Last Minute Tips
Criminal Law
Atty. Ronel U. Buenaventura, M.A., M.C.L.1
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW
Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect. Thus, R.A. No. 10951, which adjusted the value of property
and damage on which a penalty is based, has retroactive effect if favorable to the accused, regardless of whether its effectivity comes after
the time when the judgment of conviction is rendered and even if service of sentence has already begun. (Hernan v. Sandiganbayan,
December 5, 2017) Thus, the accused may be immediately released if the actual length of time actually served and whether good conduct
time allowance should actually be allowed, among others, show that he has fully satisfied judgment, which must be determined by the trial
court. (In Re: Correction/Adjustment of Penalty Pursuant to R.A. No. 10951, August 14, 2018) Similarly, R.A. No. 10592 (modifying certain
provisions of the Revised Penal Code [RPC] on the grant of good conduct time allowance) does not define a crime or provides a penalty,
its provisions have the purpose and effect of diminishing the punishment attached to the crime and hence is considered as a penal law
calling for the retroactive application. (Inmates of the New Bilibid Prison v. De Lima, June 25, 2019) Notably, persons convicted of
heinous crimes are still entitled to good conduct time allowance despite being excluded from the IRR since the law itself did not exclude
them. (Guinto v. Department of Justice, April 3, 2024)
The prohibition against ex post facto laws is aimed against the retrospectivity of penal laws. Nonetheless, that Proclamation No.
572, which revokes the amnesty given to Trillanes, is not a penal statute is no justification for exempting it from the constitutional proscription
against ex post facto laws. The prohibition preventing the State from unlawfully and retroactively stripping a person of a lawful protection to
which they have been entitled, such as a grant of amnesty, must apply equally to all branches of government, including the Executive. If a
law cannot be allowed to deprive an accused of a lawful protection to which they have become entitled, then a presidential proclamation
must similarly be barred from doing so. (Trillanes IV v. Executive Secretary, April 3, 2024)
Generally, the absolute repeal of a penal law deprives the courts of their authority to punish an accused charged with a violation
of the old law prior to its repeal. Under such absolute repeal, the offense no longer exists as if the person who committed it never did so.
An exception to this rule is where the repealing law reenacts the former statute and punishes the act previously penalized under the old
law. Thus, where the crime charged was committed in August 2016, when the prevailing law was R.A. 9775 (Anti-Child Pornography Act)
and the subsequent law, R.A. No. 111930 (Online Sexual Abuse of Exploitation of Children (OSAEC) and Anti-Child Sexual Abuse or
Exploitation Materials (CSAEM) Act) expressly repealed R.A. No. 9775 but at the same time reenacted the unlawful acts defined as child
pornography, then the reenactment in R.A. No. 11930 of prohibited acts considered as child pornography manifests the legislative intent to
reserve the right of the State to prosecute and punish offenses in the repealed R.A. No. 9775. (People v. YYY, February 20, 2024)
Crimes mala in se presuppose that the person who did the felonious act had criminal intent to do so, while crimes mala prohibita
do not require knowledge or criminal intent. In the case of mala in se, it is necessary, to constitute a punishable offense, for the person
doing the act to have knowledge of the nature of his act and to have a criminal intent; in the case of mala prohibita, unless such words as
“knowingly” and “willfully” are contained in the statute, neither knowledge nor criminal intent is necessary. (Sama v. People, January 5, 2021
[J. Lazaro-Javier]) Not all crimes under the RPC are considered mala in se. There are mala prohibita crimes defined in RPC, such as
technical malversation. Conversely, there are mala in se crimes under special laws, such as plunder. (Dungo v. People, July 1, 2015) The
better approach to distinguish between mala in se and mala prohibita crimes is the determination of the inherent immorality or vileness of the
penalized act. Hence, while the Omnibus Election Code is a special law, vote-buying is inherently immoral as it destroys the sanctity of
votes and prostitutes the election process and therefore, intent is an element of the crime. (Rodriguez v. Commission on Elections, January
10, 2023) The offense of creating “conditions prejudicial to the child’s development” under R.A. No. 7610 is not mala prohibita, for there may
1 Atty. Ronel U. Buenaventura was consistent awardee of Academic Excellence Award and University President Scholarship and graduated Class Valedictorian
and Magna Cum Laude from Bulacan State University College of Law Class of 2015 and ranked 10th in the 2015 Bar Examinations. He finished Master of
Corporate Law in the University of Cambridge, obtaining First Class Honours, ranking 11th in Class of 2024, and was awarded Simms Prize for Educational
Achievement (Distinction Results). He also completed Master of Arts (2011) and Bachelor of Arts (2009) from the University of the Philippines. He is a professor
of law at Tarlac State University, University of Sto. Tomas, Bulacan State University, and Pampanga State University, and previously at Tomas Claudio Colleges
and Wesleyan University Philippines. He is an MCLE lecturer and bar reviewer at Jurists Bar Review Center, Villasis Law Center, Albano Review Center, and
Magnificus Juris Reviews and Seminars. He has authored several books and journal articles and a former General Editor of the Editorial Board of Cambridge
International Law Journal. He has received several awards and recognition from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines – Bulacan, where he presently serves as
one of its directors, and previously served as Integrated Bar of the Philippines Central Luzon Regional Director for Legal Education and Development. He has
acted as Deputy Director of the Anti-Money Laundering Council and has worked as Legal Officer in Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and as Associate Solicitor in the
Office of the Solicitor General. He currently works as Vice President at Globe Fintech Innovations, Inc., GCash’s mother company.
