LENT Term (2)
IR00 International Relations: Theories, Concepts and Debates
Part 2
WEEK 1 Sovereignty
Essential Reading: x4
What is sovereignty?
Who is sovereign – and how much?
Has sovereignty waned since the late 20th century?
How has sovereignty been re-articulated since the late 1990s?
1) Krasner, S (1999) Sovereignty. Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Chapter 1 Aim = The extent to which Westphalian and International legal sovereignty has been
practiced and observed in international politics.
There is no clear consensus on the nature and status of sovereignty by academics. Some have
characterised it as being eroded by globalisation while others posit that it has become emboldened
by the global values and ‘shared expectations generated by international society’p10
- some say that the enforcement power of the state is magnified, others that it is shrinking.
- some attribute modern norms like human rights to represent the evolution of institutions in power
while others argue it is representative of a conscious break with historic morality.
Krasner emphasises that much of these contradicting ideas are due to the nebulous definition of
sovereignty adopted by academics.
Furthermore, he argues that any reference to norms imposes an unrealistic binary on the
international order because irrespective of norms evolving and coming into popularity, they will
have a ‘limited influence and always be subject to challenge’ due to ‘logical contradictions’p10 he
believes that actors will not ‘tightly conform with any given set of norms’ irrespective of the ones
chosen due to the lack of an ‘institutional arrangement for authoritatively resolving conflicts.’ Such
wording seems to reference and align with the Realist perception that the international order is
anarchic due to the lack of a singular overlording body.
Krasner suggests there are 4 different definitions of Sovereignty:
Westphalian – creates an organised political hierarchy based on the exclusion of external
actors from power structures within a set territory.
Domestic – formal organisation of political institutions within the state, with the authority to
exercise control within their respective borders.
Interdependence – ‘the ability of public authorities to regulate the flow of information…
goods, people, pollutants, or capital, across borders’ and into their state.
International Legal – ‘practices associated with mutual recognition,’ typically within the
context of state actors with ‘formal juridical independence’ p10
Key conditions used by Krasner to delineate between the 4 types of sovereignty:
Authority – both Westphalian and International legal define sovereignty as occurring when
Authority and Legitimacy are consolidated within a state. International Legal sovereignty regards
the existence of an independent judicial body as evidence of a central authority within a state and
thus extends legitimacy to other territories with a concept of juridical institutions. Westphalian
sovereignty, however, defines itself against the interference of actors deemed external to a
territory. It therefore argues that the only legitimate political actors and policy makers are domestic
ones and considers the role of authority and legitimacy by stating that the only legitimate
authorities, de facto or de jure p11, are internal.
,LENT Term (2)
Legitimacy – Domestic sovereignty prioritises legitimacy and control by placing emphasis on the
need for a legitimate (in reference to social contracts theory and democratic process) authorities
within a political society (polity). Control for domestic sovereignty is seemingly thought of in a
practical sense, with concern placed upon the degree to which ‘authority can be effectively
exercised’ p11
Control – Interdependence sovereignty defines itself along very physical manifestations of territory
and a nation state. As a result, control over territorial borders is the defining feature of
Interdependence sovereignty. – ‘capacity of a state to regulate movements across its borders.’ P11
*Krasner writes that a single state can adopt multiple forms of sovereignty however said forms can
contradict certain features of one another to create more nuanced relationships between
governments and sovereignty. For example, International legal sovereignty can undermine a state
that practices Westphalian sovereignty because, by accepting regulations set by supranational
organisations such as the UN, that state’s policy is now influenced by external power structures.
EXAMPLES:
Taiwan can have Westphalian sovereignty but not International legal sovereignty considering
that its status as an independent state goes unrecognised by the majority of the international
community and their judicial branches.
Arguably, there are outliers to these definitions. Somaliland has neither Westphalian or International
legal sovereignty but maintains its own currency and elected government, giving it a level of financial
independence from Somalia.
Failed states highlight the potential for domestic unrest and international intervention to
create countries with nominal international legal sovereignty but limited authority or control.
Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD government in Myanmar (2012-16) was internationally recognised
and thus had International legal sovereignty due to the international community legitimising
the election. However, domestically, democratic elections had not changed the fact that
Myanmar had two competing power structures in the form of a political Assembly and a
Military council. Therefore, her government was unable to exert sovereign control over key
policy areas such as border security, human rights and violence in the northern Rakhine state.
