Q2
This question calls for the debate of Law of Easements. The issue here is can Rahim and
Laila, both prevent each other from benefitting from others land. The problem question is
designed in a way where both Laila and Rahim have easements over each other’s land. So, it
is imperative that the answer be divided into two parts first showing Rahim’s position as
Dominant tenement and the second illustrating Laila’s position as dominant tenement.
Similar line of reason and application of principle will be followed for both. Starting off with
satisfying Re Ellenborough Park (1995) requirements followed by the creation of the
easements which in this case seems to be implied legal easements.
Rahim as Dominant Tenement
The claimed easements in this scenario are Rahim’s use of the driveway and his use of part
of Darkacre to practice martial arts. The case of Re Ellenborough Park laid down four
requirements which if satisfied, shows that the claimed right is capable of being an
easement. The first requirement is that there must be dominant and servient tenement. The
facts illustrate that the Rahim was benefitting from Laila’s land as she allowed him to park
his car on her driveway and also gave him a remote corner of Darkacre to practice martial
arts. Hence as he was using the land of Laila his land can be called as dominant and her land
as servient tenement.
The second requirement is that the benefit must accommodate the dominant tenement.
This has two aspects first that both lands should be proximate to each other following the
case of London & Blenheim estates v Ladbroke (1993). It is clearly evident that the Barn was
leased which formed a part of Servient land which is Darkacre. The second aspect states
that rights should not confer any personal benefit rather they should enhance the usual
enjoyment of land. The complex nature of this law can be seen in the light of judicial
precedents of Hill v Tupper(1863) against Moodle v Steggles(1879). Although it is clear that
parking car qualifies as accommodating the dominant tenement as it provides the dominant
land with a dedicated parking space, so it accommodates the dominant land. However,
using servient land for martial arts is a debatable point. The case of Regency Villers v
Diamond Resort state(2018) that easements can constitute recreational use that confers a
benefit on dominant land, however practicing marital arts on a part of land does not
increase the social or economic value of the dominant land. Contrasting the current factual
situation with Regency Villers, in that case there was leisure complex composing of pools
and golf courses and unrestricted access to those increases the value of land. Here, there is
no indication any facilities present so this may not accommodate the dominant tenement.
Thus, this easement is not capable to exist.
Moving on to the third requirement, there should be diversity of occupation. It is evident
that Rahim has been given a five-year lease of Dominant land and Laila owns the servient
land which is Darkacre. Hence the third requirement is evidently fulfilled.
The last requirement is that the easement must be capable of forming a subject matter of a
grant. Following the case of Re Aldred(1610) easements should be precise and defined and
, not vague. Moreover, it must not amount to exclusive possession (Batchelor v Marlow
2003). In the facts, there is no indication that portrays that use of car park over burdens the
servient land. Hence it can be assumed that Laila is under no positive obligation (Moncrieff
v Jamison 2007) to do anything with the car parking area, which might extinguish the
easement as per William Old International v Arya (2009). Finally, easements cannot be
recognised if the benefit is through permission. Even though the facts state that Laila gave
permission to park, it does not seem to be exercised as one. Following the case of Green v
Ashco(1966), there is no mentioning that every time Rahim wanted to park he asked
permission hence through this evaluation it can be deduced that he exercised it as a right.
Hence this last requirement is also established.
The above section supports the point that easement of Parking on driveway existed here
and now we will shift the argument to the creation of that easement. The process of Implied
legal easements is best suited in this situation.
In this scenario Laila has granted easements to Rahim to use her driveway to park his car.
Hence her land is under burden of Rahim’s land. So, the most viable method that can be
used here is the application of s.62 LPA 1925, because it is imperative to keep in mind that
we are considering the second lease granted to Rahim. S.62 states that there should be
diversity of ownership which can be seen as Rahim was a leaseholder and Laila was the
freeholder, secondly the permission to use must be granted by servient land (Wright v
Macadam 1949). It is stated in the facts that Laila expressly gave him permission to park his
car on her driveway. There needs to be enjoyment of rights prior to the conveyance
following the case of Campbell v Banks (2011), this is clearly proved as he was using
benefits of parking. Lastly there needs to be the conveyance of dominant land, which as per
the facts, is fulfilled because Rahim was granted a new lease of five years. All the rights and
privileges are implied in the grant of the new lease. It is to be noted that there is no
indication that the rights were expressly stopped or extinguished by Laila, so they
transferred with the conveyance, and it wasn’t until sometime later after the creation of
new lease that she refused.
Hence in conclusion Rahim is advised to continue the use of Parking space as it is proved to
exist validly through implied legal easement Laila cannot restrict him from doing so,
however Rahim may not be allowed to use the remote space for martial arts because it is
not capable of being categorized in easements.
Laila’s land as dominant tenement
Similar structure will be followed as above. But at this instant we are considering Laila’s
position as a dominant tenement because used to store her art materials in the barn whom
she leased to Rahim. To satisfy whether this easement is capable to exist we would apply Re
Ellenborough Park criteria.
