LAW CASES REGISTRATION,
FORMALITY REQUIREMENTS,
ACQUISITION OF TITLE EXAM
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
LYUS V PROWSA DEVELOPMENTS [1982] JUDGMENT - ANSWER-Held that P's
claim for a declaration that the original agreement and for specific performance that
P could not rely on the LPA 1925 s.56. However, D in turn was not entitled to rely on
the LRA 1925 S.20 and s.34(4) and P were entitled to an order for specific
performance.
LYUS V PROWSA DEVELOPMENTS [1982] PRINCIPLE - ANSWER-What
circumstances can a promise by C give rise to a direct right for B?
Key point was that C was regarded as reneging on a positive stipulation favour of B
in the bargain of B in the bargain under which C acquired the land.
Court found for P stating that in accepting the contract with Y, D had agreed to hold
the right for P on constructive trust and to allow him to deny the right's validity would
be to allow the LRA 1925 to facilitate fraud.
CITY PERMANENT BUILDING SOCIETY V MILLER [1952] DETAILS - ANSWER-
D1 Miller (mortgagor) orally agreed to grant D2 Mrs Cumberland (tenant) a lease/
tenancy of the first and second floors of Earl's Court. At that date D1 had no
proprietary interest in the property. D2 who had several children needed a home and
agreed to pay 3 years rent in advance which D1 accepted and granted the tenancy.
The lease was not registered. D1 gave a mortgage on the property to P who claimed
possession against D1 and D2 after D1 defaulted on payments.
CITY PERMANENT BUILDING SOCIETY V MILLER [1962] JUDGEMENT -
ANSWER-CA held that P could take possession. For a lease to be an overriding
interest under the 1925 LRA it had to be a lease for any term or interest not
exceeding 21 years granted at a rent. 'Granted' was taken to mean the actual
creation of a lease and does not include mere agreement with simply a contractual
effect. Therefore D2 did not show she had an interest that took priority.
Evershed MR said D2 never got a lease but a mere contractual right to obtain a
lease from D1. Jenkins LJ said that agreements to lease are not overriding interests
in the way that actual leases are.
CITY PERMANENT BUILDING SOCIETY V MILLER PRINCIPLE - ANSWER-Legal
leases of three years' duration or less are protected only as overriding interests.
Equitable leases fall outside of the scope of Sch 3 Para 1 which is confined to leases
granted. As CA confirmed in this case a grant implies the acquisition of a LEGAL
property right.
, However an equitable lease that is not protected by entry of notice may be an
overriding interest under Sch 3 Para 2.
NATIONAL PROVINCIAL BANK LTD V AINSWORTH [1965] DETAILS - ANSWER-
X left his wife D living in a matrimonial home after he divorced her. She was granted
custody and alimony. Husband owned 2 other properties. He owed nearly £6000 to a
bank to a bank secured by a charge on the matrimonial home. He incorporated his
business into a company and conveyed the matrimonial home and his place of
business to the company
NATIONAL PROVINCIAL BANK LTD V AINSWORTH [1965] JUDGEMENT -
ANSWER-HoL found that D had no interest in the property since the rights of a
deserted wife were personal rather than proprietary. Therefore the 'actual
occupation' clause did not apply. She had a right to occupation of the matrimonial
home by virtue of her status as a wife.
Lord Hodson said the LRA is concerned with rights that are capable of surviving
through different ownerships of land, which the right of a deserted wife is not.
NATIONAL PROVINCIAL BANK LTD V AINSWORTH [1965] PRINCIPLE -
ANSWER-
WILLIAMS & GLY'NS BANK V BOLAND DETAILS - ANSWER-Mr Boland was
registered as holding a freehold of a home in Surrey. Mr Boland and his brother were
directors of a building company. To support the business Mr Boland borrowed
money from the Williams & Glyn's Bank. The money was borrowed as part of a
mortgage deal. To secure his duty to repay that sum + interest Mr Boland gave the
bank a legal charge over him home. Boland failed to repay the loan, the bank wished
to sell the land. To get a good price, the bank knew it would be better to sell vacant
premises and applied for possession of the home.
WILLIAMS & GLYN'S BANK V BOLAND JUDGEMENT - ANSWER-House of Lords
held that the wife's interest prevented them from possessing the premises. She had
an overriding interest because she was in actual occupation of the premises and a
minor, registrable, unregistered interest could be an overriding interest.
WILLIAMS & GLYN'S BANK V BOLAND (1981) PRINCIPLE - ANSWER-Boland is
different from Ainsworth. Mrs Boland did not attempt to asset 'deserted wife's equity'
against the bank. Mr Boland had acquired his freehold of the land with Mrs Boland's
financial assistance he was under a duty to use that freehold not for his own sole
benefit but for the benefit of himself AND his wife. Mr Boland held his freehold on
trusts where both he and his wife were beneficiaries. As a beneficiary Mrs Boland
has an equitable interest so she had more than a personal right. With an equitable
interest it was capable of binding a third party.
