A Rules concerning the responsibility of a State under international law are described in the
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ASR). Every
internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State.
Therefore, it is important to assess whether State Pronto has committed an internationally
wrongful act first. According to article 2 ASR, a wrongful act includes an action or omission which
constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State. This breach must then also be
attributable to the State under international law.
State Pronto failed to protect Ophelia during the academic seminar at Pronto University which leads
to an omission. According to the Tehran Hostages case, an inaction can constitute a clear and
serious violation of international obligations of States. The international obligation allegedly
breached when abducting Ophelia is the obligation to treat her with due respect and taking all
appropriate steps to prevent any attack on her freedom as codified in article 29 VCDR. Since the
existence of a breach of an international obligation can be assumed, examined must be whether
this breach is attributable to State Pronto. The general rule entails that States will not be
responsible for the conduct of private individuals. Exceptions to this general rule involve the
situation in which individuals perform public functions conferred upon them, acts under state
direction or control or acts adopted by the State. None of these exceptions seem to be applicable in
this case-study.
If, however, the breach was considered attributable to State pronto, articles 20 to 26 ASR must be
taken into consideration. These articles describe circumstances precluding the wrongfulness of an
internationally wrongful act. These circumstances are divided into provisions regarding responsive
behaviour on one hand and objective circumstances on the other hand. Since none of these
circumstances seem to be applicable, the foregoing leads to the conclusion that State Pronto is
responsible under international law for failing to protect Ophelia during the academic seminar at
Pronto University.
B The law of immunities of high-ranking state officials (HRSOs) is derived from State
immunity. In the Arrest Warrant case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has ruled on various
aspects regarding this doctrine and demonstrated that the immunity of HRSOs before domestic
courts is of customary law. This immunity has been granted to ensure the effective performance of
their functions on behalf of their respective State.
In the same case, the Court concluded that HRSOs enjoy full immunity from criminal jurisdiction
and inviolability throughout the duration of his or her office. This leads to the situation in which no
distinction can be drawn between acts committed in an official capacity and acts committed in a
private capacity while the HRSO is in office. Ophelia is the prime minister of State Nero and can
therefore be considered a HRSO. The case-study does not mention the situation in which Ophelia
has ceased to hold office. Assuming prime minister Ophelia is still in office, she cannot be subjected
to prosecution for acts covered by personal immunity or function immunity.
The question arises whether her immunity can be lifted in the situation where it concerns a
violation of a jus cogens norm. State Blanca indicts Ophelia and brings her before its domestic
court for the crime of genocide. According to the ruling of the Court in the Jurisdictional Immunities
of the State Germany v. Italy case, there is no collusion between jus cogens norms and rules on
State immunity. This is because State immunity concerns rules of a procedural character and jus
cogens norms regard substantive law. The Court also ruled in the Arrest Warrant case that a
suspicion of violating a jus cogens norm does not interfere with the immunity of a HRSO.
The same case addressed that immunities of HRSOs does not culminate in all-encompassing
impunity. Four possibilities have been set out of holding the person concerned individually
responsible for its actions. These include situations in which the HRSO is subjected to proceedings
in their own domestic courts or the International Criminal Court, the State has waived immunity or
the HRSO has ceased to hold office. Ophelia can validly claim immunity from jurisdiction before the
domestic courts of State Blanca since these possibilities are inapplicable to this case.
State Blanca indicts Ophelia and brings her before its domestic court despite her immunity. In
order to examine whether State Blanca can be held internationally responsible for this, the same
conditions as set out under A will be applied.
The domestic court of State Blanca denied Ophelia’s immunity plea which leads to an action within
the meaning of article 2 ASR. This action subsequently constitutes a breach under customary
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ASR). Every
internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State.
Therefore, it is important to assess whether State Pronto has committed an internationally
wrongful act first. According to article 2 ASR, a wrongful act includes an action or omission which
constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State. This breach must then also be
attributable to the State under international law.
State Pronto failed to protect Ophelia during the academic seminar at Pronto University which leads
to an omission. According to the Tehran Hostages case, an inaction can constitute a clear and
serious violation of international obligations of States. The international obligation allegedly
breached when abducting Ophelia is the obligation to treat her with due respect and taking all
appropriate steps to prevent any attack on her freedom as codified in article 29 VCDR. Since the
existence of a breach of an international obligation can be assumed, examined must be whether
this breach is attributable to State Pronto. The general rule entails that States will not be
responsible for the conduct of private individuals. Exceptions to this general rule involve the
situation in which individuals perform public functions conferred upon them, acts under state
direction or control or acts adopted by the State. None of these exceptions seem to be applicable in
this case-study.
If, however, the breach was considered attributable to State pronto, articles 20 to 26 ASR must be
taken into consideration. These articles describe circumstances precluding the wrongfulness of an
internationally wrongful act. These circumstances are divided into provisions regarding responsive
behaviour on one hand and objective circumstances on the other hand. Since none of these
circumstances seem to be applicable, the foregoing leads to the conclusion that State Pronto is
responsible under international law for failing to protect Ophelia during the academic seminar at
Pronto University.
B The law of immunities of high-ranking state officials (HRSOs) is derived from State
immunity. In the Arrest Warrant case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has ruled on various
aspects regarding this doctrine and demonstrated that the immunity of HRSOs before domestic
courts is of customary law. This immunity has been granted to ensure the effective performance of
their functions on behalf of their respective State.
In the same case, the Court concluded that HRSOs enjoy full immunity from criminal jurisdiction
and inviolability throughout the duration of his or her office. This leads to the situation in which no
distinction can be drawn between acts committed in an official capacity and acts committed in a
private capacity while the HRSO is in office. Ophelia is the prime minister of State Nero and can
therefore be considered a HRSO. The case-study does not mention the situation in which Ophelia
has ceased to hold office. Assuming prime minister Ophelia is still in office, she cannot be subjected
to prosecution for acts covered by personal immunity or function immunity.
The question arises whether her immunity can be lifted in the situation where it concerns a
violation of a jus cogens norm. State Blanca indicts Ophelia and brings her before its domestic
court for the crime of genocide. According to the ruling of the Court in the Jurisdictional Immunities
of the State Germany v. Italy case, there is no collusion between jus cogens norms and rules on
State immunity. This is because State immunity concerns rules of a procedural character and jus
cogens norms regard substantive law. The Court also ruled in the Arrest Warrant case that a
suspicion of violating a jus cogens norm does not interfere with the immunity of a HRSO.
The same case addressed that immunities of HRSOs does not culminate in all-encompassing
impunity. Four possibilities have been set out of holding the person concerned individually
responsible for its actions. These include situations in which the HRSO is subjected to proceedings
in their own domestic courts or the International Criminal Court, the State has waived immunity or
the HRSO has ceased to hold office. Ophelia can validly claim immunity from jurisdiction before the
domestic courts of State Blanca since these possibilities are inapplicable to this case.
State Blanca indicts Ophelia and brings her before its domestic court despite her immunity. In
order to examine whether State Blanca can be held internationally responsible for this, the same
conditions as set out under A will be applied.
The domestic court of State Blanca denied Ophelia’s immunity plea which leads to an action within
the meaning of article 2 ASR. This action subsequently constitutes a breach under customary