Atty. Ronel U. Buenaventura is a proud member of Alpha Phi Beta Fraternity.
For questions, email me at .
, Criminal Law
Atty. Ronel U. Buenaventura
be instances where the child finds himself/herself in that situation without the willful intent of the adults around him or her. For example,
failure to send a child to school would certainly be prejudicial to his/her development, but if it was because the child lived in a remote area
under the care of an unemployed and financially struggling single parent, the latter may not necessarily be convicted under Section 10(a)
of R.A. No. 7610. The same may not necessarily be said of parents who are well-off but intentionally deprive education for their children
just so that they could always have someone to order around the house. (Garzon v. People, September 15, 2021)
Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended to
commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself. When an act is prohibited
by a special law, it is considered injurious to public welfare, and the performance of the prohibited act is the crime itself. (Sama v. People,
January 5, 2021) Thus, lack of “intent to perpetrate the crime” is a defense against crimes punishable under special penal laws. For instance,
if charged with illegal possession of firearm, the accused may show lack of animus possidendi or intent to possess on his part, which is the
crime in itself. (Fajardo v. People, January 10, 2011)
Where an offense is defined and is ostensibly punished under a special law, but the penalty therefor is actually taken from the RPC in its
technical nomenclature, the duration, correlation, and legal effects under the system of penalties native to RPC also apply. Thus,
modifying circumstances may be appreciated to determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even to reduce the penalty by degrees. (AAA
v. People, November 28, 2018) Clearly, there is no suppletory effect of the rules for the application of penalties under the RPC in special laws that
impose different penalties from the RPC. This is accurate in the case of the crime of carnapping. While it is true that the penalty of fourteen (14)
years and eight (8) months, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as maximum, under R.A. No. 6539 is virtually equivalent
to the duration of the medium period of Reclusion Temporal, such technical term under the RPC is not given to the penalty for Carnapping.
Moreover, the other penalties for Carnapping attended by the qualifying circumstance stated in the law do not correspond to those in the RPC.
