INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
MIDTERM: APRIL 21ST 2025
LECTURE 2-7
LECTURE 2
Stephen Walt, “Alliance, Formation, and the Balance of World Power,” International
Security, vol. 9, no. 4, 1985. (Reading Focus: 3-18)
Walt introduces the Balance of Threat theory, refining the classical Balance of Power
concept in international relations. Walt argues that states form alliances not merely to
counterbalance power but to address perceived threats, which are influenced by several
factors.
Balance of Power vs Balance of Threat
● Traditional Balance of Power: states internally balance against a threat by forming
an alliance with other threatened states to balance/ counteract the potential
threat.
● Balance of Threat: States form an alliance as a response to threat and threat
perceptions depends on 4 factors:
1. Aggregate Power: states’s total resources
a. i.e., population, industrial and military capability, technological
prowess -> greater potential threat it can pose to others.
2. Geographical Proximity: States will also align in response to threats from
proximate power.
a. Ability to project power declines w distance states → nearby pose a
greater threat than those that are far away.
i. E.g., British Foreign Officer was more sensitive to German
naval expansion compared to similar movement in Brazil →
due to proximitiy of German coasts and the remoteness of
Brazil.
b. Proximate threats trigger a balancing or bandwagoning response.
i. If PP triggers a balancing response → alliance networks →
‘neighbors of neighbors are friends’
ii. If PP triggers bandwagoning → ‘sphere of influence’
1. Small states bordering a great power may be so
vulnerable → choose to bandwagon rather than
balance
3. Offensive Capability/ Offensive Power: states w/ larger offensive
capability = more likely to provoke an alliance.
a. Balancing: Immediate threat posed by offensive capabilities = leads
states to balancing (allying w/ others).
b. If offensive power is deemed too strong → vulnerable states sees
little hope in resisting → balancing may not be able to provide
assistance fast enough = bandwagon
4. Offensive intentions: how aggressive are states?
, a. States that appear aggressive → likely to provoke others to balance
against them.
b. e.g., Nazi-Germany provoked a coalition due to its extremely
offensive ambitions
c. Perceptions of intent play an especially crucial role in alliance
choices.
d. f the intentions are aggressive → balancing w/ other → avoid
becoming a victim.
Therefore, Walt contends that perceived threats—rather than power alone—drive alliance
formation.
Balancing Behaviour
● States will balance for 2 key reasons:
1. Safer for states to ally w/ weaker states to avoid being dominated.
2. States will join the weaker states to reduce the dominant state’s influence.
Bandwagoning Behaviour
● Two motives for bandwagoning:
1. As a form of appeasement - to avoid an attack
2. To share the spoils of victory - i.e., territory
Implications for International Security
Walt's theory has significant implications for understanding global alliances. It suggests
that the structure of international power is shaped by how states perceive and respond
to threats. Misjudging the balance between balancing and bandwagoning can lead to
flawed foreign policies and unintended escalations.
In summary, Walt's work provides a nuanced framework for analyzing alliance behavior,
emphasizing the importance of threat perception over mere power calculations in
international relations.
Randall Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back in,”
International Security, vol. 19, no. 1, 1994.
Schweller challenges traditional theories of alliance formation by introducing the concept
of bandwagoning for profit, emphasizing that states may align with stronger powers not
out of fear, but to gain from their success.
Introduction of Bandwagoning for Profit:
, ● Schweller introduces the concept of bandwagoning for profit, where weaker
states align with stronger, revisionist states to gain from their expansionist
success.
● This behavior is driven by the potential rewards of aligning with a rising power,
rather than by the need to counter a threat.
● Schweller argues that a threat is required for balancing, however it is unnecessary
for bandwagoning
Revisionist vs. Status-Quo States:
● Schweller distinguishes between revisionist states: states that seek to improve
their position in the system and are attracted to expanding their state and
status-quo states: states that are content w/ the system and aim to maintain it.
● Revisionist may attract weaker states to bandwagon, offering potential gains.
Bandwagoning:
● Schweller focuses on 2 aspects of bandwagoning:
1. The opportunistic gains from bandwagoning.
2. The alliance choice of threatening states and how states respond to that
threat.
● Schweller distinguishes that balancing is more costly, whereas bandwagoning is
more of the expectation of the gain.
Schweller identifies several types of bandwagoning:
1. Jackal Bandwagoning
a. Goal of JB: profit
b. Weaker revisionist states bandwagon to share the spoils of victory (e.g.,
territory or security)
c. Strong revisionist states may accept bandwagon in attempt to prevent/
block the formation of a status-quo coalition.
i. e.g., Italy, SU, Japan, Hungary, Bulgaria was encouraged to share the
spoils of Hitler in order to block the formation of a rival coalition.
2. Piling On
a. When the outcome of war has been determined ⇒ states bandwagon to
more ‘overwhelming coalitions’ to share the spoils of victory or out of fear
of punishment.
b. To minimise their risk + maximise potential gains.
c. E.g., Coalition during the Gulf War -> by aligning w/ the US, states hoped to
gain potential economic and diplomatic benefits from the winning side.
3. Wave of the Future
a. States may bandwagon if they feel that it is going the direction of ‘wave of
the future’ (aka the winning side)
i. e.g., many were drawn to communism during the cold war ⇒
bandwagon the SU w/ the belief that communism would be a global
belief.
