IR and GG literature tekst
Must international studies be a science? (lecture 1, welcome)
This text is a discussion of whether "international studies" can or should be
considered a "science," focusing on the broad nature of the field, the
definition of science, and different types of knowledge. Here's a
breakdown of its key points:
The author acknowledges the difficulty of defining "international studies"
because it encompasses multiple conflicting understandings. Different
scholars define the field in various ways, including its connections to
colonialism, state-centric issues, or paradigms that no longer hold
universal appeal.
The author proposes using a broad definition of "international studies" to
avoid excluding diverse work. The term "international" here is seen not as
tied exclusively to relations between states, but to any cross-boundary
encounter with "difference"—interactions between different cultures,
peoples, or ideas.
The author argues against limiting "international" to interactions between
sovereign states. Instead, any encounter with difference (cultural,
economic, military, etc.) can have an international aspect. This broader
view allows for a wide range of topics to be considered part of
international studies.
‘Cross-Boundary Encounters’ are encounters—whether in economics, war,
or identity—often revolve around maintaining or subverting boundaries
between "self" and "other." The field thus examines how these boundaries
are created, negotiated, and transcended.
The author critiques the narrow view of science as purely focused on
generalization and proposes a broader understanding. They introduce four
approaches to being "scientific" in international studies:
o Neopositivism (focus on general laws and hypothesis testing)
o Critical Realism (focus on uncovering causal mechanisms)
o Analyticism (ideal-typical models for case-specific insights)
o Reflexivity (knowledge grounded in scholars’ own social
locations)
Common Goals: While these approaches differ in methodology, they all
aim for systematic, public, and empirical inquiry. The goal is not absolute
truth but generating valid knowledge claims that can withstand public
scrutiny.
Epistemic vs. Practical Knowledge: Drawing on philosophical distinctions
(especially from Wittgenstein and Aristotle), the author distinguishes
between two types of knowledge:
o Epistemic knowledge ("knowing-that"): Factual, propositional
knowledge (e.g., how distillation works in making whisky).
o Practical knowledge ("know-how"): Skills needed to
perform a task (e.g., how to actually make whisky or pass
legislation).
Epistemic Impersonality: The validity of epistemic claims isn't subjective
but intended to be universally accepted, even if it's based in specific
, cultural or political contexts. This objectivity is a hallmark of scientific
inquiry.
Example of Whisky
Whisky as a Case Study: The author uses whisky production as an analogy
to explain different types of knowledge. While the scientific understanding
of distillation came later, the practical knowledge of how to make whisky
existed long before. Similarly, in international studies, practical knowledge
(like managing state relations) often exists alongside or even precedes
epistemic, scientific knowledge.
The development of whisky, as an industry, was shaped by regulations,
technology, and political-economic forces. This serves as an illustration of
how social-scientific knowledge (about, say, tax laws) interacts with
practical knowledge (about actually making whisky).
The second part of the text expands on the idea that different forms of
knowing have distinct purposes and ways of being evaluated. The author
argues for a pluralistic approach to knowledge, the author suggests there
are multiple legitimate kinds of knowledge—epistemic, technical,
aesthetic, and normative—and each has its own role and standards of
evaluation.
Four Forms of Knowing
1. Epistemic knowing: Focused on objective facts and systematic
investigation. It's impersonal and detached.
2. Technical knowing: Involves skill and the practical application of
knowledge. It is engaged, tied to real-world practice and outcomes.
3. Aesthetic knowing: Concerned with creative appreciation, such as
evaluating the beauty or artistic value of an object or experience.
4. Normative knowing: Involves moral judgments and the shared
understanding of values.
Detached vs. Engaged Knowing
The author introduces two key distinctions:
1. Impersonal vs. Value-perspectival: Epistemic and technical
knowledge aim for detachment from personal perspectives, whereas
aesthetic and normative knowing are embedded in particular
viewpoints and values.
2. Detached vs. Engaged: Epistemic and aesthetic knowing involve a
detached, contemplative stance (thinking about things from a
distance), while technical and normative knowing are engaged in
ongoing activities.
This framework illustrates that different kinds of knowledge serve different
functions, and they require different standards of evaluation. For example,
a scientific claim (epistemic knowing) should be judged on its factual
accuracy, whereas a claim about social norms (normative knowing) should
be evaluated based on ethical considerations.
In conclusion, the text advocates for an academic practice that respects
and includes multiple ways of knowing, whether they involve facts, skills,
values, or artistic appreciation. This pluralism enriches fields like
international studies, making them more comprehensive and responsive to
the real-world challenges they aim to address.
