How far was the soviet economic decline in the period 1964-85 a result of a failure of
leadership?
During the period 1964-85 growth rates were in steady decline and the vast soviet economy
seemed to be grinding to a halt. In a command economy, where power resides at the centre of
government it would seem logically to place responsibility for decline with the leadership.
However, it must also be considered the system that Brezhnev was dealing with at the time
had inherent issues. The legacy of the Stalinist system was to make itself know later during
the economic decline and much of the issues that were associated during the 1980s had their
roots in the policy requirements of the 1930s. A failure of leadership was definitely a cause of
the economic decline, but that it not to say it was the only factor.
After Khrushchev’s dismissal, Brezhnev was keen to bring stability back into the party and
abandoned the most controversial policies, placing power back in the central planning
apparatus. The central control did not encourage initiative and creativity in the system.
Bonuses for output were often higher than bonuses for ‘innovation’ therefore workers often
stuck with tried and tested methods leading to a stagnating economy. Experimentation at
local level by individual managers was perceived as a threat to the power of central planners.
This is best evidenced by the Kosygin Reforms in 1965 which were sabotaged by Brezhnev
so they were watered down to the point where they were ineffective. Under Brezhnev the
leadership preferred to keep party official happy rather than encourage growth. During the
period 1964-85, the party had become a group of self-serving individuals who wanted to
preserve the system that had given them their positions. Many bureaucrats’ careers had
blossomed and they were resistant to change. Brezhnev was the leader that encouraged
caution and presented a more conservative approach compared to his predecessor, which
made him popular amongst the party officials. Therefore, although there were issues inherent
in the command economy system, soviet economic decline was in part as a result of a failure
of leadership as Brezhnev sympathised with conservatives in the party and sabotaged
attempts at reform. In addition, Brezhnev made no attempt to develop the economy as he
became content with the trappings of power.
Inefficiency and inflexibility are key problems that result from a command economy and
were certainly integral in the economic decline of the 1980s. The command economy had its
origins in the Stalinist era, where it had been designed to push for rapid industrialisation,
therefore moving towards efficiency and quality of goods was very difficult in a highly
centralised system. Although Brezhnev made attempts to move away from using output
figures as a sign of success, the use of cost and profit indicators to judge performance was not
always helpful in an economic system where prices were set by the government with little
reference to supply and demand. The highly centralised structure was not sophisticated
enough for a complex modern economy and the USSR had developed considerably since the
Stalin era and the focus had changed away from heavy industry towards light industry and
science and technology, yet the economy had not adapted to reflect this. The command
economy had performed well when the focus was improving output for a limited number of
products. It was far less effective when continued growth depended in gains in quality and
efficiency. The system had become increasingly complex and overburdened. Therefore,
although Brezhnev and the leadership did not make much attempt at change to the economy,
the system they were dealing with did not support long term growth and was resistant to
change.
leadership?
During the period 1964-85 growth rates were in steady decline and the vast soviet economy
seemed to be grinding to a halt. In a command economy, where power resides at the centre of
government it would seem logically to place responsibility for decline with the leadership.
However, it must also be considered the system that Brezhnev was dealing with at the time
had inherent issues. The legacy of the Stalinist system was to make itself know later during
the economic decline and much of the issues that were associated during the 1980s had their
roots in the policy requirements of the 1930s. A failure of leadership was definitely a cause of
the economic decline, but that it not to say it was the only factor.
After Khrushchev’s dismissal, Brezhnev was keen to bring stability back into the party and
abandoned the most controversial policies, placing power back in the central planning
apparatus. The central control did not encourage initiative and creativity in the system.
Bonuses for output were often higher than bonuses for ‘innovation’ therefore workers often
stuck with tried and tested methods leading to a stagnating economy. Experimentation at
local level by individual managers was perceived as a threat to the power of central planners.
This is best evidenced by the Kosygin Reforms in 1965 which were sabotaged by Brezhnev
so they were watered down to the point where they were ineffective. Under Brezhnev the
leadership preferred to keep party official happy rather than encourage growth. During the
period 1964-85, the party had become a group of self-serving individuals who wanted to
preserve the system that had given them their positions. Many bureaucrats’ careers had
blossomed and they were resistant to change. Brezhnev was the leader that encouraged
caution and presented a more conservative approach compared to his predecessor, which
made him popular amongst the party officials. Therefore, although there were issues inherent
in the command economy system, soviet economic decline was in part as a result of a failure
of leadership as Brezhnev sympathised with conservatives in the party and sabotaged
attempts at reform. In addition, Brezhnev made no attempt to develop the economy as he
became content with the trappings of power.
Inefficiency and inflexibility are key problems that result from a command economy and
were certainly integral in the economic decline of the 1980s. The command economy had its
origins in the Stalinist era, where it had been designed to push for rapid industrialisation,
therefore moving towards efficiency and quality of goods was very difficult in a highly
centralised system. Although Brezhnev made attempts to move away from using output
figures as a sign of success, the use of cost and profit indicators to judge performance was not
always helpful in an economic system where prices were set by the government with little
reference to supply and demand. The highly centralised structure was not sophisticated
enough for a complex modern economy and the USSR had developed considerably since the
Stalin era and the focus had changed away from heavy industry towards light industry and
science and technology, yet the economy had not adapted to reflect this. The command
economy had performed well when the focus was improving output for a limited number of
products. It was far less effective when continued growth depended in gains in quality and
efficiency. The system had become increasingly complex and overburdened. Therefore,
although Brezhnev and the leadership did not make much attempt at change to the economy,
the system they were dealing with did not support long term growth and was resistant to
change.