(Turalba v. People, March 16, 2022)
REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK ONE
Motive, which pertains to the reason that prompts the accused to engage in a particular criminal activity, is not an essential element of a
crime and therefore not needed to be proven in criminal prosecutions. (People v. Pentecostes, November 8, 2017) Proof of motive for
the commission of the offense charged does not show guilt and absence of proof of such motive does not establish the innocence of the
accused. Crime is rarely rational. (People v. Arpon, June 10, 2019) The question of motive becomes material when there is doubt as to the
identity of the malefactor committing the offense (People v. Pentecostes, November 8, 2017) or when the evidence is circumstantial or
inconclusive, and there is some doubt on whether a crime has been committed or whether the accused has committed it. Thus, where a
reliable eyewitness has fully and satisfactorily identified the accused as the perpetrator of the felony, motive becomes immaterial in the
successful prosecution of a criminal case. (People v. Ducabo, September 28, 2007)
Mistake of fact is a misapprehension of a fact which, if true, would have justified the act or omission which is the subject of the
prosecution. It is a defense to a charge of crime where it negates the intent component of the crime. Inquiry is into the mistaken belief of
the defendant, and it does not look at all to the belief or state of mind of any other person. Proper invocation of this defense requires (i)
mistake be honest and reasonable, (ii) it be a matter of fact, and (iii) it negates the culpability required to commit the crime or the existence
of the mental state which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the offense. (Yapyuco v. Sandiganbayan, June 25, 2012)
Mistake of fact applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. (People v. Gerbero, July 11, 2018)
Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. (Dumayag v. People, November 26, 2012) The felony committed is not
the proximate cause of the resulting injury when (i) there is an active force that intervened between the felony committed and the resulting
injury, and the active force is a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the felonious act of the accused or (ii) resulting injury is due to the
intentional act of the victim. Thus, if a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put life in jeopardy and death
follows as a consequence of their felonious act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes cooperated in
producing the factual result. The offender is criminally liable for the death of the victim if his delictual act caused, accelerated, or contributed to
the death of the victim. (Quinto v. Andres, March 16, 2005)
2
, Criminal Law
Atty. Ronel U. Buenaventura
The accused using a curved sword attacking without provocation the victim who was able to evade but instead hitting the
victim’s granddaughter is an example of aberratio ictus. The fatal blow to the granddaughter was only delivered by mistake as it was
the victim who was the accused’s intended target. The single deed resulted in complex crime under Article 48: (i) attempted murder of victim and
(ii) consummated murder of victim’s granddaughter. (People v. Umawid, June 9, 2014)
Impossible crime is one committed by any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it
not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate to ineffectual means. There
is an impossible crime of theft when the accused stole a check payable to his employer, and when she encashed the check, it bounced as
the account against which the check was drawn is unfunded. The accused performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified
theft, which is a crime against property. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face value thereof,
which was not rightfully hers. (Jacinto v. People, July 13, 2009) Similarly, there is impossible crime of theft when a man puts his hand in the
coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter’s wallet but gets nothing since the pocket is empty. Factual impossibility rendered
the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. There is also an impossible crime of murder when the accused, armed with rifle and
with intent to kill, continuously fired at victim’s bedroom, thinking the latter was sleeping; but unknown to the accused, the victim left for
Manila early that day. Physical impossibility rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. (Intod v. People, October 21, 1992)
But the accused is liable for the crime of murder, not for impossible crime, if he stabs a victim who lost consciousness because of the blow of
his co-conspirators. While there is impossibility of killing a person who is already dead, there is no impossibility if the person is only
unconscious. Even so, the collective liability of the accused conspirators renders both guilty of the crime of murder. (People v. Callao, March
14, 2018)
There is no crime of frustrated theft. Theft can only be attempted or consummated. Theft is already produced upon the taking of personal
property of another without the latter’s consent, even if the offender has no opportunity to dispose of the same. (Valenzuela v. People, June
21, 2007)
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. Where the several accused were shown to have acted in concert at the time of the commission of the offense, and their acts
indicated that they had the same purpose or common design and were united in the execution, conspiracy is established. Conspiracy
transcends companionship; mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge of, or
acquiescence in, or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the
commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. Thus, the mere fact that the accused were
seen together riding a motorcycle immediately after the commission of a felony does not necessarily prove the existence of a conspiracy
between them. (People v. Salga, July 23, 2018) But there is conspiracy where the four accused in a coordinated actions surrounded the
victim when it alighted the jeepney and took turns hitting and stabbing him with stone, samurai, and knife, and they immediately escaped.
(People v. Batulan, July 29, 2019 [J. Lazaro-Javier]) The existence of conspiracy must be proven with the same standard of proof required
to establish the crime itself, that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt. (People v. Arnado, March 21, 2022) Where the quantum of proof
required to establish conspiracy is lacking, the accused is responsible only for the consequences of his own acts. (People v. Catulang, November
3, 2020)
Under the doctrine of implied conspiracy, conspiracy is implied if two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent,
were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, even
though no actual meeting among them to concert means is proved. (People v. De Leon, June 26, 2009) Further, to be a conspirator,
one need not participate in every detail of the execution; neither did he have to know the exact part performed by his co-conspirator in the
execution of the criminal acts. (People v. Laguda, October 7, 2020)
Where the accused failed to prove all the elements of self-defense, he may nonetheless be entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense. The accused must prove the existence of the majority of the elements for self-defense, but
unlawful aggression, being an indispensable element, must be present. Either or both requisites may be absent: reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel it or the lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. (People v. Dulin,
June 29, 2015) Without unlawful aggression, there can be no justified killing in defense. (People v. Lumahang, March 27, 2019; People v.
