the philosophy of) 2. Trends (ethnophilosophy, sage philosophy, ideological philosophy, and professional philosophy) 3. Metaphysics (idealism) 4. Epistemology (sociology of knowledge) 5. Ethics (communitarianism) 6. Politics (liberation ideologies and struggles) 7. Aesthetics (the status of African art as ‘Art’) The book begins with an introductory sketch on the problems created by European (anthropological) constructions of the African person and his/her life-world. Biakolo argues that the basis of the construction of Africa, in terms of distinctions between savage/civilized, prelogical/ logical, oral/written, magical/scientific, is nothing more than European ethnocentric convention. This sets the scene for an examination of the uses o f culture and cultural constructs in African contexts. An attempt is made to develop a context in which the idea of a ‘culture-specific’ philosophy can be discussed and placed in perspective. Van Staden argues for an ‘articulation’ concept of culture which is contrasted with a ‘communicalogical’ concept. The articulation concept has great power to displace the communicalogical concept since it reaches beyond the cultural and ethnic frameworks to which the communicalogical idea is confined, thereby creating a context for the development of a critical discourse on culture and its uses in the African context. The discussion of this contemporary notion of culture is essential to the main themes of the book. African philosophers argue that philosophy is a cultural enterprise and that African philosophies are culture specific. This means that they are perspective driven. Some are ethnic perspectival models (Wiredu, Gyekye), others are non-ethnic (panAfrican) models (Appiah). The specificity thesis is complemented by a diversity thesis which states that there is no single philosophical (conceptual) order for all mankind. This does not mean that cultural groups differ with respect to their capacity for cognition and rationality, it merely means that systems of reasoning are bound by the traditions within which they develop. There are cognitive as well as normative universals, but these are shaded in different colours in different cultures. The trends in African philosophy are discussed with reference to the thesis of culturespecificity. Van Niekerk stresses the conceptual link between culture and trends. She develops this link with reference to her distinction between ‘Hermesian’ and ‘Promethean’ rationalities, and by applying it in a critical appraisal of ethnophilosophy and related trends. The chapter on Understanding Trends in ‘African Thinking’ connects conceptually with everything else that follows. The chapter Metaphysical Thinking in Africa follows the culture-specific approach which Wiredu has so aptly described as ‘strategic particularism’. But Teffo and Roux sketch a view of metaphysics which transcends the parameters of particularity insofar as they show that the themes in African metaphysics have universal significance. This is in line with Wiredu’s method of pursuing the universal through the particular, and echoes Van Staden’s theme of the need to create a wider context within which particular discourses may meaningfully be examined. In African Epistemology Kaphagawani and Malherbe address the question whether it makes sense to talk of an African articulation and formulation of knowledge, and find an affirmative answer in an argument pitched neatly between the relativism which attends discrete particularism and the absolutism which accompanies an uncompromising universalism. The need for a cross-cultural context and discourse is manifested in the arguments advanced for epistemic modernity, a move which again echoes Van Staden’s theme. Normative universals find a place in communitarian systems of ethics and politics. In Particularity in Morality and its Relation to Community Coetzee examines how Wiredu develops a notion of particularity in morals from the specifics of the kinship structures of the Akans of Ghana. Notions of the good, which specific kin groups endorse in civic contexts, generate various solidarities which find a place in civil life. The particularities of civic structures, then, find expression in the political structures of civil society. The problem of accommodating a variety of civic perspectives in a single political unit in a multicultural state like Ghana is, in fact, a problem for all African states. South Africa is no exception. How might multicultural states accommodate different cultural and social identities within single political orders? In The Problem of Political SelfDefinition in South Africa Coetzee argues for the need to create a political culture which accords at least an equality of regard to all cultural communities. A substantive equality may not be achieved, yet it can be approached through social programmes designed in an open forum of public debate—one which acknowledges the constraints of public reason. In Using and Abusing African Art Wilkinson addresses the problem of understanding the objects of African art as African art, and not as re-culturized objects in the