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Metaphysics lecture notes - Categories of being (2)

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Lecture notes for third-year metaphysics module

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Uploaded on
July 8, 2023
Number of pages
2
Written in
2022/2023
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Class notes
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Dr stephen mumford
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XIII. Categories of being: substances (II)

XIII. a. Recap

XIII. b. General problems with bundle theories

1) Counting tropes
- Bundle theory of tropes: tropes lacking determinate countability (i.e., possibility
counting shades of red in world ; difficulty counting number of exactly resembling
tropes in set of exactly resembling tropes)
- Basis for numerically distinction of tropes belonging to same exact resemblance
class: tropes = distinct particulars
o Question basis of distinct particularity of tropes (i.e., spatiotemporal
particularity ; particularity on basis of instantiating substance)

2) Problem with bundle theories
- Properties ≠ suited playing role of substances
- Properties = ways of being of substances

 Inevitable conclusion: rejecting bundle theories & accepting substances as
ontologically additional category

XIII. c. Aristotelian substances: substance ontology
- Substance = ontologically additional entity ≠ thin particular
- Properties so intimately connected to substances  ≠ need for admitting state of
affairs for welding properties & substances together  properties & substances ≠
distinct constituents
- Intimate connection properties/substances  distinguishing thinking
misconceived  substance ≠ thin particular
- Properties ontologically dependent on substances
- Substances ≠ ontologically dependent on anything

XIII. d. Properties as universals or tropes
- Properties = universals  ≠ need for properties as particulars when substances =
particularising entities
- Problem: contrasting Platonistic & Aristotelian understandings of properties
o Platonistic understanding of properties: properties = transcendent &
standing apart from substance
o Aristotelian understanding of properties: properties existing solely in
substances  ‘in re’ conception of properties
- Aristotelian account of substance: difficulty understanding substance instantiating
property from different realm while preserving intimate dependence relationship
between substance & property
- Properties = ways of being of substances  properties located at same location
as substances  properties instantiated by concrete substance located in space
& time
o Properties as tropes: tropes = ‘in re’ = existing in instantiating substance
due to particularity of property to substance
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