CITY OF LONDON BUILDING SOCIETY V FLEGG [1988] DETAILS - ANSWER-Mr
and Mrs Flegg sold their home of 28 years and contributed the proceeds to the
purchase of Bleak House as a new home for themselves and their daughter and son-
in-law (the Maxwell-Browns). Balance of the purchase price was funded by a
mortgage. Despite their solicitor's advice that Bleak House should be registered in
FORMALITY REQUIREMENTS,
ACQUISITION OF TITLE EXAM
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
LYUS V PROWSA DEVELOPMENTS [1982] JUDGMENT - ANSWER-Held that P's
claim for a declaration that the original agreement and for specific performance that
P could not rely on the LPA 1925 s.56. However, D in turn was not entitled to rely on
the LRA 1925 S.20 and s.34(4) and P were entitled to an order for specific
performance.
LYUS V PROWSA DEVELOPMENTS [1982] PRINCIPLE - ANSWER-What
circumstances can a promise by C give rise to a direct right for B?
Key point was that C was regarded as reneging on a positive stipulation favour of B
in the bargain of B in the bargain under which C acquired the land.
Court found for P stating that in accepting the contract with Y, D had agreed to hold
the right for P on constructive trust and to allow him to deny the right's validity would
be to allow the LRA 1925 to facilitate fraud.
CITY PERMANENT BUILDING SOCIETY V MILLER [1952] DETAILS - ANSWER-
D1 Miller (mortgagor) orally agreed to grant D2 Mrs Cumberland (tenant) a lease/
tenancy of the first and second floors of Earl's Court. At that date D1 had no
proprietary interest in the property. D2 who had several children needed a home and
agreed to pay 3 years rent in advance which D1 accepted and granted the tenancy.
The lease was not registered. D1 gave a mortgage on the property to P who claimed
possession against D1 and D2 after D1 defaulted on payments.
CITY PERMANENT BUILDING SOCIETY V MILLER [1962] JUDGEMENT -
ANSWER-CA held that P could take possession. For a lease to be an overriding
interest under the 1925 LRA it had to be a lease for any term or interest not
exceeding 21 years granted at a rent. 'Granted' was taken to mean the actual
creation of a lease and does not include mere agreement with simply a contractual
effect. Therefore D2 did not show she had an interest that took priority.
Evershed MR said D2 never got a lease but a mere contractual right to obtain a
lease from D1. Jenkins LJ said that agreements to lease are not overriding interests
in the way that actual leases are.
CITY PERMANENT BUILDING SOCIETY V MILLER PRINCIPLE - ANSWER-Legal
leases of three years' duration or less are protected only as overriding interests.
Equitable leases fall outside of the scope of Sch 3 Para 1 which is confined to leases
granted. As CA confirmed in this case a grant implies the acquisition of a LEGAL
property right.
, However an equitable lease that is not protected by entry of notice may be an
overriding interest under Sch 3 Para 2.
NATIONAL PROVINCIAL BANK LTD V AINSWORTH [1965] DETAILS - ANSWER-
X left his wife D living in a matrimonial home after he divorced her. She was granted
custody and alimony. Husband owned 2 other properties. He owed nearly £6000 to a
bank to a bank secured by a charge on the matrimonial home. He incorporated his
business into a company and conveyed the matrimonial home and his place of
business to the company
NATIONAL PROVINCIAL BANK LTD V AINSWORTH [1965] JUDGEMENT -
ANSWER-HoL found that D had no interest in the property since the rights of a
deserted wife were personal rather than proprietary. Therefore the 'actual
occupation' clause did not apply. She had a right to occupation of the matrimonial
home by virtue of her status as a wife.
Lord Hodson said the LRA is concerned with rights that are capable of surviving
through different ownerships of land, which the right of a deserted wife is not.
NATIONAL PROVINCIAL BANK LTD V AINSWORTH [1965] PRINCIPLE -
ANSWER-
WILLIAMS & GLY'NS BANK V BOLAND DETAILS - ANSWER-Mr Boland was
registered as holding a freehold of a home in Surrey. Mr Boland and his brother were
directors of a building company. To support the business Mr Boland borrowed
money from the Williams & Glyn's Bank. The money was borrowed as part of a
mortgage deal. To secure his duty to repay that sum + interest Mr Boland gave the
bank a legal charge over him home. Boland failed to repay the loan, the bank wished
to sell the land. To get a good price, the bank knew it would be better to sell vacant
premises and applied for possession of the home.
WILLIAMS & GLYN'S BANK V BOLAND JUDGEMENT - ANSWER-House of Lords
held that the wife's interest prevented them from possessing the premises. She had
an overriding interest because she was in actual occupation of the premises and a
minor, registrable, unregistered interest could be an overriding interest.
WILLIAMS & GLYN'S BANK V BOLAND (1981) PRINCIPLE - ANSWER-Boland is
different from Ainsworth. Mrs Boland did not attempt to asset 'deserted wife's equity'
against the bank. Mr Boland had acquired his freehold of the land with Mrs Boland's
financial assistance he was under a duty to use that freehold not for his own sole
benefit but for the benefit of himself AND his wife. Mr Boland held his freehold on
trusts where both he and his wife were beneficiaries. As a beneficiary Mrs Boland
has an equitable interest so she had more than a personal right. With an equitable
interest it was capable of binding a third party.
CITY OF LONDON BUILDING SOCIETY V FLEGG [1988] DETAILS - ANSWER-Mr
and Mrs Flegg sold their home of 28 years and contributed the proceeds to the
purchase of Bleak House as a new home for themselves and their daughter and son-
in-law (the Maxwell-Browns). Balance of the purchase price was funded by a
mortgage. Despite their solicitor's advice that Bleak House should be registered in
