c c c c c c
Edition Ross, Westerfield, and Jordan
c c c c c c
Chapters 1 - 27
c c c
,CHAPTER 1: Introduction to Corporate Finance
c c c c c
CHAPTER 2: Financial Statements, Taxes, And Cash Flow
c c c c c c c
CHAPTER 3: Working with Financial Statements
c c c c c
CHAPTER 4: Long-Term Financial Planning and Growth
c c c c c c
CHAPTER 5: Introduction to Valuation: The Time Value of Money
c c c c c c c c c
CHAPTER 6: Discounted Cash Flow Valuation
c c c c c
CHAPTER 7: Interest Rates and Bond Valuation
c c c c c c
CHAPTER 8: Stock Valuation
c c c
CHAPTER 9: Net Present Value and Other Investment Criteria
c c c c c c c c
CHAPTER 10: Making Capital Investment Decisions
c c c c c
CHAPTER 11: Project Analysis and Evaluation
c c c c c
CHAPTER 12: Some Lessons from Capital Market History
c c c c c c c
CHAPTER 13: Return, Risk, And the Security Market Line
c c c c c c c c
CHAPTER 14: Cost of Capital
c c c c
CHAPTER 15: Raising Capital
c c c
CHAPTER 16: Financial Leverage and Capital Structure Policy
c c c c c c c
CHAPTER 17: Dividends and Payout Policy
c c c c c
CHAPTER 18: Short-Term Finance and Planning
c c c c c
CHAPTER 19: Cash and Liquidity Management
c c c c c
CHAPTER 20: Credit and Inventory Management
c c c c c
CHAPTER 21: International Corporate Finance
c c c c
CHAPTER 22: Behavioral Finance: Implications for Financial Manage
c c c c c c c
CHAPTER 23: Enterprise Risk Management
c c c c
CHAPTER 24:Options and Corporate Finance
c c c c
CHAPTER 25: Option Valuation
c c c
CHAPTER 26: Mergers and Acquisitions
c c c c
CHAPTER 27: Leasing
c c
,CHAPTER 1 c
INTRODUCTION TO c
CORPORATEFINANCE
c c
Answers to Concepts Review and Critical Thinking Questions
c c c c c c c
1. Capital budgeting (deciding whether to expand a manufacturing plant), capital structure (deciding
c c c c c c c c c c c
whether to issue new equity and use the proceeds to retire outstanding debt), and working capital
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
management (modifying the firm‘s credit collection policy with its customers).
c c c c c c c c c c
2. Disadvantages: unlimited liability, limited life, difficulty in transferring ownership, hard to raise
c c c c c c c c c c c
capital funds. Some advantages: simpler, less regulation, the owners are also the managers,
c c c c c c c c c c c c c
sometimes personal tax rates are better than corporate tax rates.
c c c c c c c c c c
3. The primary disadvantage of the corporate form is the double taxation to shareholders of distributed
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
earnings and dividends. Some advantages include: limited liability, ease of transferability, ability to
c c c c c c c c c c c c c
raise capital, unlimited life, and so forth.
c c c c c c c
4. In response to Sarbanes-Oxley, small firms have elected to go dark because of the costs of
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
compliance. The costs to comply with Sarbox can be several million dollars, which can be a large
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
percentage of a small firms profits. A major cost of going dark is less access to capital.
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
cSince the firm is no longer publicly traded, it can no longer raise money in the public market.