3
Criminal Law
Atty. Ronel U. Buenaventura, M.A., M.C.L.1
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW
Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect. Thus, R.A. No. 10951, which adjusted the value of property
and damage on which a penalty is based, has retroactive effect if favorable to the accused, regardless of whether its effectivity comes after
the time when the judgment of conviction is rendered and even if service of sentence has already begun. (Hernan v. Sandiganbayan,
December 5, 2017) Thus, the accused may be immediately released if the actual length of time actually served and whether good conduct
time allowance should actually be allowed, among others, show that he has fully satisfied judgment, which must be determined by the trial
court. (In Re: Correction/Adjustment of Penalty Pursuant to R.A. No. 10951, August 14, 2018) Similarly, R.A. No. 10592 (modifying certain
provisions of the Revised Penal Code [RPC] on the grant of good conduct time allowance) does not define a crime or provides a penalty,
its provisions have the purpose and effect of diminishing the punishment attached to the crime and hence is considered as a penal law
calling for the retroactive application. (Inmates of the New Bilibid Prison v. De Lima, June 25, 2019) Notably, persons convicted of
heinous crimes are still entitled to good conduct time allowance despite being excluded from the IRR since the law itself did not exclude
them. (Guinto v. Department of Justice, April 3, 2024)
The prohibition against ex post facto laws is aimed against the retrospectivity of penal laws. Nonetheless, that Proclamation No.
572, which revokes the amnesty given to Trillanes, is not a penal statute is no justification for exempting it from the constitutional proscription
against ex post facto laws. The prohibition preventing the State from unlawfully and retroactively stripping a person of a lawful protection to
which they have been entitled, such as a grant of amnesty, must apply equally to all branches of government, including the Executive. If a
law cannot be allowed to deprive an accused of a lawful protection to which they have become entitled, then a presidential proclamation
must similarly be barred from doing so. (Trillanes IV v. Executive Secretary, April 3, 2024)
Generally, the absolute repeal of a penal law deprives the courts of their authority to punish an accused charged with a violation
of the old law prior to its repeal. Under such absolute repeal, the offense no longer exists as if the person who committed it never did so.
An exception to this rule is where the repealing law reenacts the former statute and punishes the act previously penalized under the old
law. Thus, where the crime charged was committed in August 2016, when the prevailing law was R.A. 9775 (Anti-Child Pornography Act)
and the subsequent law, R.A. No. 111930 (Online Sexual Abuse of Exploitation of Children (OSAEC) and Anti-Child Sexual Abuse or
Exploitation Materials (CSAEM) Act) expressly repealed R.A. No. 9775 but at the same time reenacted the unlawful acts defined as child
pornography, then the reenactment in R.A. No. 11930 of prohibited acts considered as child pornography manifests the legislative intent to
reserve the right of the State to prosecute and punish offenses in the repealed R.A. No. 9775. (People v. YYY, February 20, 2024)
Crimes mala in se presuppose that the person who did the felonious act had criminal intent to do so, while crimes mala prohibita
do not require knowledge or criminal intent. In the case of mala in se, it is necessary, to constitute a punishable offense, for the person
doing the act to have knowledge of the nature of his act and to have a criminal intent; in the case of mala prohibita, unless such words as
“knowingly” and “willfully” are contained in the statute, neither knowledge nor criminal intent is necessary. (Sama v. People, January 5, 2021
[J. Lazaro-Javier]) Not all crimes under the RPC are considered mala in se. There are mala prohibita crimes defined in RPC, such as
technical malversation. Conversely, there are mala in se crimes under special laws, such as plunder. (Dungo v. People, July 1, 2015) The
better approach to distinguish between mala in se and mala prohibita crimes is the determination of the inherent immorality or vileness of the
penalized act. Hence, while the Omnibus Election Code is a special law, vote-buying is inherently immoral as it destroys the sanctity of
votes and prostitutes the election process and therefore, intent is an element of the crime. (Rodriguez v. Commission on Elections, January
10, 2023) The offense of creating “conditions prejudicial to the child’s development” under R.A. No. 7610 is not mala prohibita, for there may
1 Atty. Ronel U. Buenaventura was consistent awardee of Academic Excellence Award and University President Scholarship and graduated Class Valedictorian
and Magna Cum Laude from Bulacan State University College of Law Class of 2015 and ranked 10th in the 2015 Bar Examinations. He finished Master of
Corporate Law in the University of Cambridge, obtaining First Class Honours, ranking 11th in Class of 2024, and was awarded Simms Prize for Educational
Achievement (Distinction Results). He also completed Master of Arts (2011) and Bachelor of Arts (2009) from the University of the Philippines. He is a professor
of law at Tarlac State University, University of Sto. Tomas, Bulacan State University, and Pampanga State University, and previously at Tomas Claudio Colleges
and Wesleyan University Philippines. He is an MCLE lecturer and bar reviewer at Jurists Bar Review Center, Villasis Law Center, Albano Review Center, and
Magnificus Juris Reviews and Seminars. He has authored several books and journal articles and a former General Editor of the Editorial Board of Cambridge
International Law Journal. He has received several awards and recognition from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines – Bulacan, where he presently serves as
one of its directors, and previously served as Integrated Bar of the Philippines Central Luzon Regional Director for Legal Education and Development. He has
acted as Deputy Director of the Anti-Money Laundering Council and has worked as Legal Officer in Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and as Associate Solicitor in the
Office of the Solicitor General. He currently works as Vice President at Globe Fintech Innovations, Inc., GCash’s mother company.
