The view that abortion is seriously immoral has received little support in the recent philosophical
literature. This essay sets out an argument that purports to show, as well as any argument in
ethics can show, that abortion is, except possibly in rare cases, seriously immoral, that it is in
the same moral category as killing an innocent human being. The argument is based on a major
assumption. Many writers on the ethics of abortion believe that whether or not abortion is
morally permissible stands or falls on whether or not a fetus is a sort of being whose life it is
seriously wrong to end. The argument of this essay will assume that they are correct. Also, this
essay will neglect issues of great importance to complete the ethics of abortion.
I.
Anti-abortionists seem to believe that the truth of all the claims (life is present from the moment
of conception or fetuses look like babies, etc.) is quite obvious, and establishing any of these
claims is sufficient to show that abortion is morally akin to murder. A standard pro-choice
strategy exhibits similarities. Pro-choicers seem to believe that the truth of any of these claims
(fetuses are not persons or social beings) and establishing any of these claims sufficient to
show that an abortion is not a wrongful killing.
On one hand, the anti-abortionist will defend a moral principle concerning the wrongness of
killing which tends to be broad in scope so that even fetuses at an early stage of pregnancy will
fall under it. The problem with broad principles is that they often embrace too much. On the
other hand, the pro-choicer wants to find a moral principle concerning the wrongness of killing
which tends to be narrow in scope so that fetuses will not fall under it. The problem with narrow
principles is that they often do not embrace enough. The anti-abortionist charges, not
unreasonably, that pro-choice principles concerning killing are too narrow to be acceptable; the
pro-choicer charges, not unreasonably, that anti-abortionist principles concerning killing are too
broad to be acceptable.
Attempts by both sides to patch up the difficulties in their positions run into further difficulties.
The anti-abortionist will try to remove the problem in her position by reformulating her principle
concerning killing in terms of human beings: it is always prima facie seriously wrong to end the
life of a human being. For although it is clear that a fetus is both human and alive, it is not all
clear that a fetus is a human being. There is at least something to be said for the view that
something becomes a human being only after a process of development, and that therefore
first-trimester fetuses perhaps all fetuses are not yet human beings. The pro-choicer fares no
better. She may attempt to find reasons why killing infants, young children, and the severely
retarded is wrong which are independent of her major principle that is supposed to explain the
wrongness of taking human life, but which will not also make abortion immortal. A pro-choice
strategy that extends the definition of 'person' to infants or even to young children seems just as
arbitrary as an anti-abortion strategy that extends the definitions of 'human being' to fetuses.
If a 'human being' is taken to be a biological category, then the anti-abortionist is left with the
problem of explaining why a merely biological category should make a moral difference. If a
'human being', on the other hand, is taken to be a moral category, then the claim that a fetus is
a human being cannot be taken to a premise in the anti-abortion argument, for it is precisely
literature. This essay sets out an argument that purports to show, as well as any argument in
ethics can show, that abortion is, except possibly in rare cases, seriously immoral, that it is in
the same moral category as killing an innocent human being. The argument is based on a major
assumption. Many writers on the ethics of abortion believe that whether or not abortion is
morally permissible stands or falls on whether or not a fetus is a sort of being whose life it is
seriously wrong to end. The argument of this essay will assume that they are correct. Also, this
essay will neglect issues of great importance to complete the ethics of abortion.
I.
Anti-abortionists seem to believe that the truth of all the claims (life is present from the moment
of conception or fetuses look like babies, etc.) is quite obvious, and establishing any of these
claims is sufficient to show that abortion is morally akin to murder. A standard pro-choice
strategy exhibits similarities. Pro-choicers seem to believe that the truth of any of these claims
(fetuses are not persons or social beings) and establishing any of these claims sufficient to
show that an abortion is not a wrongful killing.
On one hand, the anti-abortionist will defend a moral principle concerning the wrongness of
killing which tends to be broad in scope so that even fetuses at an early stage of pregnancy will
fall under it. The problem with broad principles is that they often embrace too much. On the
other hand, the pro-choicer wants to find a moral principle concerning the wrongness of killing
which tends to be narrow in scope so that fetuses will not fall under it. The problem with narrow
principles is that they often do not embrace enough. The anti-abortionist charges, not
unreasonably, that pro-choice principles concerning killing are too narrow to be acceptable; the
pro-choicer charges, not unreasonably, that anti-abortionist principles concerning killing are too
broad to be acceptable.
Attempts by both sides to patch up the difficulties in their positions run into further difficulties.
The anti-abortionist will try to remove the problem in her position by reformulating her principle
concerning killing in terms of human beings: it is always prima facie seriously wrong to end the
life of a human being. For although it is clear that a fetus is both human and alive, it is not all
clear that a fetus is a human being. There is at least something to be said for the view that
something becomes a human being only after a process of development, and that therefore
first-trimester fetuses perhaps all fetuses are not yet human beings. The pro-choicer fares no
better. She may attempt to find reasons why killing infants, young children, and the severely
retarded is wrong which are independent of her major principle that is supposed to explain the
wrongness of taking human life, but which will not also make abortion immortal. A pro-choice
strategy that extends the definition of 'person' to infants or even to young children seems just as
arbitrary as an anti-abortion strategy that extends the definitions of 'human being' to fetuses.
If a 'human being' is taken to be a biological category, then the anti-abortionist is left with the
problem of explaining why a merely biological category should make a moral difference. If a
'human being', on the other hand, is taken to be a moral category, then the claim that a fetus is
a human being cannot be taken to a premise in the anti-abortion argument, for it is precisely