European world. She argues that the way the problem has been posed in the past has suffered from misguided attempts to be politically correct. Rather than ask how ‘art’ should (logically) be used, we should ask how ‘art’ has (empirically) been used in Africa and particularly in South Africa. The book closes with Shutte’s post-anthropological attempt to find a model for crosscultural philosophical understanding. The history of Africa, Shutte claims, makes the linking between African and European philosophy unavoidable. Shutte elaborates this linking in terms of Senghor’s idea of a ‘Civilization of the Universal’—and in so doing develops Biakolo’s theme and adds a new dimension to Van Staden’s theme. The readings which appear in Chapters 2–8 present the reader with an exposure to some genuine philosophizing in Africa. They have been chosen as exemplars of the various trends, and also for the story they tell about the concerns of Africa’s philosophers. Among these, a concern with cultural issues, especially the tension between tradition and modernity, which imparts a particular colour to the African experience, figures prominently. This concern with the cultural reconstruction of Africa has many facets. It raises deep critical questions about metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, politics, and, of course, the nature of African philosophy itself. And in doing so, we learn something about other tensions—between the need to conserve what is good and useful in tradition, and what is needed to modernize Africa’s cultures; between preferences for traditional agrarian communities and their value structures, and the force of urbanization which follows in the wake of technological advancement. These tensions create a need for African philosophers to engage in interdisciplinary research, for renewal requires reflection on education, government, social organization, religious practices, and many other areas. We hope the way in which the readings are ordered in each chapter will help the reader to explore these possibilities. The editors thank all the authors for their contributions. A very special word of thanks goes to Marinda Delport who took charge of the typing and the preparation of the manuscript, Willena Reinach who assisted her, and to Lynda Gillfillan for the language editing of the manuscript. P.H.COETZEE A.P.J.ROUX ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We wish to thank Oxford University Press for their readiness to publish the second edition of Philosophy from Africa. A special word of thanks also goes to Professor Anthony Melck, former Principal of the University of South Africa, for making available the necessary funds for editorial work. We wish to convey our heartfelt gratitude to all the contributors for their permission to have their essays published in this second edition. Equally we thank all the copyright holders for their permission to have the essays published in the present volume. At a time when her research and teaching programme was exceptionally congested our colleague, Professor Naomi Morgan, graciously accepted the additional task of translating two essays from French to English. Her excellence and professionalism speak for themselves. We wish to thank you very much for your efficient and competent response at a time of need. Anxious to meet the publisher’s deadline for the submission of the typescript (manuscript), we were fortunate to have found Mrs Lavina Hobbs. She was responsible for formatting, typing, and arranging the typescript according to the specifications of the publisher. In addition, she had to pay special attention to almost endless changes and details submitted to her by the editors. We thank you very much indeed for your patience, competence, and excellence in the performance of your task. Because of you we were able to submit the typescript before the expiry of the publisher’s deadline. Our thanks go also to Ethné Clarke for her careful reading and editing of the manuscript and page proofs. Special thanks are also due to our colleague, Professor Mogobe Ramose, for his encouragement, support, and active participation in the entire editorial process. P.H.COETZEE A.P.J.ROUX 2002 COPYRIGHT ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The publisher and editors gratefully acknowledge and thank the authors and copyright holders for permission to reproduce the following material. Every effort has been made to trace copyright holders, but where this has proved impossible, the publisher would be grateful for information that would enable it to amend any omissions in future editions. Appiah, Kwame A. ‘Race, culture, identity: Misunderstood connections’, in Color conscious: The political morality of race, by Kwame A.Appiah and Amy Gutmann. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1996. pp. 74–105. ©1996 by Princeton University Press. Reprinted by permission of Princeton University Press. Biakolo, Emevwo M. ‘Categories of cross-cultural cognition and the African condition’, in Philosophy from Africa (first edition), P.Coetzee and A.Roux (eds). Cape Town: Oxford University Press. 