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
Although the company will still have access to bank loans and the private equity market, the costs
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
associated with raising funds in these markets are usually higher than the costs of raising funds in the
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
public market.
c c
5. The treasurer‘s office and the controller‘s office are the two primary organizational
c c c c c c c c c c c
cgroups that report directly to the chief financial officer. The controller‘s office handles cost and
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
financial accounting, tax management, and management information systems, while the treasurer‘s
c c c c c c c c c c c
office is responsible for cash and credit management, capital budgeting, and financial
c c c c c c c c c c c c
planning. Therefore, the study of corporate finance is concentrated within the treasury group‘s
c c c c c c c c c c c c c
functions.
c
6. To maximize the current market value (share price) of the equity of the firm (whether it‘s publicly-
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
traded or not).
c c c
7. In the corporate form of ownership, the shareholders are the owners of the firm. The shareholders
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
elect the directors of the corporation, who in turn appoint the firm‘s management. This separation of
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
ownership from control in the corporate form of organization is what causes agency problems to
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
exist. Management may act in its own or someone else‘s best interests, rather than those of the
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
shareholders. If such events occur, they may contradict the goal of maximizing the share price of the
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
equity of the firm.
c c c c
8. A primary market transaction.
c c c
, B-2 SOLUTIONS
c
9. In auction markets like the NYSE, brokers and agents meet at a physical location (the exchange) to
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
cmatch buyers and sellers of assets. Dealer markets like NASDAQ consist of dealers operating at
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
dispersed locales who buy and sell assets themselves, communicating with other dealers either
c c c c c c c c c c c c c
electronically or literally over-the-counter.
c c c c
10. Such organizations frequently pursue social or political missions, so many different goals are
c c c c c c c c c c c c
conceivable. One goal that is often cited is revenue minimization; i.e., provide whatever goods and
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
services are offered at the lowest possible cost to society. A better approach might be to observe that
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
even a not-for-profit business has equity. Thus, one answer is that the appropriate goal is to
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
maximize the value of the equity.
c c c c c c
11. Presumably, the current stock value reflects the risk, timing, and magnitude of all future cash flows,
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
both short-term and long-term. If this is correct, then the statement is false.
c c c c c c c c c c c c c
12. An argument can be made either way. At the one extreme, we could argue that in a market
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
economy,all of these things are priced. There is thus an optimal level of, for example, ethical and/or
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
illegal behavior, and the framework of stock valuation explicitly includes these. At the other
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
extreme, we could argue that these are non-economic phenomena and are best handled through the
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
political process. A classic (and highly relevant) thought question that illustrates this debate goes
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
something like this: ―A firm has estimated that the cost of improving the safety of one of its
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
products is $30 million. However, the firm believes that improving the safety of the product will
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
only save $20 million in product liability claims. What should the firm do?‖
c c c c c c c c c c c c c
13. The goal will be the same, but the best course of action toward that goal may be different because of
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
differing social, political, and economic institutions.
c c c c c c
14. The goal of management should be to maximize the share price for the current shareholders. If
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
management believes that it can improve the profitability of the firm so that the share price will
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
exceed $35, then they should fight the offer from the outside company. If management believes that
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
this bidder or other unidentified bidders will actually pay more than $35 per share to acquire the
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
company, then they should still fight the offer. However, if the current management cannot increase
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
the value of the firm beyond the bid price, and no other higher bids come in, then management is not
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
acting in the interests of the shareholders by fighting the offer. Since current managers often lose
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
their jobs when the corporation is acquired, poorly monitored managers have an incentive to fight
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
corporate takeovers in situations such as this.
c c c c c c c
15. We would expect agency problems to be less severe in other countries, primarily due to the
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
relatively small percentage of individual ownership. Fewer individual owners should reduce the
c c c c c c c c c c c c
number of diverse opinions concerning corporate goals. The high percentage of institutional
c c c c c c c c c c c c
ownership might lead to a higher degree of agreement between owners and managers on decisions
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
concerning risky projects. In addition, institutions may be better able to implement effective
c c c c c c c c c c c c c
monitoring mechanisms on managers than can individual owners, based on the institutions‘ deeper
c c c c c c c c c c c c c
resources and experiences with their own management. The increase in institutional ownership of
c c c c c c c c c c c c c
stock in the United States and the growing activism of these large shareholder groups may lead to a
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
reduction in agency problems for U.S. corporations and a more efficient market for corporate
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
control.
c