The objection from the possibility of inverted qualia.
Qualia = the phenomenal properties of experience
What is the inverted qualia argument?
- The inverted qualia argument is a thought experiment that poses a challenge to functionalism
and certain theories of consciousness. The argument explores the possibility that individuals
could have different subjective experiences while behaving in the same way or having the same
functional organization of their mental states. This thought experiment is often used to raise
questions about whether functionalism can fully account for the nature of consciousness and
subjective experience.
The argument:
Imagine two individuals, let's call them person A and person B.
Person A perceives the color red and experiences it as a vivid, rich sensation. Person B, however,
has inverted qualia and perceives the color red in a way that is subjectively different from
person A.
Despite this difference in subjective experience, both individuals behave in the same way when
presented with objects of the color red. They both correctly identify red objects, use the word
"red" in the same contexts, and exhibit the same functional responses.
However, person B has a sensation different from ours in each of these cases; their sensory
states are "inverted."
It is plausible to think that since A and B differ in their qualia, they have different mental states.
Since, however, those states are functionally the same, functionalism apparently counts them as
having the same type of mental state. Hence, something is wrong in functionalism.
Implications of this argument?
- The challenge posed by inverted qualia is whether functionalism, which emphasizes the
functional roles of mental states, can adequately account for this difference in subjective
experience. If mental states are defined solely by their functional roles, then person A and
person B, who behave identically, would be considered to have the same mental states.
However, they seem to have different qualitative experiences of the color red.
- If two individuals with different qualia can behave the same way, does this mean that
functionalism misses something crucial about what it means to have conscious experiences?
Reply 1 – dispositional functionalism
Dispositional functionalism emphasizes the dispositions or behavioral tendencies linked to mental states
rather than the immediate, qualitative aspects of experience. Distinguishing between actual mental
states and the dispositional properties associated with those states. According to this view, individuals
with inverted qualia may still share the same dispositions and behavioral responses, even if their
immediate subjective experiences differ. The way they respond, their disposition to the color "red" is the
same despite it being inverted.
Qualia = the phenomenal properties of experience
What is the inverted qualia argument?
- The inverted qualia argument is a thought experiment that poses a challenge to functionalism
and certain theories of consciousness. The argument explores the possibility that individuals
could have different subjective experiences while behaving in the same way or having the same
functional organization of their mental states. This thought experiment is often used to raise
questions about whether functionalism can fully account for the nature of consciousness and
subjective experience.
The argument:
Imagine two individuals, let's call them person A and person B.
Person A perceives the color red and experiences it as a vivid, rich sensation. Person B, however,
has inverted qualia and perceives the color red in a way that is subjectively different from
person A.
Despite this difference in subjective experience, both individuals behave in the same way when
presented with objects of the color red. They both correctly identify red objects, use the word
"red" in the same contexts, and exhibit the same functional responses.
However, person B has a sensation different from ours in each of these cases; their sensory
states are "inverted."
It is plausible to think that since A and B differ in their qualia, they have different mental states.
Since, however, those states are functionally the same, functionalism apparently counts them as
having the same type of mental state. Hence, something is wrong in functionalism.
Implications of this argument?
- The challenge posed by inverted qualia is whether functionalism, which emphasizes the
functional roles of mental states, can adequately account for this difference in subjective
experience. If mental states are defined solely by their functional roles, then person A and
person B, who behave identically, would be considered to have the same mental states.
However, they seem to have different qualitative experiences of the color red.
- If two individuals with different qualia can behave the same way, does this mean that
functionalism misses something crucial about what it means to have conscious experiences?
Reply 1 – dispositional functionalism
Dispositional functionalism emphasizes the dispositions or behavioral tendencies linked to mental states
rather than the immediate, qualitative aspects of experience. Distinguishing between actual mental
states and the dispositional properties associated with those states. According to this view, individuals
with inverted qualia may still share the same dispositions and behavioral responses, even if their
immediate subjective experiences differ. The way they respond, their disposition to the color "red" is the
same despite it being inverted.
