Media & Informatie – Literatuur
Samenvatting
Week 1
Bhatti, Y. (2010). What would happen if we were better informed?
Simulating increased knowledge in European Parliament (EP)
elections. Representation, 46(4), 391-410
This article examines the consequences of political knowledge on turnout
and vote choices in three recent Nordic European Parliament (EP)
elections. Only a moderate increase in political knowledge would result in
more than 3 percentage point higher turnout. Social democratic parties
would be the big losers and among the winners would in particular be
conservative parties.
The importance of knowledge
A long survey-based tradition has convincingly taught us that the
average individual voter is relatively ignorant. This ignorance may
be rational, but it is nevertheless a problem for the functioning of
democracy since collective decisions as a consequence cannot be
expected to be optimally informed.
Revisionist view: optimistic as concerns the ability of the public to
provide informed decisions, i.e., the public can act as if it was
informed.
Individual opinion may not be uniformed after all even though
most individuals hold limited factual political knowledge.
Voters can use heuristic shortcuts or may take into account
information that they have processed and forgotten
Collective choice may be informed, though individual opinion
is not due to ‘the miracle of aggregation; individual errors
cancel out when collective decisions are taken
Measuring political knowledge
The EES does ask respondents to place parties on a left–right scale.
It has been suggested that placement variables may have better
comparative attributes than factual questions from a knowledge
quiz.
Simulation methodology
In the first step, a multinomial logistic model is estimated for vote
choice, including the choice to turn out or not. The independent
variables are demographical characteristics, predisposition
(measured as ideological self placement) and the knowledge
1
, variables plus interactions between knowledge and the other
variables.
Second step: actual simulation is carried out. This is done by
predicting probabilities for hypothetical respondents with exact
demographical characteristics as the observed ones but with a new
knowledge level.
Weaknesses of the simulation method:
- The simulation is sensitive to misspecification in the vote choice
model. The simulations are based on the assumption that the
observed partial slope of the knowledge variables represents the
causal impact of knowledge on vote choice.
- The simulation is static—it does not take into account that
politicians would alter their positions and strategies if the public
became differently informed
Simulating the effect of knowledge on EP turnout
The potential turnout gains and losses are substantial. If all
individuals had 2 standard deviations more knowledge than the
actual mean knowledge level, one would see an approximately 30
percentage point increase in turnout in all three Nordic countries
Simulating the effect of knowledge on EP vote decisions
Information effects on vote choice excluding turnout
FIGURE: Simulating the effect of a
fully uninformed and a fully
informed public on vote choice
across countries and ordered by
EP party group when turnout is not
taken into account
The social democratic group (PES)
suffers the greatest loses due to
increased knowledge.
Information effects on vote choice including turnout
One ideally should take into account that some actual non-voters
turn out when knowledge levels increase while some actual voters
stay at home when knowledge levels decrease
2
, FIGURE: Simulating the effect
of a fully uninformed and a
fully informed public on vote
choice across countries and
ordered by EP party group
when turnout is taken into
account
Taking turnout into account
moderates some of the
knowledge effects but does not alter them fundamentally
Conclusion
Substantial increases in turnout would be the consequence of more
knowledgeable citizens. A fully informed citizenry would result in
an approximately 30% turnout increase.
The most unambiguous result from the simulations was that the
social democratic parties would lose substantially from an increase
in knowledge. Almost as clear was the increased support for
conservative parties.
Though there are large theoretical interesting differences at the
party level, realistic changes would in practice probably have a
limited impact on political life, (1) since party-level changes cancel
each other out within ideological blocks, and (2) since changes of
the magnitude of the theoretical interesting counterfactual (i.e., full
information) are unlikely to happen in practice.
When turnout is taken into account, the social democratic will gain
from decreased knowledge. This is partly offset by the most likely
non-voters opting out. The least knowledgeable voters are also the
ones with the highest probability of abstaining
Limitations
- It is a simulation of what would happen if electors became more
informed and parties kept their current issue positions
- The applied simulation method is—as discussed—based on the
assumption that the partial slopes of the knowledge variables
represent a causal relationship
Week 2
Sherry (2004). Media effects theory and the nature/nurture
debate: A historical overview and directions for future research.
