Philosophy of Mind, Brain and Behaviour
Lecture 1 (14-4-2020):
Mind: umbrella-term for all mental states (thoughts, beliefs, hopes, fears, dreams)
Mental: intentional (about something else - unconscious thoughts) and/or
phenomenal (subjective sensation – feeling anxious but not knowing about what)
Substance dualism: the mind is an immaterial substance that is distinct from the
body but connected to the body (mind is a non-physical substance (a soul) that is
causally connected to the body)
Descartes: the mind is non-physical. What is it that we can’t doubt (you can doubt the
existence of your body, you can’t doubt the existence of your thoughts “I think,
therefore I am” (cogito ergo sum), because material things can’t think/doubt)
therefore my thinking and my body are two distinct substances
- Extended (physical): body
- Thinking (non-physical): mind
Logical structure of the cogito argument:
- X=Y only when X and Y share all their properties (regardless of our
perspective) I can doubt the existence of my body, I cannot doubt the
existence of my thinking thinking and the body are two distinct substances
Problems:
- Our perspective on something is not a property to that thing (one thing may
seem two distinct things because of our perspective to it, but it has all the
same properties)
- The interaction problem (Elizabeth): there is no explanation for the interaction
between the mind and the body (but even if there isn’t an explanation, it
doesn’t mean there’s no interaction)
Cartesian dualism: the immateriality of the soul and the separation of the outside
world and the inside mind
Psychological behaviourism: a response for methodological problems with dualism
(contrast between mind and behaviour study behaviour instead of the mind)
- As the mind is a non-physical substance, you can’t approach it otherwise than
from within (introspection (subjective)) Objective scientific investigation of
the mind or unconscious mental states aren’t possible, but behaviour is
possible
- Watson: there is no such thing as a soul, behaviourism is a methodological
thesis
- Skinner: ‘the history of human thought is the history of what humans have said
and done’
, Logical behaviourism: a response for logical, conceptual, philosophical or
theoretical problems with dualism (no contrast between mind and behaviour define
the mind in terms of behaviour and behavioural dispositions = all mental states can
be reduced to physical states (are about actual or potential observable behaviour))
The concept of Mind (Ryle):
- Conceptual analysis of ‘mind’ (mind is a manifestation of behaviour)
- The mind is not a thing (that’s a category mistake wrong conceptualisation
of the mind (just like the university and buildings))
- Mental states are behavioural dispositions (potential behaviour in certain
specific circumstances) thoughts/beliefs might give rise to behaviour
Problems:
- Being in pain, but not displaying this in behaviour or displaying ‘pain
behaviour’ but not being in pain (actress)
- Mental holism: mental states form a kind of network that define one another
(explaining behaviour not by one mental state, but by a whole network)
- para-mechanical hypothesis (Ryle): mind and body are depicted as pupetteer
and puppet (this is wrong) We postulate the mind as a hidden locus of
control in order to explain the difference between intelligent (caused by the
mind) and non-intelligent (caused by the body) behaviour. But we can only do
that if we already understand the distinction between intelligent and non-
intelligent behaviour ‘mind’ is a part of our behaviour, not the cause of it
(mind is a word for intelligent behaviour)
Identity theory: the mind is identical to the brain (mental = physical)
- Boring: consciousness is identical to/constituted by a brain process
- Place: part of the mind is behaviour (mental states are behavioural
dispositions), other part of the mind are brain processes (consciousness)
- Smart: the mind is as manipulatable as the brain. Mentalistic languages (the
way we speak in terms of what we think, feel, want…) is ‘topic neutral’ (without
making assumptions of the material/immaterial nature of our minds)
Problems:
- The ‘explanatory gap’: stating that mental states are brain states doesn’t
explain anything & how can intentionality and phenomenality be physical?