Krasner mentions that some historians attribute the powerlessness of failed states over
cross-border flows to globalisation. P11
Note – Krasner’s chapters centre around Westphalian and International legal
James March and Johan Olsen: logics of expected consequences and logics of appropriateness.
Logics of consequences see political action and outcomes, including institutions, as the product of
rational calculating behaviour designed to maximize a given set of unexplained preferences. Classical
game theory and neoclassical economics are well-known examples.
Logics of appropriateness understand political action as a product of rules, roles, and identities that
stipulate appropriate behaviour in given situations. The question is not how can I maximize my self-
interest but rather, given who or what I am, how should I act in this circumstance. P12
These two logics are not mutually incompatible, but their importance varies across environments. If
a logic of appropriateness is unambiguous and the consequences of alternative courses of action
unclear, the behaviour of actors (primarily rulers for this study) is likely to be determined by their
roles.
If actors find themselves in a situation in which they have multiple and contradictory roles and rules,
or no rules at all, but the results of different courses of action are obvious, a logic of consequences
will prevail. 5
, LENT Term (2)
- In a well-established domestic polity a logic of appropriateness will weigh heavily, although
within the confines imposed by specific roles (president, general, senator, voter) actors will
also calculate the course of action that will maximize their interests.
Even in very well settled situations, such as Swedish local governments, which Nils Brunsson uses to
motivate his study of what he has ingeniously termed the organization of hypocrisy, actors never
fully conform with the logic of appropriateness associated with their specific roles; they also engage
in purely instrumental behaviour 6 generated by a logic of expected consequences.
The basic contention of this study is that the international system is an environment in which the
logics of consequences dominate the logics of appropriateness. Actors embody multiple roles, such
as head of state, diplomatic representative, government leader, party organizer, ethnic
representative, revolutionary avatar, or religious prophet, that imply conflicting rules for action.
- International rules can be contradictory— non-intervention as opposed to the protection of
human rights, for example— and there is no authority structure to adjudicate such
controversies.
- In most cases domestic roles will be more compelling than international ones, because
domestic rather than international logics of appropriateness are most likely to dominate the
self-conceptualization of any political leader. Moreover, the international system is
characterized by power asymmetries. Stronger actors can, in some cases, conquer weaker
ones, eliminating the existence of a particular state, although not necessarily challenging the
general principles associated with Westphalian or international legal sovereignty. Conquest
simply changes borders. P12
Rulers may decide to reconfigure domestic authority structures in other states, accepting their
juridical independence but compromising their de facto autonomy, a policy that does violate
Westphalian sovereignty. Stronger states can pick and choose among different rules selecting the
one that best suits their instrumental objectives, as the European powers did during the era of
colonialism when they “resuscitated pre-Westphalian forms of divided sovereignty” such as
protectorates and subordinate states. 7 In the international environment roles and rules are not
irrelevant. Rulers do have to give reasons for their actions, but their audiences are usually domestic.
Norms in the international system will be less constraining than would be the case in other political
settings because of conflicting logics of appropriateness, the absence of mechanisms for deciding
among competing rules, and power asymmetries among states. P13
Krasner typecasts American liberalism and Neoliberalism, when applied to international policy, as
being motivated by a logic of consequences.
He states that the logic of consequences fails to explain breaches of sovereignty such as when
internal autonomy of states is encroached upon.
When considering the interplay of IR theory with the logics of policy motivations, Krasner highlights
that English school and certain Constructivist narratives attempt to use the logic of appropriateness
to explain the significance of international norms and institutions. Crucially, he criticises these
theories as disregarding the comparative value of domestic politics and legal systems.
Both international legal sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty can be defined by clear rules or
logics of appropriateness: recognize juridically independent territorial entities; exclude external
authority structures from the territory of the state. Yet both logics have been violated, more
frequently for Westphalian sovereignty than international legal sovereignty, because logics of
consequences can be so compelling in the international environment. Rulers have found that it is in
their interest to break the rules. Violations of international legal sovereignty have taken place
through mutual agreement since recognition depends on the voluntary acceptance of other states.
