‘the liberal government under asquith was primarily responsible for the home rule crisis’
how far do you agree?
-introduction
-the liberal government had failed to recognise the severity of the situation before it was
too late
-the role of the conservatives and their belligerent language, the ulster unionists and the IPP
cannot be ignored when considering who was primarily responsible for the crisis
-the liberal party
-asquith’s ‘wait and see’ policy allowed the liberals to avoid too much involvement in home
rule
-wait and see- lack of strategy
-allowed carson and bonar law to turn towards militancy and hard line strategies
-asquith missed the chance to compromise as early as 1912
-asquith rejected any amendments or attempts at early exclusion – Lloyd George and
Churchill proposal of exclusion in February 1912 and agar-robertes amendment in June 1912
-he failed to listen to cabinet members who saw the severity of the situation in ulster- he
relied on Redmond’s opinion
-liberals failed to produce any clear strategy to deal with the exclusion of ulster when this
became a reality- instead choosing to reassure the IPP of their commitment to home-rule
for all of Ireland
-by the Buckingham palace conference- asquith had no clear view on the extent of what
exclusion for ulster would be (how many counties involved and if it would be temporary or
permanent) – the talks ended in deadlock
-failed to consider the warnings that the british army officers would refuse to move against
the ulster unionists- as demonstrated by the curragh mutiny
-although asquith met secretely with Redmond, carson and other leaders by the time of the
Buckingham palace conference it was too little, too late
-other mitigating factors where more focused on- the suffragettes and industrial violence
-conservatives and bonar law
-bonar law used the crisis to unite the party which had split following 3 successive electoral
defeats
-he pushed the limits of constitutional politics
-he saw ulster unionism as a way of destroying the home rule bill which they saw as a
‘corrupt parliamentary bargain’
-1912 blenheim palace speech- encouraging extra-parliamentary means – ‘I can imagine no
length of resistance to which ulster can go in which I should not be prepared to support
them’ – he described ulster as key to the empire
-the british league for the support of ulster and the union – was one of the propaganda tools
used by the conservatives
-predominantly conservative house of lords angry at the parliament act which reduced their
powers
-private talks with Churchill- bonar law claimed he wanted ulster to be excluded but would
accept home rule in the southern provinces
-he told carson he would accept partition encouraging the ulster unionist cause
how far do you agree?
-introduction
-the liberal government had failed to recognise the severity of the situation before it was
too late
-the role of the conservatives and their belligerent language, the ulster unionists and the IPP
cannot be ignored when considering who was primarily responsible for the crisis
-the liberal party
-asquith’s ‘wait and see’ policy allowed the liberals to avoid too much involvement in home
rule
-wait and see- lack of strategy
-allowed carson and bonar law to turn towards militancy and hard line strategies
-asquith missed the chance to compromise as early as 1912
-asquith rejected any amendments or attempts at early exclusion – Lloyd George and
Churchill proposal of exclusion in February 1912 and agar-robertes amendment in June 1912
-he failed to listen to cabinet members who saw the severity of the situation in ulster- he
relied on Redmond’s opinion
-liberals failed to produce any clear strategy to deal with the exclusion of ulster when this
became a reality- instead choosing to reassure the IPP of their commitment to home-rule
for all of Ireland
-by the Buckingham palace conference- asquith had no clear view on the extent of what
exclusion for ulster would be (how many counties involved and if it would be temporary or
permanent) – the talks ended in deadlock
-failed to consider the warnings that the british army officers would refuse to move against
the ulster unionists- as demonstrated by the curragh mutiny
-although asquith met secretely with Redmond, carson and other leaders by the time of the
Buckingham palace conference it was too little, too late
-other mitigating factors where more focused on- the suffragettes and industrial violence
-conservatives and bonar law
-bonar law used the crisis to unite the party which had split following 3 successive electoral
defeats
-he pushed the limits of constitutional politics
-he saw ulster unionism as a way of destroying the home rule bill which they saw as a
‘corrupt parliamentary bargain’
-1912 blenheim palace speech- encouraging extra-parliamentary means – ‘I can imagine no
length of resistance to which ulster can go in which I should not be prepared to support
them’ – he described ulster as key to the empire
-the british league for the support of ulster and the union – was one of the propaganda tools
used by the conservatives
-predominantly conservative house of lords angry at the parliament act which reduced their
powers
-private talks with Churchill- bonar law claimed he wanted ulster to be excluded but would
accept home rule in the southern provinces
-he told carson he would accept partition encouraging the ulster unionist cause
