kellogg02.qxd b b 7/11/02 b b 10:27 AM bb b b Page 25 bb
CHAPTER 2
COGNITIVENEUROSCIENC b
E
bb
T
he field of cognitive neuroscience addresses how mental functions
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
ar e supported by the brain. This close relative of cognitive psychology
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
is exp loding with new findings as a result of the discovery of methods
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
for imagi ng the workings of the living brain. Neuroimaging
bb bb b b bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
technologies have rev olutionized the study of the brain, but as will be
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
seen in this chapter, theirde ffective use requires thed behavioral
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
measures, research strategies, and theories of cognitive psychology. It
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
is also important to understand that th
bb bb bb e core questions of bb bb bb bb b b bb bb bb
cognitive psychology cannot be answered just by viewi ng the brain in
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
action. One must first know which cognitive functions, such
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
as short- bb
term memory, to look fordin a highly complex organ. Indotherdwords,
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
cogni tive psychology provides the theories that guide the
bb bb b b b b b b b b b b b b b b
search into the b b b b b b
structures and activities of thedbrain. bb bb bb bb
The chapter begins with an introduction to the problem of how the
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
min d and brain are related to each other. Next, a brief tour of
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
functional neu- roanatomy is provided, followed by a discussion of the
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
methods used in c ognitive neuroscience. Lastly, the fundamental
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
properties of connectionist models are presented. As noted in
bb bb bb bb b b b b b b b b b b
Chapterd 1, these are highly simplifie d
b b bb b b b b b b b b bb
,kellogg02.qxd b b 7/11/02 b b 10:27 AM
bb b b Page 26
bb
25
,kellogg02.qxd b b 7/11/02 b b 10:27 AM bb b b Page 27 bb
26 b b ● SCOPE AND METHODS
bb bb bb
models of the brain using artificial neurons that mimic some of the
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
basic p roperties of real neurons. Connectionist models are now a
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
central tool in c ognitive neuroscience and the broader field of
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
cognitive psychology.
bb bb
● MIND AND BRAIN bb bb
Cognitive neuroscience confronts us with one of the most challenging, if
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
n
bb ot the most challenging, philosophical and scientificdquestions.
b b bb bb bb bb bb bb
What exactl y is thedrelation between the mind and the body? Put
bb bb b b bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
differently, how is co n-
bb bb bb bb bb
sciousness produced by the brain? Is a mental state reducible to a
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
physica
bb l state of the brain, or are they separate phenomena?
b b bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
One view of the relation between the brain and the mind is that
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
they a re one and the same. Materialism regards the mind as the
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
product of the b raindand its physiological processes. The mind does
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
not exist independentl
bb bb y of the nervous system, according to
bb b b bb bb bb bb bb bb
materialism. One version of material ism contends that it is possible
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
in theory to reduce all cognitive processes
bb bb to descriptions of neural
bb bb bb bb bb b b bb bb bb
events (Crick, 1994). The reductionisticdpoint of v iew was well-
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
expressed by Dennett (1991) in these words: bb bb bb bb bb bb
The prevailing wisdom, variously expressed and argued for, is material
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
- ism: there is only one sort ofdstuff, namelydmatter—
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
the physical stuff of physics, chemistry, and physiology—
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
and the mind is somehowdnothing but a physical phenomenon. In
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
sho rt, the mind is the brain. Accordingdto the materialists, we can
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
(in prin ciple!) account for every mental phenomenon usingdthe
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
same physical principles, laws, and raw materials that suffice to
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
explain radioactivity, continental drift, photosynthesis,
bb bb bb bb bb
reproduction, nutrition, and growth
bb bb bb bb
. (p. 33)
bb bb
Not all versions of materialism contend that the mind can be
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
bb reduced t o a description ofdbrain states. An alternative version
bb b b bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
bb regards mental state s as emergent properties of neural functioning
bb bb b b bb bb bb bb bb bb
bb (Scott, 1995). An emergent property implies that the whole is
bb bb bb bb bb b b b b b b b b
b b greater than the sum of its parts. It i s not possible to
b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b bb bb bb bb
bb predict the behavior of the whole just from knowingdthe behavior of
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
bb the parts. In addition, it is necessary to understand how all of t he
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
bb parts interact with one another to produce the whole. A mental state
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
bb ca n be viewed, then, as a whole that is more than the sum of the
b b bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
bb individual n eurons firing. Regarding the mind as an emergent
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
bb property is mentalistic b ut stays within the confines of materialism.