Must international studies be a science? (lecture 1, welcome)
This text is a discussion of whether "international studies" can or should be
considered a "science," focusing on the broad nature of the field, the
definition of science, and different types of knowledge. Here's a
breakdown of its key points:
The author acknowledges the difficulty of defining "international studies"
because it encompasses multiple conflicting understandings. Different
scholars define the field in various ways, including its connections to
colonialism, state-centric issues, or paradigms that no longer hold
universal appeal.
The author proposes using a broad definition of "international studies" to
avoid excluding diverse work. The term "international" here is seen not as
tied exclusively to relations between states, but to any cross-boundary
encounter with "difference"—interactions between different cultures,
peoples, or ideas.
The author argues against limiting "international" to interactions between
sovereign states. Instead, any encounter with difference (cultural,
economic, military, etc.) can have an international aspect. This broader
view allows for a wide range of topics to be considered part of
international studies.
‘Cross-Boundary Encounters’ are encounters—whether in economics, war,
or identity—often revolve around maintaining or subverting boundaries
between "self" and "other." The field thus examines how these boundaries
are created, negotiated, and transcended.
The author critiques the narrow view of science as purely focused on
generalization and proposes a broader understanding. They introduce four
approaches to being "scientific" in international studies:
o Neopositivism (focus on general laws and hypothesis testing)
o Critical Realism (focus on uncovering causal mechanisms)
o Analyticism (ideal-typical models for case-specific insights)
o Reflexivity (knowledge grounded in scholars’ own social
locations)
Common Goals: While these approaches differ in methodology, they all
aim for systematic, public, and empirical inquiry. The goal is not absolute
truth but generating valid knowledge claims that can withstand public
scrutiny.
Epistemic vs. Practical Knowledge: Drawing on philosophical distinctions
(especially from Wittgenstein and Aristotle), the author distinguishes
between two types of knowledge:
o Epistemic knowledge ("knowing-that"): Factual, propositional
knowledge (e.g., how distillation works in making whisky).
o Practical knowledge ("know-how"): Skills needed to
perform a task (e.g., how to actually make whisky or pass
legislation).
Epistemic Impersonality: The validity of epistemic claims isn't subjective
but intended to be universally accepted, even if it's based in specific
, cultural or political contexts. This objectivity is a hallmark of scientific
inquiry.
Example of Whisky
Whisky as a Case Study: The author uses whisky production as an analogy
to explain different types of knowledge. While the scientific understanding
of distillation came later, the practical knowledge of how to make whisky
existed long before. Similarly, in international studies, practical knowledge
(like managing state relations) often exists alongside or even precedes
epistemic, scientific knowledge.
The development of whisky, as an industry, was shaped by regulations,
technology, and political-economic forces. This serves as an illustration of
how social-scientific knowledge (about, say, tax laws) interacts with
practical knowledge (about actually making whisky).
The second part of the text expands on the idea that different forms of
knowing have distinct purposes and ways of being evaluated. The author
argues for a pluralistic approach to knowledge, the author suggests there
are multiple legitimate kinds of knowledge—epistemic, technical,
aesthetic, and normative—and each has its own role and standards of
evaluation.
Four Forms of Knowing
1. Epistemic knowing: Focused on objective facts and systematic
investigation. It's impersonal and detached.
2. Technical knowing: Involves skill and the practical application of
knowledge. It is engaged, tied to real-world practice and outcomes.
3. Aesthetic knowing: Concerned with creative appreciation, such as
evaluating the beauty or artistic value of an object or experience.
4. Normative knowing: Involves moral judgments and the shared
understanding of values.
Detached vs. Engaged Knowing
The author introduces two key distinctions:
1. Impersonal vs. Value-perspectival: Epistemic and technical
knowledge aim for detachment from personal perspectives, whereas
aesthetic and normative knowing are embedded in particular
viewpoints and values.
2. Detached vs. Engaged: Epistemic and aesthetic knowing involve a
detached, contemplative stance (thinking about things from a
distance), while technical and normative knowing are engaged in
ongoing activities.
This framework illustrates that different kinds of knowledge serve different
functions, and they require different standards of evaluation. For example,
a scientific claim (epistemic knowing) should be judged on its factual
accuracy, whereas a claim about social norms (normative knowing) should
be evaluated based on ethical considerations.
In conclusion, the text advocates for an academic practice that respects
and includes multiple ways of knowing, whether they involve facts, skills,
values, or artistic appreciation. This pluralism enriches fields like
international studies, making them more comprehensive and responsive to
the real-world challenges they aim to address.