Atty. Ronel U. Buenaventura is a proud member of Alpha Phi Beta Fraternity.
For questions, email me at .
, Criminal Law
Atty. Ronel U. Buenaventura
be instances where the child finds himself/herself in that situation without the willful intent of the adults around him or her. For example,
failure to send a child to school would certainly be prejudicial to his/her development, but if it was because the child lived in a remote area
under the care of an unemployed and financially struggling single parent, the latter may not necessarily be convicted under Section 10(a)
of R.A. No. 7610. The same may not necessarily be said of parents who are well-off but intentionally deprive education for their children
just so that they could always have someone to order around the house. (Garzon v. People, September 15, 2021)
Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended to
commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself. When an act is prohibited
by a special law, it is considered injurious to public welfare, and the performance of the prohibited act is the crime itself. (Sama v. People,
January 5, 2021) Thus, lack of “intent to perpetrate the crime” is a defense against crimes punishable under special penal laws. For instance,
if charged with illegal possession of firearm, the accused may show lack of animus possidendi or intent to possess on his part, which is the
crime in itself. (Fajardo v. People, January 10, 2011)
Where an offense is defined and is ostensibly punished under a special law, but the penalty therefor is actually taken from the RPC in its
technical nomenclature, the duration, correlation, and legal effects under the system of penalties native to RPC also apply. Thus,
modifying circumstances may be appreciated to determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even to reduce the penalty by degrees. (AAA
v. People, November 28, 2018) Clearly, there is no suppletory effect of the rules for the application of penalties under the RPC in special laws that
impose different penalties from the RPC. This is accurate in the case of the crime of carnapping. While it is true that the penalty of fourteen (14)
years and eight (8) months, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as maximum, under R.A. No. 6539 is virtually equivalent
to the duration of the medium period of Reclusion Temporal, such technical term under the RPC is not given to the penalty for Carnapping.
Moreover, the other penalties for Carnapping attended by the qualifying circumstance stated in the law do not correspond to those in the RPC.