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
bb Mental experience depends on, and is a functional property of,
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
, kellogg02.qxd b b 7/11/02 b b 10:27 AM bb b b Page 28bb
bb andactive living brain. Sperry (1980) expla ined the mentalistic
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
bb approach to materialism in the following passage:
bb bb bb bb bb bb
CHAPTER 2
COGNITIVENEUROSCIENC b
E
bb
T
he field of cognitive neuroscience addresses how mental functions
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
ar e supported by the brain. This close relative of cognitive psychology
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
is exp loding with new findings as a result of the discovery of methods
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
for imagi ng the workings of the living brain. Neuroimaging
bb bb b b bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
technologies have rev olutionized the study of the brain, but as will be
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
seen in this chapter, theirde ffective use requires thed behavioral
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
measures, research strategies, and theories of cognitive psychology. It
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
is also important to understand that th
bb bb bb e core questions of bb bb bb bb b b bb bb bb
cognitive psychology cannot be answered just by viewi ng the brain in
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
action. One must first know which cognitive functions, such
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
as short- bb
term memory, to look fordin a highly complex organ. Indotherdwords,
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
cogni tive psychology provides the theories that guide the
bb bb b b b b b b b b b b b b b b
search into the b b b b b b
structures and activities of thedbrain. bb bb bb bb
The chapter begins with an introduction to the problem of how the
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
min d and brain are related to each other. Next, a brief tour of
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
functional neu- roanatomy is provided, followed by a discussion of the
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
methods used in c ognitive neuroscience. Lastly, the fundamental
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
properties of connectionist models are presented. As noted in
bb bb bb bb b b b b b b b b b b
Chapterd 1, these are highly simplifie d
b b bb b b b b b b b b bb
,kellogg02.qxd b b 7/11/02 b b 10:27 AM
bb b b Page 26
bb
25
,kellogg02.qxd b b 7/11/02 b b 10:27 AM bb b b Page 27 bb
26 b b ● SCOPE AND METHODS
bb bb bb
models of the brain using artificial neurons that mimic some of the
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
basic p roperties of real neurons. Connectionist models are now a
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
central tool in c ognitive neuroscience and the broader field of
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
cognitive psychology.
bb bb
● MIND AND BRAIN bb bb
Cognitive neuroscience confronts us with one of the most challenging, if
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
n
bb ot the most challenging, philosophical and scientificdquestions.
b b bb bb bb bb bb bb
What exactl y is thedrelation between the mind and the body? Put
bb bb b b bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
differently, how is co n-
bb bb bb bb bb
sciousness produced by the brain? Is a mental state reducible to a
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
physica
bb l state of the brain, or are they separate phenomena?
b b bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
One view of the relation between the brain and the mind is that
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
they a re one and the same. Materialism regards the mind as the
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
product of the b raindand its physiological processes. The mind does
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
not exist independentl
bb bb y of the nervous system, according to
bb b b bb bb bb bb bb bb
materialism. One version of material ism contends that it is possible
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
in theory to reduce all cognitive processes
bb bb to descriptions of neural
bb bb bb bb bb b b bb bb bb
events (Crick, 1994). The reductionisticdpoint of v iew was well-
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
expressed by Dennett (1991) in these words: bb bb bb bb bb bb
The prevailing wisdom, variously expressed and argued for, is material
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
- ism: there is only one sort ofdstuff, namelydmatter—
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
the physical stuff of physics, chemistry, and physiology—
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
and the mind is somehowdnothing but a physical phenomenon. In
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
sho rt, the mind is the brain. Accordingdto the materialists, we can
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
(in prin ciple!) account for every mental phenomenon usingdthe
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
same physical principles, laws, and raw materials that suffice to
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
explain radioactivity, continental drift, photosynthesis,
bb bb bb bb bb
reproduction, nutrition, and growth
bb bb bb bb
. (p. 33)
bb bb
Not all versions of materialism contend that the mind can be
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
bb reduced t o a description ofdbrain states. An alternative version
bb b b bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
bb regards mental state s as emergent properties of neural functioning
bb bb b b bb bb bb bb bb bb
bb (Scott, 1995). An emergent property implies that the whole is
bb bb bb bb bb b b b b b b b b
b b greater than the sum of its parts. It i s not possible to
b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b bb bb bb bb
bb predict the behavior of the whole just from knowingdthe behavior of
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
bb the parts. In addition, it is necessary to understand how all of t he
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
bb parts interact with one another to produce the whole. A mental state
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
bb ca n be viewed, then, as a whole that is more than the sum of the
b b bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
bb individual n eurons firing. Regarding the mind as an emergent
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
bb property is mentalistic b ut stays within the confines of materialism.
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
bb Mental experience depends on, and is a functional property of,
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
, kellogg02.qxd b b 7/11/02 b b 10:27 AM bb b b Page 28bb
bb andactive living brain. Sperry (1980) expla ined the mentalistic
bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
bb approach to materialism in the following passage:
bb bb bb bb bb bb