Violations of Westphalian sovereignty have occurred through both voluntary agreements and the
use of coercion. p13
IR00 International Relations: Theories, Concepts and Debates
Part 2
WEEK 1 Sovereignty
Essential Reading: x4
What is sovereignty?
Who is sovereign – and how much?
Has sovereignty waned since the late 20th century?
How has sovereignty been re-articulated since the late 1990s?
1) Krasner, S (1999) Sovereignty. Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Chapter 1 Aim = The extent to which Westphalian and International legal sovereignty has been
practiced and observed in international politics.
There is no clear consensus on the nature and status of sovereignty by academics. Some have
characterised it as being eroded by globalisation while others posit that it has become emboldened
by the global values and ‘shared expectations generated by international society’p10
- some say that the enforcement power of the state is magnified, others that it is shrinking.
- some attribute modern norms like human rights to represent the evolution of institutions in power
while others argue it is representative of a conscious break with historic morality.
Krasner emphasises that much of these contradicting ideas are due to the nebulous definition of
sovereignty adopted by academics.
Furthermore, he argues that any reference to norms imposes an unrealistic binary on the
international order because irrespective of norms evolving and coming into popularity, they will
have a ‘limited influence and always be subject to challenge’ due to ‘logical contradictions’p10 he
believes that actors will not ‘tightly conform with any given set of norms’ irrespective of the ones
chosen due to the lack of an ‘institutional arrangement for authoritatively resolving conflicts.’ Such
wording seems to reference and align with the Realist perception that the international order is
anarchic due to the lack of a singular overlording body.
Krasner suggests there are 4 different definitions of Sovereignty:
Westphalian – creates an organised political hierarchy based on the exclusion of external
actors from power structures within a set territory.
Domestic – formal organisation of political institutions within the state, with the authority to
exercise control within their respective borders.
Interdependence – ‘the ability of public authorities to regulate the flow of information…
goods, people, pollutants, or capital, across borders’ and into their state.
International Legal – ‘practices associated with mutual recognition,’ typically within the
context of state actors with ‘formal juridical independence’ p10
Key conditions used by Krasner to delineate between the 4 types of sovereignty:
Authority – both Westphalian and International legal define sovereignty as occurring when
Authority and Legitimacy are consolidated within a state. International Legal sovereignty regards
the existence of an independent judicial body as evidence of a central authority within a state and
thus extends legitimacy to other territories with a concept of juridical institutions. Westphalian
sovereignty, however, defines itself against the interference of actors deemed external to a
territory. It therefore argues that the only legitimate political actors and policy makers are domestic
ones and considers the role of authority and legitimacy by stating that the only legitimate
authorities, de facto or de jure p11, are internal.
,LENT Term (2)
Legitimacy – Domestic sovereignty prioritises legitimacy and control by placing emphasis on the
need for a legitimate (in reference to social contracts theory and democratic process) authorities
within a political society (polity). Control for domestic sovereignty is seemingly thought of in a
practical sense, with concern placed upon the degree to which ‘authority can be effectively
exercised’ p11
Control – Interdependence sovereignty defines itself along very physical manifestations of territory
and a nation state. As a result, control over territorial borders is the defining feature of
Interdependence sovereignty. – ‘capacity of a state to regulate movements across its borders.’ P11
*Krasner writes that a single state can adopt multiple forms of sovereignty however said forms can
contradict certain features of one another to create more nuanced relationships between
governments and sovereignty. For example, International legal sovereignty can undermine a state
that practices Westphalian sovereignty because, by accepting regulations set by supranational
organisations such as the UN, that state’s policy is now influenced by external power structures.
EXAMPLES:
Taiwan can have Westphalian sovereignty but not International legal sovereignty considering
that its status as an independent state goes unrecognised by the majority of the international
community and their judicial branches.
Arguably, there are outliers to these definitions. Somaliland has neither Westphalian or International
legal sovereignty but maintains its own currency and elected government, giving it a level of financial
independence from Somalia.
Failed states highlight the potential for domestic unrest and international intervention to
create countries with nominal international legal sovereignty but limited authority or control.
Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD government in Myanmar (2012-16) was internationally recognised
and thus had International legal sovereignty due to the international community legitimising
the election. However, domestically, democratic elections had not changed the fact that
Myanmar had two competing power structures in the form of a political Assembly and a
Military council. Therefore, her government was unable to exert sovereign control over key
policy areas such as border security, human rights and violence in the northern Rakhine state.