(Turalba v. People, March 16, 2022)
REVISED PENAL CODE – BOOK ONE
Motive, which pertains to the reason that prompts the accused to engage in a particular criminal activity, is not an essential element of a
crime and therefore not needed to be proven in criminal prosecutions. (People v. Pentecostes, November 8, 2017) Proof of motive for
the commission of the offense charged does not show guilt and absence of proof of such motive does not establish the innocence of the
accused. Crime is rarely rational. (People v. Arpon, June 10, 2019) The question of motive becomes material when there is doubt as to the
identity of the malefactor committing the offense (People v. Pentecostes, November 8, 2017) or when the evidence is circumstantial or
inconclusive, and there is some doubt on whether a crime has been committed or whether the accused has committed it. Thus, where a
reliable eyewitness has fully and satisfactorily identified the accused as the perpetrator of the felony, motive becomes immaterial in the
successful prosecution of a criminal case. (People v. Ducabo, September 28, 2007)
Mistake of fact is a misapprehension of a fact which, if true, would have justified the act or omission which is the subject of the
prosecution. It is a defense to a charge of crime where it negates the intent component of the crime. Inquiry is into the mistaken belief of
the defendant, and it does not look at all to the belief or state of mind of any other person. Proper invocation of this defense requires (i)
mistake be honest and reasonable, (ii) it be a matter of fact, and (iii) it negates the culpability required to commit the crime or the existence
of the mental state which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the offense. (Yapyuco v. Sandiganbayan, June 25, 2012)
Mistake of fact applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. (People v. Gerbero, July 11, 2018)
Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. (Dumayag v. People, November 26, 2012) The felony committed is not
the proximate cause of the resulting injury when (i) there is an active force that intervened between the felony committed and the resulting
injury, and the active force is a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the felonious act of the accused or (ii) resulting injury is due to the
intentional act of the victim. Thus, if a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put life in jeopardy and death
follows as a consequence of their felonious act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes cooperated in
producing the factual result. The offender is criminally liable for the death of the victim if his delictual act caused, accelerated, or contributed to
the death of the victim. (Quinto v. Andres, March 16, 2005)
2
, Criminal Law
Atty. Ronel U. Buenaventura
The accused using a curved sword attacking without provocation the victim who was able to evade but instead hitting the
victim’s granddaughter is an example of aberratio ictus. The fatal blow to the granddaughter was only delivered by mistake as it was
the victim who was the accused’s intended target. The single deed resulted in complex crime under Article 48: (i) attempted murder of victim and
(ii) consummated murder of victim’s granddaughter. (People v. Umawid, June 9, 2014)
Impossible crime is one committed by any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it
not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate to ineffectual means. There
is an impossible crime of theft when the accused stole a check payable to his employer, and when she encashed the check, it bounced as
the account against which the check was drawn is unfunded. The accused performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified
theft, which is a crime against property. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face value thereof,
which was not rightfully hers. (Jacinto v. People, July 13, 2009) Similarly, there is impossible crime of theft when a man puts his hand in the
coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter’s wallet but gets nothing since the pocket is empty. Factual impossibility rendered
the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. There is also an impossible crime of murder when the accused, armed with rifle and
with intent to kill, continuously fired at victim’s bedroom, thinking the latter was sleeping; but unknown to the accused, the victim left for
Manila early that day. Physical impossibility rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. (Intod v. People, October 21, 1992)
But the accused is liable for the crime of murder, not for impossible crime, if he stabs a victim who lost consciousness because of the blow of
his co-conspirators. While there is impossibility of killing a person who is already dead, there is no impossibility if the person is only
unconscious. Even so, the collective liability of the accused conspirators renders both guilty of the crime of murder. (People v. Callao, March
14, 2018)
There is no crime of frustrated theft. Theft can only be attempted or consummated. Theft is already produced upon the taking of personal
property of another without the latter’s consent, even if the offender has no opportunity to dispose of the same. (Valenzuela v. People, June
21, 2007)
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. Where the several accused were shown to have acted in concert at the time of the commission of the offense, and their acts
indicated that they had the same purpose or common design and were united in the execution, conspiracy is established. Conspiracy
transcends companionship; mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge of, or
acquiescence in, or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the
commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. Thus, the mere fact that the accused were
seen together riding a motorcycle immediately after the commission of a felony does not necessarily prove the existence of a conspiracy
between them. (People v. Salga, July 23, 2018) But there is conspiracy where the four accused in a coordinated actions surrounded the
victim when it alighted the jeepney and took turns hitting and stabbing him with stone, samurai, and knife, and they immediately escaped.
(People v. Batulan, July 29, 2019 [J. Lazaro-Javier]) The existence of conspiracy must be proven with the same standard of proof required
to establish the crime itself, that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt. (People v. Arnado, March 21, 2022) Where the quantum of proof
required to establish conspiracy is lacking, the accused is responsible only for the consequences of his own acts. (People v. Catulang, November
3, 2020)
Under the doctrine of implied conspiracy, conspiracy is implied if two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent,
were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, even
though no actual meeting among them to concert means is proved. (People v. De Leon, June 26, 2009) Further, to be a conspirator,
one need not participate in every detail of the execution; neither did he have to know the exact part performed by his co-conspirator in the
execution of the criminal acts. (People v. Laguda, October 7, 2020)
Where the accused failed to prove all the elements of self-defense, he may nonetheless be entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense. The accused must prove the existence of the majority of the elements for self-defense, but
unlawful aggression, being an indispensable element, must be present. Either or both requisites may be absent: reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel it or the lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. (People v. Dulin,
June 29, 2015) Without unlawful aggression, there can be no justified killing in defense. (People v. Lumahang, March 27, 2019; People v.
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