VI. The plurality of worlds: the framework
VI.a. The possible state of affairs - Question metaphysical/logical possibility
of ≠ Humean alternative worlds exempt
- Theory of counterfactuals (Lewis) reliant
from Humean principles
on alternative possible state of affairs
- Lewis rejecting counterargument from
overall resembling actual state of affairs &
common sense/intuition against plurality of
differing in certain small ways
worlds theory
- Problem definition/criteria possible state of
- Hypothesis of plurality of worlds
affairs
serviceable explaining modality +
VI.b. Defining a world counterfactuals + causation benefits in
- World = everything physical & non- theoretical unity & economy
physical existing/real regardless distance - Weighing advantages/counterintuitive
in space & time (i.e., including past/future) character of theory
omnitemporal concrete whole VI.c. Modal realism
- Theory of plurality of worlds (Lewis)
- Different worlds spatiotemporally - Modal realism theory (Lewis) accepting
reality of concrete other worlds more/less
disconnected from each other
- Infinity of different worlds including all resembling own world
- Lexical misnomer for theory ≠ realist
alternative states of affairs of every single
world about intra-world modality
- Expanded/contracted worlds relative to o All modal truths (= truths about
own world worlds containing more/less possibility/necessity) inter-world only =
things than others possibility of found in relations between different
existence of more than things in own worlds ≠ feature in any single world
world since all worlds Humean
- Humean supervenience holding in every - Anti-Humeans realist about modality:
world modality = feature of own world &
o Causal relations + laws of nature in independent of other worlds opponents
plural worlds entirely dependent on of modal realism
distributions of local matters of VI.d. Modality
particular fact
- Modality concerning necessity &
- World = mereological sum of all individual possibility
parts ≠ container of individual parts
o Some true statements also
≠ empty world necessary truth =
necessarily true
existence of something
o Some false statements possibly true =
- Challenge of metaphysical nihilists
contingent
committed to existence of nothingness
o Some true statements possibly false
(i.e., empty world) by subtraction
- Actual = state of affairs in own world
argument
- Possible = state of affairs in at least one
- Lewisian principle of plenitude: world for
other world
every possibility
- Necessary = state of affairs in all worlds
- Theoretical restrictions on principle of
- Impossible = ≠ state of affairs in any world
plenitude = criteria of Hume world’s
- Contingent = state of affairs in some
parameters (i.e., Humean causality)
worlds
- Actual = indexical
VI.a. The possible state of affairs - Question metaphysical/logical possibility
of ≠ Humean alternative worlds exempt
- Theory of counterfactuals (Lewis) reliant
from Humean principles
on alternative possible state of affairs
- Lewis rejecting counterargument from
overall resembling actual state of affairs &
common sense/intuition against plurality of
differing in certain small ways
worlds theory
- Problem definition/criteria possible state of
- Hypothesis of plurality of worlds
affairs
serviceable explaining modality +
VI.b. Defining a world counterfactuals + causation benefits in
- World = everything physical & non- theoretical unity & economy
physical existing/real regardless distance - Weighing advantages/counterintuitive
in space & time (i.e., including past/future) character of theory
omnitemporal concrete whole VI.c. Modal realism
- Theory of plurality of worlds (Lewis)
- Different worlds spatiotemporally - Modal realism theory (Lewis) accepting
reality of concrete other worlds more/less
disconnected from each other
- Infinity of different worlds including all resembling own world
- Lexical misnomer for theory ≠ realist
alternative states of affairs of every single
world about intra-world modality
- Expanded/contracted worlds relative to o All modal truths (= truths about
own world worlds containing more/less possibility/necessity) inter-world only =
things than others possibility of found in relations between different
existence of more than things in own worlds ≠ feature in any single world
world since all worlds Humean
- Humean supervenience holding in every - Anti-Humeans realist about modality:
world modality = feature of own world &
o Causal relations + laws of nature in independent of other worlds opponents
plural worlds entirely dependent on of modal realism
distributions of local matters of VI.d. Modality
particular fact
- Modality concerning necessity &
- World = mereological sum of all individual possibility
parts ≠ container of individual parts
o Some true statements also
≠ empty world necessary truth =
necessarily true
existence of something
o Some false statements possibly true =
- Challenge of metaphysical nihilists
contingent
committed to existence of nothingness
o Some true statements possibly false
(i.e., empty world) by subtraction
- Actual = state of affairs in own world
argument
- Possible = state of affairs in at least one
- Lewisian principle of plenitude: world for
other world
every possibility
- Necessary = state of affairs in all worlds
- Theoretical restrictions on principle of
- Impossible = ≠ state of affairs in any world
plenitude = criteria of Hume world’s
- Contingent = state of affairs in some
parameters (i.e., Humean causality)
worlds
- Actual = indexical