Media Psychology, 6(1), 83-109
3
Samenvatting
Week 1
Bhatti, Y. (2010). What would happen if we were better informed?
Simulating increased knowledge in European Parliament (EP)
elections. Representation, 46(4), 391-410
This article examines the consequences of political knowledge on turnout
and vote choices in three recent Nordic European Parliament (EP)
elections. Only a moderate increase in political knowledge would result in
more than 3 percentage point higher turnout. Social democratic parties
would be the big losers and among the winners would in particular be
conservative parties.
The importance of knowledge
A long survey-based tradition has convincingly taught us that the
average individual voter is relatively ignorant. This ignorance may
be rational, but it is nevertheless a problem for the functioning of
democracy since collective decisions as a consequence cannot be
expected to be optimally informed.
Revisionist view: optimistic as concerns the ability of the public to
provide informed decisions, i.e., the public can act as if it was
informed.
Individual opinion may not be uniformed after all even though
most individuals hold limited factual political knowledge.
Voters can use heuristic shortcuts or may take into account
information that they have processed and forgotten
Collective choice may be informed, though individual opinion
is not due to ‘the miracle of aggregation; individual errors
cancel out when collective decisions are taken
Measuring political knowledge
The EES does ask respondents to place parties on a left–right scale.
It has been suggested that placement variables may have better
comparative attributes than factual questions from a knowledge
quiz.
Simulation methodology
In the first step, a multinomial logistic model is estimated for vote
choice, including the choice to turn out or not. The independent
variables are demographical characteristics, predisposition
(measured as ideological self placement) and the knowledge
1
, variables plus interactions between knowledge and the other
variables.
Second step: actual simulation is carried out. This is done by
predicting probabilities for hypothetical respondents with exact
demographical characteristics as the observed ones but with a new
knowledge level.
Weaknesses of the simulation method:
- The simulation is sensitive to misspecification in the vote choice
model. The simulations are based on the assumption that the
observed partial slope of the knowledge variables represents the
causal impact of knowledge on vote choice.
- The simulation is static—it does not take into account that
politicians would alter their positions and strategies if the public
became differently informed
Simulating the effect of knowledge on EP turnout
The potential turnout gains and losses are substantial. If all
individuals had 2 standard deviations more knowledge than the
actual mean knowledge level, one would see an approximately 30
percentage point increase in turnout in all three Nordic countries
Simulating the effect of knowledge on EP vote decisions
Information effects on vote choice excluding turnout
FIGURE: Simulating the effect of a
fully uninformed and a fully
informed public on vote choice
across countries and ordered by
EP party group when turnout is not
taken into account
The social democratic group (PES)
suffers the greatest loses due to
increased knowledge.
Information effects on vote choice including turnout
One ideally should take into account that some actual non-voters
turn out when knowledge levels increase while some actual voters
stay at home when knowledge levels decrease
2
, FIGURE: Simulating the effect
of a fully uninformed and a
fully informed public on vote
choice across countries and
ordered by EP party group
when turnout is taken into
account
Taking turnout into account
moderates some of the
knowledge effects but does not alter them fundamentally
Conclusion
Substantial increases in turnout would be the consequence of more
knowledgeable citizens. A fully informed citizenry would result in
an approximately 30% turnout increase.
The most unambiguous result from the simulations was that the
social democratic parties would lose substantially from an increase
in knowledge. Almost as clear was the increased support for
conservative parties.
Though there are large theoretical interesting differences at the
party level, realistic changes would in practice probably have a
limited impact on political life, (1) since party-level changes cancel
each other out within ideological blocks, and (2) since changes of
the magnitude of the theoretical interesting counterfactual (i.e., full
information) are unlikely to happen in practice.
When turnout is taken into account, the social democratic will gain
from decreased knowledge. This is partly offset by the most likely
non-voters opting out. The least knowledgeable voters are also the
ones with the highest probability of abstaining
Limitations
- It is a simulation of what would happen if electors became more
informed and parties kept their current issue positions
- The applied simulation method is—as discussed—based on the
assumption that the partial slopes of the knowledge variables
represent a causal relationship
Week 2
Sherry (2004). Media effects theory and the nature/nurture
debate: A historical overview and directions for future research.
Media Psychology, 6(1), 83-109
3
