LCR4805
Assessment 2
Semester 2 2025
Unique No: 801278
Due September 2025
, LCR4805
Assessment 2
Semester 2 2025
Unique No: 801278
Due September 2025
Question 1: Whether Information Can Be Stolen under South African Law
The common-law definition of theft in South Africa, consistently affirmed through judicial
precedent, requires the unlawful and intentional appropriation of movable corporeal
property belonging to another, with the intention of permanently depriving the owner of
it. This definition highlights two critical elements: first, that the object of theft must be
corporeal, meaning tangible and capable of physical possession; and second, that the
appropriation must involve the assumption of control with intent to exclude the owner
permanently. Traditional examples include goods, cash, or other physically movable
objects. The central issue, therefore, is whether “information”—by its nature intangible—
can fall within this framework.
South African courts have repeatedly rejected the notion that information can be stolen
under common law because it lacks corporeality. In S v Mintoor, the court held that
copying confidential information did not constitute theft: the original owner was not
dispossessed in a tangible sense, and permanent deprivation was absent since the
information remained accessible to the rightful owner. Similarly, in Nissan South Africa
(Pty) Ltd v Marnitz, the judiciary emphasized that intellectual and intangible assets are
excluded from the scope of theft. Appropriation, the court reasoned, requires physical
control over an item that can be moved and possessed.
This limitation creates a fundamental gap in the law in an era where data and
information constitute valuable assets. While the Supreme Court of Appeal in S v
Assessment 2
Semester 2 2025
Unique No: 801278
Due September 2025
, LCR4805
Assessment 2
Semester 2 2025
Unique No: 801278
Due September 2025
Question 1: Whether Information Can Be Stolen under South African Law
The common-law definition of theft in South Africa, consistently affirmed through judicial
precedent, requires the unlawful and intentional appropriation of movable corporeal
property belonging to another, with the intention of permanently depriving the owner of
it. This definition highlights two critical elements: first, that the object of theft must be
corporeal, meaning tangible and capable of physical possession; and second, that the
appropriation must involve the assumption of control with intent to exclude the owner
permanently. Traditional examples include goods, cash, or other physically movable
objects. The central issue, therefore, is whether “information”—by its nature intangible—
can fall within this framework.
South African courts have repeatedly rejected the notion that information can be stolen
under common law because it lacks corporeality. In S v Mintoor, the court held that
copying confidential information did not constitute theft: the original owner was not
dispossessed in a tangible sense, and permanent deprivation was absent since the
information remained accessible to the rightful owner. Similarly, in Nissan South Africa
(Pty) Ltd v Marnitz, the judiciary emphasized that intellectual and intangible assets are
excluded from the scope of theft. Appropriation, the court reasoned, requires physical
control over an item that can be moved and possessed.
This limitation creates a fundamental gap in the law in an era where data and
information constitute valuable assets. While the Supreme Court of Appeal in S v
