PH338 Intergenerational Justice
Fundamental assumption: the impacts of climate change will be felt by future generations
So, responses to climate changes are frequently justified with reference to
intergenerational justice.
Are we obliged to act to improve or maintain the condition of people who do not
yet exist?
How can we have duties to something that does not exist? Does this make sense?
This will require looking at reciprocity-based; subject-centred and future discounting
theories of intergenerational justice.
Two Bases of Justice (Buchanan 1990)
(a) Reciprocity
Based on the idea of interaction, and of distribution of social goods/bads through
cooperation. Questions of justice arise within the framework of cooperative schemes -
and reciprocity sets the scope and boundaries of justice. This interaction-based justice is
the basis for “basic structure” cosmopolitans (Pogge, Beitz) and liberal internationalists
(Miller, Rawls).
Issues:
What kind of reciprocity? Reciprocate costs (tit-for-tat) or aim for fairness?
Exclusion of the “naturally unempowered” - those unable to contribute to social
scheme / normatively excluded from justice relationships and hence claim
reciprocity duties, e.g. the disabled, the “able but unwanted”. Those who may need
help most are denied any entitlement, and are dependent on the goodwill/charity of
others.
(b) Subject-centred
Justice is still about the distribution of social goods and bads. Reciprocity matters, but it
does not set boundaries - it does not tell us anything about the limits of our duties. The
scope of justice is determined by intrinsic features of its subjects. These theories pay less
heed to interactions, and are more cosmopolitan in advocating entitlements based on the
‘fact’ of being human (Caney, Nussbaum, Axelsen).
Issues:
Which features of a subject are relevant? Thoughtfulness, or
rationality? Sentience? Being Human?
Fundamental assumption: the impacts of climate change will be felt by future generations
So, responses to climate changes are frequently justified with reference to
intergenerational justice.
Are we obliged to act to improve or maintain the condition of people who do not
yet exist?
How can we have duties to something that does not exist? Does this make sense?
This will require looking at reciprocity-based; subject-centred and future discounting
theories of intergenerational justice.
Two Bases of Justice (Buchanan 1990)
(a) Reciprocity
Based on the idea of interaction, and of distribution of social goods/bads through
cooperation. Questions of justice arise within the framework of cooperative schemes -
and reciprocity sets the scope and boundaries of justice. This interaction-based justice is
the basis for “basic structure” cosmopolitans (Pogge, Beitz) and liberal internationalists
(Miller, Rawls).
Issues:
What kind of reciprocity? Reciprocate costs (tit-for-tat) or aim for fairness?
Exclusion of the “naturally unempowered” - those unable to contribute to social
scheme / normatively excluded from justice relationships and hence claim
reciprocity duties, e.g. the disabled, the “able but unwanted”. Those who may need
help most are denied any entitlement, and are dependent on the goodwill/charity of
others.
(b) Subject-centred
Justice is still about the distribution of social goods and bads. Reciprocity matters, but it
does not set boundaries - it does not tell us anything about the limits of our duties. The
scope of justice is determined by intrinsic features of its subjects. These theories pay less
heed to interactions, and are more cosmopolitan in advocating entitlements based on the
‘fact’ of being human (Caney, Nussbaum, Axelsen).
Issues:
Which features of a subject are relevant? Thoughtfulness, or
rationality? Sentience? Being Human?