Krasner mentions that some historians attribute the powerlessness of failed states over
cross-border flows to globalisation. P11
Note – Krasner’s chapters centre around Westphalian and International legal
James March and Johan Olsen: logics of expected consequences and logics of appropriateness.
Logics of consequences see political action and outcomes, including institutions, as the product of
rational calculating behaviour designed to maximize a given set of unexplained preferences. Classical
game theory and neoclassical economics are well-known examples.
Logics of appropriateness understand political action as a product of rules, roles, and identities that
stipulate appropriate behaviour in given situations. The question is not how can I maximize my self-
interest but rather, given who or what I am, how should I act in this circumstance. P12
These two logics are not mutually incompatible, but their importance varies across environments. If
a logic of appropriateness is unambiguous and the consequences of alternative courses of action
unclear, the behaviour of actors (primarily rulers for this study) is likely to be determined by their
roles.
If actors find themselves in a situation in which they have multiple and contradictory roles and rules,
or no rules at all, but the results of different courses of action are obvious, a logic of consequences
will prevail. 5
, LENT Term (2)
- In a well-established domestic polity a logic of appropriateness will weigh heavily, although
within the confines imposed by specific roles (president, general, senator, voter) actors will
also calculate the course of action that will maximize their interests.
Even in very well settled situations, such as Swedish local governments, which Nils Brunsson uses to
motivate his study of what he has ingeniously termed the organization of hypocrisy, actors never
fully conform with the logic of appropriateness associated with their specific roles; they also engage
in purely instrumental behaviour 6 generated by a logic of expected consequences.
The basic contention of this study is that the international system is an environment in which the
logics of consequences dominate the logics of appropriateness. Actors embody multiple roles, such
as head of state, diplomatic representative, government leader, party organizer, ethnic
representative, revolutionary avatar, or religious prophet, that imply conflicting rules for action.
- International rules can be contradictory— non-intervention as opposed to the protection of
human rights, for example— and there is no authority structure to adjudicate such
controversies.
- In most cases domestic roles will be more compelling than international ones, because
domestic rather than international logics of appropriateness are most likely to dominate the
self-conceptualization of any political leader. Moreover, the international system is
characterized by power asymmetries. Stronger actors can, in some cases, conquer weaker
ones, eliminating the existence of a particular state, although not necessarily challenging the
general principles associated with Westphalian or international legal sovereignty. Conquest
simply changes borders. P12
Rulers may decide to reconfigure domestic authority structures in other states, accepting their
juridical independence but compromising their de facto autonomy, a policy that does violate
Westphalian sovereignty. Stronger states can pick and choose among different rules selecting the
one that best suits their instrumental objectives, as the European powers did during the era of
colonialism when they “resuscitated pre-Westphalian forms of divided sovereignty” such as
protectorates and subordinate states. 7 In the international environment roles and rules are not
irrelevant. Rulers do have to give reasons for their actions, but their audiences are usually domestic.
Norms in the international system will be less constraining than would be the case in other political
settings because of conflicting logics of appropriateness, the absence of mechanisms for deciding
among competing rules, and power asymmetries among states. P13
Krasner typecasts American liberalism and Neoliberalism, when applied to international policy, as
being motivated by a logic of consequences.
He states that the logic of consequences fails to explain breaches of sovereignty such as when
internal autonomy of states is encroached upon.
When considering the interplay of IR theory with the logics of policy motivations, Krasner highlights
that English school and certain Constructivist narratives attempt to use the logic of appropriateness
to explain the significance of international norms and institutions. Crucially, he criticises these
theories as disregarding the comparative value of domestic politics and legal systems.
Both international legal sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty can be defined by clear rules or
logics of appropriateness: recognize juridically independent territorial entities; exclude external
authority structures from the territory of the state. Yet both logics have been violated, more
frequently for Westphalian sovereignty than international legal sovereignty, because logics of
consequences can be so compelling in the international environment. Rulers have found that it is in
their interest to break the rules. Violations of international legal sovereignty have taken place
through mutual agreement since recognition depends on the voluntary acceptance of other states.
Violations of Westphalian sovereignty have occurred through both voluntary agreements and the
use of coercion. p13