2000. pp. 1–12. Biko, Steve B. ‘Black consciousness and the quest for a true humanity’, in Black theology: The South African voice, Basil Moore (ed). C. Hurst and Company. 1973. Reproduced by permission of C.Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., London. Coetzee, Pieter H. ‘Particularity in morality and its relation to community’, in Philosophy from Africa (first edition), P.Coetzee and A. Roux (eds). Cape Town: Oxford University Press. 2000. pp. 275–291. Coetzee, Pieter H. ‘Later Marxist morality: Its relevance for Africa’s post-colonial situation’, in KOERS, 66(4). 2001. pp. 621–637. Reproduced by permission of the Bureau for Scholarly Journals. Deacon, Moya. The status of Father Tempels and ethnophilosophy in the discourse of African philosophy, an edited extract from her unpublished 1996 M.A. thesis from RAU titled African philosophy: From drums and masks to rationality. Eze, Emmanuel C. The color of reason: The idea of “race” in Kant’s anthropology, in Postcolonial African philosophy: A critical reader, E.Eze (ed). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 1997. pp. 103–140. Gbadegesin, Segun. ‘Ènìyàn: The Yoruba concept of a person’, in African philosophy: Traditional Yoruba philosophy and contemporary African realities, by Segun Gbadegesin. New York: Peter Lang. 1991. pp. 27–59. Gyekye, Kwame. ‘Person and community in African thought’, in Person and community: Ghanaian philosophical studies I,CRVP (Council for Research in Values Philosophy). 1992. pp. 193–206. Hountondji, Paulin J. ‘An alienated literature’, in African philosophy: Myth and reality (translated by Henri Evans with an introduction by Abiola Irele) (second edition). Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1983. pp. 33–46. Hountondji, Paulin J. ‘Producing knowledge in Africa today’, in African Studies Review, 38. New Brunswick: African Studies Association. December 1995. pp. 1–10. Irele, F.Abiola. ‘Francophone African philosophy, in Francophone African philosophy by F. A. Irele. London: Routledge. Irele, F.Abiola. ‘Négritude: Literature and ide-ology’, in The journal of African studies, 3(4). 1965. pp. 499–526. Kaphagawani, Didier N. and Malherbe, Jeanette G. ‘African epistemology, in Philosophy from Africa (first edition), P.Coetzee and A. Roux (eds). Cape Town: Oxford University Press. 2000. pp. 205–216. Laleye, Issiaka P. ‘Is there an African philosophy in existence today?’, in Philosophie Africaine, Vol. 3, Selected texts no. 2. pp. 467–476. Mandaza, Ibbo. ‘Reconciliation and social justice in southern Africa: The Zimbabwe experience’, in African Renaissance, M.W. Makgoba (ed). Cape Town: Mafuba/Tafelberg. 1999. pp. 77–90. Masolo, D.A. ‘Rethinking communities in a global context’, in African philosophy, 12 (1). 1999. pp. 51–68. Mazrui, Ali A. ‘Neo-dependency and Africa’s fragmentation’, in Towards a pax Africana: A study of ideology and ambition. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 1967. pp. 74–96. McGary, Howard. ‘Alienation and the African-American experience’, in AfricanAmerican perspectives and philosophical traditions, J.P. Pittman (ed). London: Routledge. 1997. pp. 282–296. Murobe, M.F. ‘Globalization and African Renaissance: An ethical reflection’, in Problematising the African Renaissance, E. Maloka and E.Le Roux (eds). Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa. 2000. pp. 43–67. Mzimba, Thami. ‘Victor’, 1995, used on cover. Unisa Art Gallery, Permanent Art Collection. Narayan, Uma. ‘Essence of cultures and a sense of history: A feminist critique of cultural essentialism’, in Hypatia, 13(2). Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Spring 1998. pp. 86–106. Nasseem, Subairi ‘B. ‘African heritage and contemporary life’, in The foundations of social life (Ugandan Philosophical Studies 1), A.T. Dalfovo et al. (eds). The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy with the assistance of CIPSH/UNESCO. 1992. pp.16–36. Okolo, Chukwudum B. ‘Self as a problem in African philosophy, in International Philosophical Quarterly, XXXII(4). December 1992. pp. 477–485. Oladipo, Olusegun. ‘Metaphysics, religion and Yoruba traditional thought’, in Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research. January–April 1990. pp. 71–83. Oruka, H.Odera. ‘Four trends in current African philosophy’, in Symposium on Philosophy in the present situation of Africa, Wednesday, August 30, 1978, Alwin Diemer and Franz Steiner (eds). Verlag GMBH: Wiesbaden. pp. 1–7. Oruka, H.Odera. ‘Ideology and culture: The African experience’, in Philosophy and cultures: Proceedings of the second Afro-Asian Philosophy Conference, Nairobi, October/November, 1981, H.Odera Oruka and D.A.Masolo (eds). Bookwise Ltd. pp. 57– 62. Osaghae, Eghosa E. ‘Rescuing the post-colonial state of Africa: A reconceptualization of the role of civil society, in Quest, 13/18(7). 1998. pp. 269–282. Outlaw, Lucius. ‘African “philosophy’: Deconstructive and reconstructive challenges’, in Sage philosophy: Indigenous thinkers and modern debate on African philosophy, H. Odera Oruka (wd). 