LCR4802
Assessment 1
Semester 2 2025
Due September 2025
, LCR4802
Assessment 1
Semester 2 2025
Due September 2025
Medical Law
(a) Statutory ground of justification
Dr Rammage could potentially rely on a statutory ground of justification under the
National Health Act 61 of 2003 (NHA) for administering insulin, fluids, and electrolytes to
John Doe without his consent. Section 7(1) of the NHA requires informed consent
before health services are provided. However, section 7(1)(f) creates an important
exception: treatment may proceed without consent where a delay would likely result in
the user’s death or irreversible damage to health, provided that the user has not
expressly, impliedly, or by conduct refused the intervention.¹
In the present scenario, John Doe is unconscious and therefore unable to give or refuse
consent. Dr Rammage’s clinical suspicion of diabetic ketoacidosis (DKA)—indicated by
severe dehydration, rapid deep breathing, fruity breath, and a diabetic bracelet—
suggests a life-threatening condition requiring immediate intervention. Any delay could
lead to coma, organ failure, or death. On these grounds, section 7(1)(f) of the NHA
would likely justify her administering emergency treatment without prior consent.
Accordingly, the statutory defence would negate civil claims of assault (unlawful
physical interference) or iniuria (infringement of dignity), since the intervention would be
lawful and directed at preventing grave harm. No other statutory basis, such as those
under the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002, would apply here, as the matter concerns
acute physical rather than psychiatric care.
Assessment 1
Semester 2 2025
Due September 2025
, LCR4802
Assessment 1
Semester 2 2025
Due September 2025
Medical Law
(a) Statutory ground of justification
Dr Rammage could potentially rely on a statutory ground of justification under the
National Health Act 61 of 2003 (NHA) for administering insulin, fluids, and electrolytes to
John Doe without his consent. Section 7(1) of the NHA requires informed consent
before health services are provided. However, section 7(1)(f) creates an important
exception: treatment may proceed without consent where a delay would likely result in
the user’s death or irreversible damage to health, provided that the user has not
expressly, impliedly, or by conduct refused the intervention.¹
In the present scenario, John Doe is unconscious and therefore unable to give or refuse
consent. Dr Rammage’s clinical suspicion of diabetic ketoacidosis (DKA)—indicated by
severe dehydration, rapid deep breathing, fruity breath, and a diabetic bracelet—
suggests a life-threatening condition requiring immediate intervention. Any delay could
lead to coma, organ failure, or death. On these grounds, section 7(1)(f) of the NHA
would likely justify her administering emergency treatment without prior consent.
Accordingly, the statutory defence would negate civil claims of assault (unlawful
physical interference) or iniuria (infringement of dignity), since the intervention would be
lawful and directed at preventing grave harm. No other statutory basis, such as those
under the Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002, would apply here, as the matter concerns
acute physical rather than psychiatric care.
