Steven Lukes - Methodological Individualism Reconsidered
● Methodological individualism is a prescription for explanation, claiming all explanations
of social or individual phenomena must be couched in terms of facts about individuals (unless
they are not rock bottom explanations, on Watkin’s account)
● Methodological individualism is distinct from the following theses, which it has been
confused with:
○ Truistic social atomism
■ statements about individuals and society which are
analytically true e.g. society consists of people, groups consist of people,
institutions consist of people plus rules and roles
○ The theory of meaning that claims that every statement about social
phenomena is either a statement about individual human beings or else unintelligible and
hence not a statement
■ `this is plausible only with a crude verificationist theory
of meaning, which claims that the meaning of p is what confirms the truth of p
○ A theory of ontology that claims that in the social world only individuals
are real - social phenomena are constructions of the mind
■ if this means that only individuals are observable in the
social world, it is false
■ if it means that individuals are easy to understand,
whereas social phenomena are not, it is implausible
■ if the theory means that individuals exist independently
of groups and institutions, it is false ‘since just as facts about social phenomena
are contingent upon facts about individuals, the reverse is also true...we can only
speak of soldiers because we can speak of armies’ (but surely the existence of the
soldiers does not require armies, only their essence as soldiers?)
■ if it means that only facts about individuals are
explanatory, this alone would make the theory equivalent to MI
○ A theory that claims that sociological laws are impossible
■ Popper provides counter examples to this
○ A theory that claims that society has as its end the good of individuals.
This may mean
■ social institutions are founded and maintained by
individuals to fulfil their ends (a version of MI)
■ social institutions in fact satisfy individual ends (Hayek
on the market, not logically related to MI)
■ social institutions ought to satisfy individual ends (a
form of liberalism advocated by Popper, again not logically or conceptually
related to MI)
● So, if methodological individualism attempts to explain social and individual phenomena
through facts about individuals, is it plausible?
● What is a ‘fact about an individual’?
○ (i) genetic make-up, brain-states - presuppose nothing conscious or social
■ e.g. Eysenck’s Psychology of Politics
○ (ii) aggression, gratification, stimulus response - presuppose
● Methodological individualism is a prescription for explanation, claiming all explanations
of social or individual phenomena must be couched in terms of facts about individuals (unless
they are not rock bottom explanations, on Watkin’s account)
● Methodological individualism is distinct from the following theses, which it has been
confused with:
○ Truistic social atomism
■ statements about individuals and society which are
analytically true e.g. society consists of people, groups consist of people,
institutions consist of people plus rules and roles
○ The theory of meaning that claims that every statement about social
phenomena is either a statement about individual human beings or else unintelligible and
hence not a statement
■ `this is plausible only with a crude verificationist theory
of meaning, which claims that the meaning of p is what confirms the truth of p
○ A theory of ontology that claims that in the social world only individuals
are real - social phenomena are constructions of the mind
■ if this means that only individuals are observable in the
social world, it is false
■ if it means that individuals are easy to understand,
whereas social phenomena are not, it is implausible
■ if the theory means that individuals exist independently
of groups and institutions, it is false ‘since just as facts about social phenomena
are contingent upon facts about individuals, the reverse is also true...we can only
speak of soldiers because we can speak of armies’ (but surely the existence of the
soldiers does not require armies, only their essence as soldiers?)
■ if it means that only facts about individuals are
explanatory, this alone would make the theory equivalent to MI
○ A theory that claims that sociological laws are impossible
■ Popper provides counter examples to this
○ A theory that claims that society has as its end the good of individuals.
This may mean
■ social institutions are founded and maintained by
individuals to fulfil their ends (a version of MI)
■ social institutions in fact satisfy individual ends (Hayek
on the market, not logically related to MI)
■ social institutions ought to satisfy individual ends (a
form of liberalism advocated by Popper, again not logically or conceptually
related to MI)
● So, if methodological individualism attempts to explain social and individual phenomena
through facts about individuals, is it plausible?
● What is a ‘fact about an individual’?
○ (i) genetic make-up, brain-states - presuppose nothing conscious or social
■ e.g. Eysenck’s Psychology of Politics
○ (ii) aggression, gratification, stimulus response - presuppose
