INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
PARADIGMS, THEORIES, AND KEY
CONCEPTS EXAM QUESTIONS AND
ANSWERS
Coordination Problems - ANSWER--The Battle of the Sexes is a typical coordination
problem.
-Coordination problems have two possible equilibrium outcomes, one of which is
preferred by each of the players.
-Once an equilibrium has been established, neither player has an incentive to deviate
from it.
-Coordination games do not require institutions with strong mechanisms for surveillance
and enforcement.
-States may create formal organizations because of transactions costs.
Collaboration Problems - ANSWER--Collaboration problems have situations where
equilibrium outcomes are suboptimal.
-Contain strong incentives to defect from established cooperative patterns of behavior
since defections result in immediate payoffs.
-States should search for mechanisms to increase the shadow of the future in order to
ensure that the immediate costs associated with cooperation will be offset by the long-
term benefits of mutual assistance.
-Formal organizations with their monitoring and enforcement functions can ensure such
cooperation.
Suasion Problems - ANSWER--Suasion problems have equilibrium solutions that leave
one player dissatisfied.
-Player A's dominant strategy is to cooperate, while player B's is to defect.
-Smaller states have incentives to free ride because public goods will be provided
nevertheless.
-Player A can threaten to defect or use side payments to get player B to cooperate.
-Formal institutions can be used by the hegemon to set the agenda and help the weaker
states to offset domestic pressures.
Assurance Problems (Stag Hunt) - ANSWER--The only preferred outcomes in these
games is mutual cooperation.
-Rational states that have complete information will cooperate within issue areas in one-
time games.
-With mutual cooperation, there is no incentive to cheat.
-However, with uncertainty about each other's payoffs and suspicion that the other
player may not be rational, states may not reach their preferred outcome.
, -Assurance situations do not need centralized enforcement mechanisms that exist in
formal multilateral organizations.
Chicken (Hawk/Dove Game) - ANSWER--In this game, two drivers are headed towards
each other on a single-lane bridge.
-One driver must swerve or they will both crash and die.
-If one driver swerves and the other does not, the one who swerves is called a 'chicken.'
-In International Relations, this is the opposite of the coordination game.
-Here, players are using a resource that comes at a cost if it is shared.
-Players therefore prefer to play different strategies.
-Each player would prefer to win over tying and also prefer tying over losing.
-Losing is also preferred over crashing.
Neorealism / Structural Realism - ANSWER--Proposed by Kenneth Waltz.
-Is a scientific / systematic / parsimonious theory.
-Focuses on the structure of the international system.
-States differ only in regard to their capabilities.
-The structure of a system changes when the distribution of capabilities across states
changes.
-Bipolar systems are more stable than multipolar ones.
Mearsheimer and Structural Realism - ANSWER--Advances Waltz's thoughts on
neorealism.
-Is an offensive realist.
-Bipolar systems are more stable because great-power conflicts are fewer, deterrence is
easier and there are fewer chances for miscalculation.
-States seek hegemony.
-States can only become the hegemon in their region of the world.
Sovereignty - ANSWER-A state's ability to decide for itself how to cope with its internal
and external problems.
Balance of Power - ANSWER-Equilibrium of power among a small number of major
states.
Balance of Threat - ANSWER-Coined by Stephen Walt. States balance against the
most threatening actor, seen in aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive
capabilities, and intentions.
Bandwagoning - ANSWER-Strategy used by weaker states to align with the more
powerful state.
Hegemonic Stability Theory - ANSWER-Stability in the international system when a
single dominant or hegemonic power is present to stabilize the system and construct a
strong regime.
PARADIGMS, THEORIES, AND KEY
CONCEPTS EXAM QUESTIONS AND
ANSWERS
Coordination Problems - ANSWER--The Battle of the Sexes is a typical coordination
problem.
-Coordination problems have two possible equilibrium outcomes, one of which is
preferred by each of the players.
-Once an equilibrium has been established, neither player has an incentive to deviate
from it.
-Coordination games do not require institutions with strong mechanisms for surveillance
and enforcement.
-States may create formal organizations because of transactions costs.
Collaboration Problems - ANSWER--Collaboration problems have situations where
equilibrium outcomes are suboptimal.
-Contain strong incentives to defect from established cooperative patterns of behavior
since defections result in immediate payoffs.
-States should search for mechanisms to increase the shadow of the future in order to
ensure that the immediate costs associated with cooperation will be offset by the long-
term benefits of mutual assistance.
-Formal organizations with their monitoring and enforcement functions can ensure such
cooperation.
Suasion Problems - ANSWER--Suasion problems have equilibrium solutions that leave
one player dissatisfied.
-Player A's dominant strategy is to cooperate, while player B's is to defect.
-Smaller states have incentives to free ride because public goods will be provided
nevertheless.
-Player A can threaten to defect or use side payments to get player B to cooperate.
-Formal institutions can be used by the hegemon to set the agenda and help the weaker
states to offset domestic pressures.
Assurance Problems (Stag Hunt) - ANSWER--The only preferred outcomes in these
games is mutual cooperation.
-Rational states that have complete information will cooperate within issue areas in one-
time games.
-With mutual cooperation, there is no incentive to cheat.
-However, with uncertainty about each other's payoffs and suspicion that the other
player may not be rational, states may not reach their preferred outcome.
, -Assurance situations do not need centralized enforcement mechanisms that exist in
formal multilateral organizations.
Chicken (Hawk/Dove Game) - ANSWER--In this game, two drivers are headed towards
each other on a single-lane bridge.
-One driver must swerve or they will both crash and die.
-If one driver swerves and the other does not, the one who swerves is called a 'chicken.'
-In International Relations, this is the opposite of the coordination game.
-Here, players are using a resource that comes at a cost if it is shared.
-Players therefore prefer to play different strategies.
-Each player would prefer to win over tying and also prefer tying over losing.
-Losing is also preferred over crashing.
Neorealism / Structural Realism - ANSWER--Proposed by Kenneth Waltz.
-Is a scientific / systematic / parsimonious theory.
-Focuses on the structure of the international system.
-States differ only in regard to their capabilities.
-The structure of a system changes when the distribution of capabilities across states
changes.
-Bipolar systems are more stable than multipolar ones.
Mearsheimer and Structural Realism - ANSWER--Advances Waltz's thoughts on
neorealism.
-Is an offensive realist.
-Bipolar systems are more stable because great-power conflicts are fewer, deterrence is
easier and there are fewer chances for miscalculation.
-States seek hegemony.
-States can only become the hegemon in their region of the world.
Sovereignty - ANSWER-A state's ability to decide for itself how to cope with its internal
and external problems.
Balance of Power - ANSWER-Equilibrium of power among a small number of major
states.
Balance of Threat - ANSWER-Coined by Stephen Walt. States balance against the
most threatening actor, seen in aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive
capabilities, and intentions.
Bandwagoning - ANSWER-Strategy used by weaker states to align with the more
powerful state.
Hegemonic Stability Theory - ANSWER-Stability in the international system when a
single dominant or hegemonic power is present to stabilize the system and construct a
strong regime.
