Assess the view that President Johnson was more responsible for
increasing American involvement in Vietnam than any other
Presidents?
Johnson's presidency saw a clear escalation in military and economic involvement: the
number of US military personnel increased from 16,000 in 1963 to over 500,000 by the end
of 1969 and spending levels peaked at $268.9 million in 1965 under Johnson. This supports
Anderson's view that Johnson is most responsible for increasing America’s involvement.
However, the role Johnson's predecessors played in shaping Johnson’s decisions needs
exploration. Eisenhower’s Domino Theory set a dangerous precedent for his successors,
creating a quagmire Johnson was unable to avoid, as VanDeMark affirms. Ball contends that
Kennedy’s sudden assassination made Johnson reliant on Kennedy’s pro-war advisors, who
gave Johnson no way to escape the conflict by pursuing aggressive policy like increased
bombing and implementing ground troops. Despite his predecessors increasing America's
political involvement in Vietnam and creating external factors which influenced Johnson’s
policies, the escalation of military and economic involvement was done under Johnson's final
orders. Historians such as Anderson are correct in labelling the Vietnam War “Johnson’s
War” and he is most responsible for increasing American involvement.
1
,Johnson can be seen as most responsible for increasing US military involvement in Vietnam
considering his implementation of US troops in Vietnam. Anderson argues that Johnson’s
commitment of troops means that he must "bear responsibility for the escalation of the war"
and that his expansionary military policies "Americanized the war". 1 Anderson is convincing
here considering the aggressive military policies pursued by Johnson. Johnson became the
first President to send ground troops to Vietnam in March 1965, a step which his
predecessors were eager to avoid. He quickly increased the number of troops to 88,000 by
May 1965 and by 1969 the number peaked at over 500,000. Operation Rolling Thunder was
another great escalatory step, ordering massively increased air attacks on North Vietnam in
order to secure the position of Americans in the South and disrupt Viet Cong supply lines
while destroying their morale. The campaign was the first sustained bombing campaign used
by US forces and it lasted until November 1968. He also created a Working Group from the
Defence Department which advised on military operations in South Vietnam, such as
creating a list of 100 target locations for bombing. The body recommended the escalation of
US military involvement in November 1964 after Johnson’s re-election. Contrastingly, Ball
argues that Kennedy’s sudden assassination forced Johnson to maintain his predecessor’s
military commitments, making Johnson less responsible. He suggests it “framed the Vietnam
decision-making process, propelling Johnson and his advisors toward an overt escalation of
the war”.2 This is compelling given the impact of Kennedy’s pro-war advisors on Johnson's
political actions. In August 1963, Secretary Rusk claimed the US should not pull out of
Vietnam, while General McNamara encouraged the use of large-scale bombing and the
introduction of US combat troops. Ambassador Lodge was also influential in increasing US
involvement, being influential in the removal of President Diem and believed the ARVN
needed US support to win the war. All three men had military backgrounds and aimed to win
the war through military intervention. The difficulty Johnson faced in turning the tide against
1 David Anderson, The Vietnam War (Macmillan Education UK, 2005), p.43.
2 Moya Ann Ball, The Phantom of the Oval Office: The John F. Kennedy Assassination's Symbolic
Impact on Lyndon B. Johnson, His Key Advisers, and the Vietnam Decision-Making Process
(Presidential Studies Quarterly, 1994), p.105.
2
, the pro-war sentiment that existed in the government is evident. However, Johnson’s own
rhetoric weakens this argument, as he publicly took a pro-war stance: "we have made a
national pledge to help South Vietnam defend its independence. I intend to keep that
promise".3 Speaking in a press conference in April 1965, Johnson was trying to justify
America's rapidly increasing military intervention in Vietnam after the first troops were sent a
month prior. He aimed to gain support amongst Americans for the inevitable escalation of
the war that was still to come and tried to use containment as justification. This supports the
view that Johnson was intent on escalating military involvement and shows that he is taking
ownership of this, strengthening the view that he is most responsible. This quote is
strengthened by Johnson’s actions make the quote convincing such as his hawkish
response to the Gulf Of Tonkin incident where he quickly passed the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution to authorise further military support to Vietnam, showing Johnson’s willingness to
heighten US involvement. This raises questions about Ball’s argument and makes it less
convincing than the source considering that Johnson’s words are reflected in his escalatory
actions. In summary, Johnson's public pro-war stance suggests his large-scale military
commitments were determined by his own beliefs, not by his predecessors’ actions. This
supports Anderson’s view that Johnson is most responsible for increasing American military
involvement in Vietnam.
Kennedy’s military commitments did not directly involve America in the war, making him less
responsible than Johnson. Rust suggests that Kennedy believed "the idea of committing US
combat troops to Vietnam appeared extremely dangerous”.4 This view is convincing as
Kennedy opted against introducing American ground troops. He recognised the dangers of
committing troops and was unwilling to send them so far away from home. Kennedy's
3 Lyndon Johnson, ‘Peace Without Conquest’, 7 April 1965. Accessed at
<https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-johns-hopkins-university-peace-without-
conquest> on 02.10.2023.
4 William Rust, Kennedy in Vietnam: American Foreign Policy from 1960 to 1963 ( Da Capo Press
Inc, 1987), p.50
3
increasing American involvement in Vietnam than any other
Presidents?
