Class 13 – Post-conflict reconstruc1on and peacebuilding
Nature of post-conflict socie,es
How do you make peace and agree to live in the same state with people who have killed your
friends and family?
How do you live with your former enemies for the rest of your life?
Is there sufficient trust between former enemies to create a func,oning state and a socially
cohesive society?
Ideal-typical post-conflict society:
In an average of around 30% of cases, conflict par,es return to violence within 5 years of
signing a peace agreement
- Typologizing post-conflict socie,es
o Post-conflict recovery
§ 3 criteria
• Level of development and prevailing opportuni,es
o Economic opportuni,es with dealing with the aCermath
of the conflict differs per country
• Presence of significant natural resources
o Can be posi,ve: creates opportunity for wealth
o Can be nega,ve: more resources, more suscep,ble to
conflict
• Horizontal inequali,es in socioeconomic dimension
o Important for long-term stability
o Difficulty of implementa,on environment
§ Number of warring par,es
• More par,es = more difficult
• Strategies of par,es unpredictable
§ Absence of a peace agreement signed by all major warring par,es
• Very likely that interna,onal mission will experience
resistance/non-support from local authori,es
§ Presence of spoilers
• Actors try to undermine peace process
§ Collapsed states
• Do the state ins,tu,ons func,on?
§ Number of soldiers
• The more soldiers, the more should be reintegrated
§ Disposable natural resources
• Resources important as a source of funding for the fights
57
, • Can be used as a way of prolonging the war (greed thinking)
§ Hos,le neighboring states or networks
• Ivory coast and its neighbors
§ Wars of secession
• Implementa,on environment more difficult
Security dilemma
- “Nego,a,ng civil war peace sealements is tricky...”
o “The greatest challenge is to design a treaty that convinces the combatants to
shed their par,san armies and surrender conquered territory even though
such steps will increase their vulnerability and limit their ability to enforce the
treaty’s other terms” (Walter 1999).
è Conflict par,es oCen face a security dilemma!
- Interna,onal rela,ons concept
o A situa,on where one state’s ac,ons to improve its security are misperceived
by another state as offensively-mo,vated and threatening
o The security measures taken by the second state in response are in turn
perceived by the first state as threatening
§ ‘civil war peace trea,es promise to create security dilemmas in reverse’
§ ‘Once underlying issues are resolved, nego,a,ons become a search for
guarantees that combatants will be protected as they mobilize and that
they will not be permanently excluded from a new government once
they have done so’
§ Third party guarantees are crucial!
- Three major security-related concerns
o Control of coercive apparatus
o Distribu,on of poli,cal power
§ Poli,cal exclusion of warring par,es
o Economic influence and power
§ Economic advantage of the conflic,ng side
§ If you give up your influence of power during disarmament, making
yourself weaker
à conflict par,es aim to adopt ins,tu,ons that seek to overcome these
security-related concerns
- Role of ins,tu,ons in mi,ga,ng the security dilemma
§ Ins,tu,ons are rulers of the game – proscribe some behaviors and
require others
§ Ins,tu,ons facilitate social interac,on by reducing uncertainty
§ Civil war opponents usually aim to adopt ins,tu,ons that seek balance,
divide or share power – overcoming the 3 security-related concerns
o Rules regarding use of coercive force
§ ‘if adversaries are to be reassured on this front, the coercive forces of
the state must somehow be neutralized or balanced through the
presence of compe,ng groups’
o Rules regarding the distribu,on of poli,cal power
§ Electoral rules: method of transla,ng votes into seats in representa,ve
ins,tu,ons
• E.g., minori,es higher number of seats in parliament
58
Nature of post-conflict socie,es
How do you make peace and agree to live in the same state with people who have killed your
friends and family?
How do you live with your former enemies for the rest of your life?
Is there sufficient trust between former enemies to create a func,oning state and a socially
cohesive society?
Ideal-typical post-conflict society:
In an average of around 30% of cases, conflict par,es return to violence within 5 years of
signing a peace agreement
- Typologizing post-conflict socie,es
o Post-conflict recovery
§ 3 criteria
• Level of development and prevailing opportuni,es
o Economic opportuni,es with dealing with the aCermath
of the conflict differs per country
• Presence of significant natural resources
o Can be posi,ve: creates opportunity for wealth
o Can be nega,ve: more resources, more suscep,ble to
conflict
• Horizontal inequali,es in socioeconomic dimension
o Important for long-term stability
o Difficulty of implementa,on environment
§ Number of warring par,es
• More par,es = more difficult
• Strategies of par,es unpredictable
§ Absence of a peace agreement signed by all major warring par,es
• Very likely that interna,onal mission will experience
resistance/non-support from local authori,es
§ Presence of spoilers
• Actors try to undermine peace process
§ Collapsed states
• Do the state ins,tu,ons func,on?
§ Number of soldiers
• The more soldiers, the more should be reintegrated
§ Disposable natural resources
• Resources important as a source of funding for the fights
57
, • Can be used as a way of prolonging the war (greed thinking)
§ Hos,le neighboring states or networks
• Ivory coast and its neighbors
§ Wars of secession
• Implementa,on environment more difficult
Security dilemma
- “Nego,a,ng civil war peace sealements is tricky...”
o “The greatest challenge is to design a treaty that convinces the combatants to
shed their par,san armies and surrender conquered territory even though
such steps will increase their vulnerability and limit their ability to enforce the
treaty’s other terms” (Walter 1999).
è Conflict par,es oCen face a security dilemma!
- Interna,onal rela,ons concept
o A situa,on where one state’s ac,ons to improve its security are misperceived
by another state as offensively-mo,vated and threatening
o The security measures taken by the second state in response are in turn
perceived by the first state as threatening
§ ‘civil war peace trea,es promise to create security dilemmas in reverse’
§ ‘Once underlying issues are resolved, nego,a,ons become a search for
guarantees that combatants will be protected as they mobilize and that
they will not be permanently excluded from a new government once
they have done so’
§ Third party guarantees are crucial!
- Three major security-related concerns
o Control of coercive apparatus
o Distribu,on of poli,cal power
§ Poli,cal exclusion of warring par,es
o Economic influence and power
§ Economic advantage of the conflic,ng side
§ If you give up your influence of power during disarmament, making
yourself weaker
à conflict par,es aim to adopt ins,tu,ons that seek to overcome these
security-related concerns
- Role of ins,tu,ons in mi,ga,ng the security dilemma
§ Ins,tu,ons are rulers of the game – proscribe some behaviors and
require others
§ Ins,tu,ons facilitate social interac,on by reducing uncertainty
§ Civil war opponents usually aim to adopt ins,tu,ons that seek balance,
divide or share power – overcoming the 3 security-related concerns
o Rules regarding use of coercive force
§ ‘if adversaries are to be reassured on this front, the coercive forces of
the state must somehow be neutralized or balanced through the
presence of compe,ng groups’
o Rules regarding the distribu,on of poli,cal power
§ Electoral rules: method of transla,ng votes into seats in representa,ve
ins,tu,ons
• E.g., minori,es higher number of seats in parliament
58