- Multiple realization: according to the identity theory, organisms with different
brains cannot have the same types of mental state unlikely (pain)
Lecture 2 (21-4-2020):
Functionalism: define mental states in terms of what they do (their function for an
organism, their interconnectedness), not in terms of what they’re made of (brain-stuff,
soul-stuff, behavioural dispositions) a mental state is characterized by how it’s
caused (sensory input) and what it causes (behaviour or other mental states)
Lecture 1 (14-4-2020):
Mind: umbrella-term for all mental states (thoughts, beliefs, hopes, fears, dreams)
Mental: intentional (about something else - unconscious thoughts) and/or
phenomenal (subjective sensation – feeling anxious but not knowing about what)
Substance dualism: the mind is an immaterial substance that is distinct from the
body but connected to the body (mind is a non-physical substance (a soul) that is
causally connected to the body)
Descartes: the mind is non-physical. What is it that we can’t doubt (you can doubt the
existence of your body, you can’t doubt the existence of your thoughts “I think,
therefore I am” (cogito ergo sum), because material things can’t think/doubt)
therefore my thinking and my body are two distinct substances
- Extended (physical): body
- Thinking (non-physical): mind
Logical structure of the cogito argument:
- X=Y only when X and Y share all their properties (regardless of our
perspective) I can doubt the existence of my body, I cannot doubt the
existence of my thinking thinking and the body are two distinct substances
Problems:
- Our perspective on something is not a property to that thing (one thing may
seem two distinct things because of our perspective to it, but it has all the
same properties)
- The interaction problem (Elizabeth): there is no explanation for the interaction
between the mind and the body (but even if there isn’t an explanation, it
doesn’t mean there’s no interaction)
Cartesian dualism: the immateriality of the soul and the separation of the outside
world and the inside mind
Psychological behaviourism: a response for methodological problems with dualism
(contrast between mind and behaviour study behaviour instead of the mind)
- As the mind is a non-physical substance, you can’t approach it otherwise than
from within (introspection (subjective)) Objective scientific investigation of
the mind or unconscious mental states aren’t possible, but behaviour is
possible
- Watson: there is no such thing as a soul, behaviourism is a methodological
thesis
- Skinner: ‘the history of human thought is the history of what humans have said
and done’
, Logical behaviourism: a response for logical, conceptual, philosophical or
theoretical problems with dualism (no contrast between mind and behaviour define
the mind in terms of behaviour and behavioural dispositions = all mental states can
be reduced to physical states (are about actual or potential observable behaviour))
The concept of Mind (Ryle):
- Conceptual analysis of ‘mind’ (mind is a manifestation of behaviour)
- The mind is not a thing (that’s a category mistake wrong conceptualisation
of the mind (just like the university and buildings))
- Mental states are behavioural dispositions (potential behaviour in certain
specific circumstances) thoughts/beliefs might give rise to behaviour
Problems:
- Being in pain, but not displaying this in behaviour or displaying ‘pain
behaviour’ but not being in pain (actress)
- Mental holism: mental states form a kind of network that define one another
(explaining behaviour not by one mental state, but by a whole network)
- para-mechanical hypothesis (Ryle): mind and body are depicted as pupetteer
and puppet (this is wrong) We postulate the mind as a hidden locus of
control in order to explain the difference between intelligent (caused by the
mind) and non-intelligent (caused by the body) behaviour. But we can only do
that if we already understand the distinction between intelligent and non-
intelligent behaviour ‘mind’ is a part of our behaviour, not the cause of it
(mind is a word for intelligent behaviour)
Identity theory: the mind is identical to the brain (mental = physical)
- Boring: consciousness is identical to/constituted by a brain process
- Place: part of the mind is behaviour (mental states are behavioural
dispositions), other part of the mind are brain processes (consciousness)
- Smart: the mind is as manipulatable as the brain. Mentalistic languages (the
way we speak in terms of what we think, feel, want…) is ‘topic neutral’ (without
making assumptions of the material/immaterial nature of our minds)
Problems:
- The ‘explanatory gap’: stating that mental states are brain states doesn’t
explain anything & how can intentionality and phenomenality be physical?
- Multiple realization: according to the identity theory, organisms with different
brains cannot have the same types of mental state unlikely (pain)
Lecture 2 (21-4-2020):
Functionalism: define mental states in terms of what they do (their function for an
organism, their interconnectedness), not in terms of what they’re made of (brain-stuff,
soul-stuff, behavioural dispositions) a mental state is characterized by how it’s
caused (sensory input) and what it causes (behaviour or other mental states)