Johnson's presidency saw a clear escalation in military and economic involvement: the
number of US military personnel increased from 16,000 in 1963 to over 500,000 by the end
of 1969 and spending levels peaked at $268.9 million in 1965 under Johnson. This supports
Anderson's view that Johnson is most responsible for increasing America’s involvement.
However, the role Johnson's predecessors played in shaping Johnson’s decisions needs
exploration. Eisenhower’s Domino Theory set a dangerous precedent for his successors,
creating a quagmire Johnson was unable to avoid, as VanDeMark affirms. Ball contends that
Kennedy’s sudden assassination made Johnson reliant on Kennedy’s pro-war advisors, who
gave Johnson no way to escape the conflict by pursuing aggressive policy like increased
bombing and implementing ground troops. Despite his predecessors increasing America's
political involvement in Vietnam and creating external factors which influenced Johnson’s
policies, the escalation of military and economic involvement was done under Johnson's final
orders. Historians such as Anderson are correct in labelling the Vietnam War “Johnson’s
War” and he is most responsible for increasing American involvement.
1
,Johnson can be seen as most responsible for increasing US military involvement in Vietnam
considering his implementation of US troops in Vietnam. Anderson argues that Johnson’s
commitment of troops means that he must "bear responsibility for the escalation of the war"
and that his expansionary military policies "Americanized the war". 1 Anderson is convincing
here considering the aggressive military policies pursued by Johnson. Johnson became the
first President to send ground troops to Vietnam in March 1965, a step which his
predecessors were eager to avoid. He quickly increased the number of troops to 88,000 by
May 1965 and by 1969 the number peaked at over 500,000. Operation Rolling Thunder was
another great escalatory step, ordering massively increased air attacks on North Vietnam in
order to secure the position of Americans in the South and disrupt Viet Cong supply lines
while destroying their morale. The campaign was the first sustained bombing campaign used
by US forces and it lasted until November 1968. He also created a Working Group from the
Defence Department which advised on military operations in South Vietnam, such as
creating a list of 100 target locations for bombing. The body recommended the escalation of
US military involvement in November 1964 after Johnson’s re-election. Contrastingly, Ball
argues that Kennedy’s sudden assassination forced Johnson to maintain his predecessor’s
military commitments, making Johnson less responsible. He suggests it “framed the Vietnam
decision-making process, propelling Johnson and his advisors toward an overt escalation of
the war”.2 This is compelling given the impact of Kennedy’s pro-war advisors on Johnson's
political actions. In August 1963, Secretary Rusk claimed the US should not pull out of
Vietnam, while General McNamara encouraged the use of large-scale bombing and the
introduction of US combat troops. Ambassador Lodge was also influential in increasing US
involvement, being influential in the removal of President Diem and believed the ARVN
needed US support to win the war. All three men had military backgrounds and aimed to win
the war through military intervention. The difficulty Johnson faced in turning the tide against
1 David Anderson, The Vietnam War (Macmillan Education UK, 2005), p.43.
2 Moya Ann Ball, The Phantom of the Oval Office: The John F. Kennedy Assassination's Symbolic
Impact on Lyndon B. Johnson, His Key Advisers, and the Vietnam Decision-Making Process
(Presidential Studies Quarterly, 1994), p.105.
2
, the pro-war sentiment that existed in the government is evident. However, Johnson’s own
rhetoric weakens this argument, as he publicly took a pro-war stance: "we have made a
national pledge to help South Vietnam defend its independence. I intend to keep that
promise".3 Speaking in a press conference in April 1965, Johnson was trying to justify
America's rapidly increasing military intervention in Vietnam after the first troops were sent a
month prior. He aimed to gain support amongst Americans for the inevitable escalation of
the war that was still to come and tried to use containment as justification. This supports the
view that Johnson was intent on escalating military involvement and shows that he is taking
ownership of this, strengthening the view that he is most responsible. This quote is
strengthened by Johnson’s actions make the quote convincing such as his hawkish
response to the Gulf Of Tonkin incident where he quickly passed the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution to authorise further military support to Vietnam, showing Johnson’s willingness to
heighten US involvement. This raises questions about Ball’s argument and makes it less
convincing than the source considering that Johnson’s words are reflected in his escalatory
actions. In summary, Johnson's public pro-war stance suggests his large-scale military
commitments were determined by his own beliefs, not by his predecessors’ actions. This
supports Anderson’s view that Johnson is most responsible for increasing American military
involvement in Vietnam.
Kennedy’s military commitments did not directly involve America in the war, making him less
responsible than Johnson. Rust suggests that Kennedy believed "the idea of committing US
combat troops to Vietnam appeared extremely dangerous”.4 This view is convincing as
Kennedy opted against introducing American ground troops. He recognised the dangers of
committing troops and was unwilling to send them so far away from home. Kennedy's
3 Lyndon Johnson, ‘Peace Without Conquest’, 7 April 1965. Accessed at
<https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-johns-hopkins-university-peace-without-
conquest> on 02.10.2023.
4 William Rust, Kennedy in Vietnam: American Foreign Policy from 1960 to 1963 ( Da Capo Press
Inc, 1987), p.50
3