1990. Leiden: E.J.Brill. pp. 223–248. Oyewumi, Oyeronke. ‘Visualizing the body, in The invention of women: Making an African sense of Western gender studies. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1997. pp. 1–30. (University of Minnesota Press. Reproduced by permission of The University of Minnesota Press.) Presbey, Gail M. ‘Should woman love “wisdom”?’, in Research in African Literatures, 30(2). Summer 1999. pp. 165–181. Ramose, Mogobe B. ‘“African Renaissance”: A northbound gaze’, in Politeia, 19(3). 2000. pp. 47–61. Reproduced by permission of Unisa Press. Ramose, Mogobe B. ‘Globalization and ubuntu’, in African philosophy through Ubuntu, by Magobe B.Ramose. Harare: Mond Books. 1999. pp. 160–205. Ramose, Mogobe B. ‘Historic titles in law’, a previously unpublished paper. Ramose, Mogobe B. ‘I conquer, therefore I am the sovereign: Reflections upon sovereignty, constitutionalism, and democracy in Zimbabwe and South Africa’, a previously unpublished paper. Ramose, Mogobe B. ‘The ethics of ubuntu’, a previously unpublished paper. Ramose, Mogobe B. The philosophy of ubuntu and ubuntu as a philosophy’, in African philosophy through Ubuntu, by Magobe B. Ramose. Harare: Mond Books. 1999. Ramose, Mogobe B. The struggle for reason in Africa’, in African philosophy through Ubuntu, by Magobe B.Ramose. Harare: Mond Books. 1999. Roux, Abraham P.J. and Teffo, Lebiso J. ‘Metaphysical thinking in Africa’, in Philosophy from Africa (first edition), P. Coetzee and A.Roux (eds). Cape Town: Oxford University Press. 2000. pp. 134–148. Reprinted with permission of the authors. Serequeberhan. Tsenay. The critique of Eurocentrism and the practice of African philosophy, in Postcolonial African Philosophy: A critical reader,E.Eze (ed). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 1997. pp. 141–161. Sogolo, Godwin S. ‘Logic and rationality’, in Foundations of African pbilosophy. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press. 1993. pp. 68–88. Sogolo, Godwin S. ‘The concept of cause in African thought’, a paper delivered a t Unisa’s first colloquium on African Philosophy, 1994. Soyinka, Wole. ‘Négritude and the gods of equity’, in The burden of memory, the muse of forgiveness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1999. pp. 145–194. Wa Thiong’o, Ngugi. ‘Moving the centre: Towards a pluralism of cultures’, in Moving the centre: The struggle for cultural freedoms. London: James Currey. 1993. pp. 2–11. Wilkinson, Jennifer R. ‘South African women and the ties that bind’, a previously unpublished paper. Wiredu, Kwasi. ‘An Akan perspective on human rights’, in Cultural universals and particulars: An African perspective. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1996. pp. 157–171. Wiredu, Kwasi. ‘On decolonising African religions’, a paper delivered at Unisa’s second colloquium on African philosophy, 1995. Wiredu, Kwasi. The concept of truth in the Akan language’, a public lecture given for the first time in 1980 at the Department of Philosophy, California State University, Los Angeles. Wiredu, Kwasi. The moral foundations of an African culture’, in Person and community: Ghanaian philosophical studies I,CRVP (Council for Research in Values Philosophy). 1992. pp. 193–206. Ya-Mona, Musambi Malongi. ‘Primacy of the ethical order over the economic order: Reflections for an ethical economy’, in Philosophie Africaine Et Ordre Social, Vol. 11. Proceedings of the ninth Philosophical Seminar at Kinshasa under the patronage of the Bishops Conference of Zaire and with the financial support of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, from 1 December to 7 December, 1985. 1 DISCOURSES ON AFRICA INTRODUCTION The struggle for reason in Africa MOGOBE B.RAMOSE For centuries, discourses on Africa have been dominated by non-Africans. Many reasons account for this state of affairs and, not least, the unjustified violence of colonization. Since colonization, Africans have had almost an infinity of spokespersons. These claimed unilaterally the right to speak on behalf of the Africans and to define the meaning of experience and truth for them. Thus Africans were reduced to silence even about themselves. On the face of it, decolonization removed this problem. However, on closer analysis it is clear that decolonization was an important catalyst in the breaking of the silence about the Africans. It is still necessary to assert and uphold the right of Africans to define the meaning of experience and truth in their own right. In order to achieve this, one of the requirements is that Africans should take the opportunity to speak for and about themselves and in that way construct an authentic and truly African discourse about Africa. In this introduction, focus is placed first upon some of the main reasons why Africa was reduced to silence. This is followed by the speech, the discourse, of Africans about the meaning of experience and truth for them. The essays contained in this section constitute this discourse. We now turn to consider some of the principal reasons why colonization considered itself justified in silencing and enslaving Africa. ‘MAN IS A RATIONAL ANIMAL’ One of the bases of colonization