The first requirement is satisfied as this is the same situation as the above, so we do not
need to establish from the start, but it needs to be considered that now Laila is dominant
tenement and Rahim is servient because she used his barn to store her tools. The second
This question calls for the debate of Law of Easements. The issue here is can Rahim and
Laila, both prevent each other from benefitting from others land. The problem question is
designed in a way where both Laila and Rahim have easements over each other’s land. So, it
is imperative that the answer be divided into two parts first showing Rahim’s position as
Dominant tenement and the second illustrating Laila’s position as dominant tenement.
Similar line of reason and application of principle will be followed for both. Starting off with
satisfying Re Ellenborough Park (1995) requirements followed by the creation of the
easements which in this case seems to be implied legal easements.
Rahim as Dominant Tenement
The claimed easements in this scenario are Rahim’s use of the driveway and his use of part
of Darkacre to practice martial arts. The case of Re Ellenborough Park laid down four
requirements which if satisfied, shows that the claimed right is capable of being an
easement. The first requirement is that there must be dominant and servient tenement. The
facts illustrate that the Rahim was benefitting from Laila’s land as she allowed him to park
his car on her driveway and also gave him a remote corner of Darkacre to practice martial
arts. Hence as he was using the land of Laila his land can be called as dominant and her land
as servient tenement.
The second requirement is that the benefit must accommodate the dominant tenement.
This has two aspects first that both lands should be proximate to each other following the
case of London & Blenheim estates v Ladbroke (1993). It is clearly evident that the Barn was
leased which formed a part of Servient land which is Darkacre. The second aspect states
that rights should not confer any personal benefit rather they should enhance the usual
enjoyment of land. The complex nature of this law can be seen in the light of judicial
precedents of Hill v Tupper(1863) against Moodle v Steggles(1879). Although it is clear that
parking car qualifies as accommodating the dominant tenement as it provides the dominant
land with a dedicated parking space, so it accommodates the dominant land. However,
using servient land for martial arts is a debatable point. The case of Regency Villers v
Diamond Resort state(2018) that easements can constitute recreational use that confers a
benefit on dominant land, however practicing marital arts on a part of land does not
increase the social or economic value of the dominant land. Contrasting the current factual
situation with Regency Villers, in that case there was leisure complex composing of pools
and golf courses and unrestricted access to those increases the value of land. Here, there is
no indication any facilities present so this may not accommodate the dominant tenement.
Thus, this easement is not capable to exist.
Moving on to the third requirement, there should be diversity of occupation. It is evident
that Rahim has been given a five-year lease of Dominant land and Laila owns the servient
land which is Darkacre. Hence the third requirement is evidently fulfilled.
The last requirement is that the easement must be capable of forming a subject matter of a
grant. Following the case of Re Aldred(1610) easements should be precise and defined and
, not vague. Moreover, it must not amount to exclusive possession (Batchelor v Marlow
2003). In the facts, there is no indication that portrays that use of car park over burdens the
servient land. Hence it can be assumed that Laila is under no positive obligation (Moncrieff
v Jamison 2007) to do anything with the car parking area, which might extinguish the
easement as per William Old International v Arya (2009). Finally, easements cannot be
recognised if the benefit is through permission. Even though the facts state that Laila gave
permission to park, it does not seem to be exercised as one. Following the case of Green v
Ashco(1966), there is no mentioning that every time Rahim wanted to park he asked
permission hence through this evaluation it can be deduced that he exercised it as a right.
Hence this last requirement is also established.
The above section supports the point that easement of Parking on driveway existed here
and now we will shift the argument to the creation of that easement. The process of Implied
legal easements is best suited in this situation.
In this scenario Laila has granted easements to Rahim to use her driveway to park his car.
Hence her land is under burden of Rahim’s land. So, the most viable method that can be
used here is the application of s.62 LPA 1925, because it is imperative to keep in mind that
we are considering the second lease granted to Rahim. S.62 states that there should be
diversity of ownership which can be seen as Rahim was a leaseholder and Laila was the
freeholder, secondly the permission to use must be granted by servient land (Wright v
Macadam 1949). It is stated in the facts that Laila expressly gave him permission to park his
car on her driveway. There needs to be enjoyment of rights prior to the conveyance
following the case of Campbell v Banks (2011), this is clearly proved as he was using
benefits of parking. Lastly there needs to be the conveyance of dominant land, which as per
the facts, is fulfilled because Rahim was granted a new lease of five years. All the rights and
privileges are implied in the grant of the new lease. It is to be noted that there is no
indication that the rights were expressly stopped or extinguished by Laila, so they
transferred with the conveyance, and it wasn’t until sometime later after the creation of
new lease that she refused.
Hence in conclusion Rahim is advised to continue the use of Parking space as it is proved to
exist validly through implied legal easement Laila cannot restrict him from doing so,
however Rahim may not be allowed to use the remote space for martial arts because it is
not capable of being categorized in easements.
Laila’s land as dominant tenement
Similar structure will be followed as above. But at this instant we are considering Laila’s
position as a dominant tenement because used to store her art materials in the barn whom
she leased to Rahim. To satisfy whether this easement is capable to exist we would apply Re
Ellenborough Park criteria.
The first requirement is satisfied as this is the same situation as the above, so we do not
need to establish from the start, but it needs to be considered that now Laila is dominant
tenement and Rahim is servient because she used his barn to store her tools. The second