4. Contagion/ Domino Effect
MIDTERM: APRIL 21ST 2025
LECTURE 2-7
LECTURE 2
Stephen Walt, “Alliance, Formation, and the Balance of World Power,” International
Security, vol. 9, no. 4, 1985. (Reading Focus: 3-18)
Walt introduces the Balance of Threat theory, refining the classical Balance of Power
concept in international relations. Walt argues that states form alliances not merely to
counterbalance power but to address perceived threats, which are influenced by several
factors.
Balance of Power vs Balance of Threat
● Traditional Balance of Power: states internally balance against a threat by forming
an alliance with other threatened states to balance/ counteract the potential
threat.
● Balance of Threat: States form an alliance as a response to threat and threat
perceptions depends on 4 factors:
1. Aggregate Power: states’s total resources
a. i.e., population, industrial and military capability, technological
prowess -> greater potential threat it can pose to others.
2. Geographical Proximity: States will also align in response to threats from
proximate power.
a. Ability to project power declines w distance states → nearby pose a
greater threat than those that are far away.
i. E.g., British Foreign Officer was more sensitive to German
naval expansion compared to similar movement in Brazil →
due to proximitiy of German coasts and the remoteness of
Brazil.
b. Proximate threats trigger a balancing or bandwagoning response.
i. If PP triggers a balancing response → alliance networks →
‘neighbors of neighbors are friends’
ii. If PP triggers bandwagoning → ‘sphere of influence’
1. Small states bordering a great power may be so
vulnerable → choose to bandwagon rather than
balance
3. Offensive Capability/ Offensive Power: states w/ larger offensive
capability = more likely to provoke an alliance.
a. Balancing: Immediate threat posed by offensive capabilities = leads
states to balancing (allying w/ others).
b. If offensive power is deemed too strong → vulnerable states sees
little hope in resisting → balancing may not be able to provide
assistance fast enough = bandwagon
4. Offensive intentions: how aggressive are states?
, a. States that appear aggressive → likely to provoke others to balance
against them.
b. e.g., Nazi-Germany provoked a coalition due to its extremely
offensive ambitions
c. Perceptions of intent play an especially crucial role in alliance
choices.
d. f the intentions are aggressive → balancing w/ other → avoid
becoming a victim.
Therefore, Walt contends that perceived threats—rather than power alone—drive alliance
formation.
Balancing Behaviour
● States will balance for 2 key reasons:
1. Safer for states to ally w/ weaker states to avoid being dominated.
2. States will join the weaker states to reduce the dominant state’s influence.
Bandwagoning Behaviour
● Two motives for bandwagoning:
1. As a form of appeasement - to avoid an attack
2. To share the spoils of victory - i.e., territory
Implications for International Security
Walt's theory has significant implications for understanding global alliances. It suggests
that the structure of international power is shaped by how states perceive and respond
to threats. Misjudging the balance between balancing and bandwagoning can lead to
flawed foreign policies and unintended escalations.
In summary, Walt's work provides a nuanced framework for analyzing alliance behavior,
emphasizing the importance of threat perception over mere power calculations in
international relations.
Randall Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back in,”
International Security, vol. 19, no. 1, 1994.
Schweller challenges traditional theories of alliance formation by introducing the concept
of bandwagoning for profit, emphasizing that states may align with stronger powers not
out of fear, but to gain from their success.
Introduction of Bandwagoning for Profit:
, ● Schweller introduces the concept of bandwagoning for profit, where weaker
states align with stronger, revisionist states to gain from their expansionist
success.
● This behavior is driven by the potential rewards of aligning with a rising power,
rather than by the need to counter a threat.
● Schweller argues that a threat is required for balancing, however it is unnecessary
for bandwagoning
Revisionist vs. Status-Quo States:
● Schweller distinguishes between revisionist states: states that seek to improve
their position in the system and are attracted to expanding their state and
status-quo states: states that are content w/ the system and aim to maintain it.
● Revisionist may attract weaker states to bandwagon, offering potential gains.
Bandwagoning:
● Schweller focuses on 2 aspects of bandwagoning:
1. The opportunistic gains from bandwagoning.
2. The alliance choice of threatening states and how states respond to that
threat.
● Schweller distinguishes that balancing is more costly, whereas bandwagoning is
more of the expectation of the gain.
Schweller identifies several types of bandwagoning:
1. Jackal Bandwagoning
a. Goal of JB: profit
b. Weaker revisionist states bandwagon to share the spoils of victory (e.g.,
territory or security)
c. Strong revisionist states may accept bandwagon in attempt to prevent/
block the formation of a status-quo coalition.
i. e.g., Italy, SU, Japan, Hungary, Bulgaria was encouraged to share the
spoils of Hitler in order to block the formation of a rival coalition.
2. Piling On
a. When the outcome of war has been determined ⇒ states bandwagon to
more ‘overwhelming coalitions’ to share the spoils of victory or out of fear
of punishment.
b. To minimise their risk + maximise potential gains.
c. E.g., Coalition during the Gulf War -> by aligning w/ the US, states hoped to
gain potential economic and diplomatic benefits from the winning side.
3. Wave of the Future
a. States may bandwagon if they feel that it is going the direction of ‘wave of
the future’ (aka the winning side)
i. e.g., many were drawn to communism during the cold war ⇒
bandwagon the SU w/ the belief that communism would be a global
belief.
4. Contagion/ Domino Effect