was that the belief ‘man is a rational animal’ was no t spoken of the African, the Amerindian, and the Australasian. Aristotle, the father of this definition of ‘man’, did not incur the wrath of women then as they were probably astounded by the fact that for him the existence of his mother appeared to be insignificant. It was only much later in history, namely at the rise of feminist thought and action, that the benign forgiveness of Aristotle by the women of his time came to be called into question.1 Little did Aristotle realize that his definition of ‘man’ laid down the foun-dation for the struggle for reason—not only between men and women but also between the colonialists and the Africans,2 the Amerindians,3 and the Australasians. Aristotle’s definition of man was deeply inscribed in the social ethos of those communities and societies that undertook the so-called voyages of discovery—apparently driven by innocent curiosity. But it is well known that these voyages changed into violent colonial incursions. These incursions, unjustifiable under all the principles of the theory of the just war, have had consequences that are still with us today. It seems then that the entire process of decolonization has, among others, upheld and not jettisoned the questionable belief that ‘man is a rational animal’ excludes the African, the Amerindian, and the Australasian. In our time, the struggle for reason is rearing its head again around the globe, especially in the West, under the familiar face of resilient racism. For example, the term ‘African philosophy’ renders the idea that history repeats itself easy to believe. More often than not the term tends to revive innate scepticism on the one hand, and to stimulate ingrained condescension on the other. The sceptic, unswervingly committed to the will to remain ignorant, is simply dismissive of any possibility, let alone the probability, of African philosophy. Impelled by the will to dominate, the condescendor—who is invariably the posterity of the colonizer—is often ready to entertain the probability of African philosophy provided the judgement pertaining to the experience, knowledge, and truth about African philosophy is recognized as the sole and exclusive right of the condescendor. Of course, this imaginary right, supported by material power designed to defend and sustain the superstition that Africa is incapable o f producing knowledge, has farreaching practical consequences for the construction of knowledge in Africa. The self-appointed heirs to the right to reason have thus established themselves as the producers of all knowledge and the only holders of the truth. In these circumstances, the right to knowledge in relation to the African is measured and determined by passive as well as uncritical assimilation,4 coupled with faithful implementation of knowledge defined and produced from outside Africa. The condescendor currently manifests the will to dominate through the imposition of ‘democratization’, ‘globalization’, and ‘human rights’. Such imposition is far from credible if one considers, for example, the fact that democracy became inadvertently the route towards the inhumanity as well as the irrationality of the holocaust. Historically, the unjust wars of colonization resulted in the forcible expropriation of land from its rightful owners: the Africans. At the same time, the land expropriation meant loss of sovereignty by the Africans. 5 The close connection between land and life 6 meant also that by losing land to the conqueror, the African thereby lost a vital resource to life. This loss was aggravated by the fact that, by virtue of the so-called right of conquest, the African was compelled to enter into the money economy. Thus the socalled right of conquest introduced an abrupt and radical change in the life of the African. From the condition of relative peace and reasonable certainty to satisfy the basic necessities of life, the African was suddenly plunged into poverty. There was no longer the reasonable certainty to meet the basic necessities of life unless money was available. Having been thus rendered poor by the stroke of the pen backed by the use of armed force, the African was compelled to find money to assure not only individual survival but also to pay tax for owning a hut, for example. In this way, the African’s right to life—the inalienable right to subsistence—was violated. Since all other rights revolve around the recognition, protection, and respect of the right to life, talk about human rights based upon the continual violation of this right can hardly be meaningful to the African. To be meaningful, human rights discourse must restore material and practical recognition, protection, and respect for the African’s inalienable right to subsistence. The 1994 Kampala conference on reparations to Africa is a pertinent example of Africa’s demand for the material and practical restoration of her inalienable right to subsistence. Reparations, though not technically due to the conquered, is in this case morally and legally appropriate. It proceeds from the premise that there is a historical and