Consciousness
Phenomenal Consciousness
Phenomenal consciousness is the subjective character of
experience. The fact that an organism has conscious
experience at all means, basically, that there is something it is
like to be that organism…fundamentally, an organism has
conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it
is to be that organism – something it is like for the organism.
Phenomenal consciousness is also known as ‘qualia’, which
refers to the qualitative aspects of consciousness. For example,
cold, warmth, pain, itch etc. It is difficult to define what
phenomenal consciousness or qualia is. However, it is possible
to do so by appealing to other phenomenally conscious
experiences.
Thomas Nagel has commented on qualia and functionalism:
“We may call this the subjective character of experience…It is
not analysable in terms of any explanatory system of functional
states, since these could be ascribed to robots or automata that
behaved like people though they experienced nothing.”
“Any shift to greater objectivity – that is, less attachment to a
specific viewpoint – does not take us nearer to the real nature
of the phenomenon: it takes us further away from it.”
The Zombie Argument
David Chalmers proposed the Zombie Argument, which says
that functionalism defines pleasure in causal terms: how it is
caused (eating ice cream), what it causes (‘mmm’ sounds), and
how it is related to other mental states (desire to have more).
But we haven’t explained the experience itself. It is logically
possible that a replica that is functionally identical would not
experience anything. This shows that functions alone do not
give us experience.
The ‘Hard Problem of Consciousness’
Chalmers has commented that ‘easy problems’ can be
functionalised. They can be explained by cognitive science i.e.,
in terms of computational or neural mechanisms. For example:
, - The ability to discriminate, categorise, and react to
environmental stimuli
- The integration of information by a cognitive system
- The reportability of mental states
- The ability of a system to access its own internal states
- The focus of attention
- The deliberate control of behaviour
- The difference between wakefulness and sleep
Crick and Koch have researched towards a neurobiological
theory of consciousness. Certain neural oscillations in the
cerebral cortex are hypothesised to be at the basis of
consciousness. The oscillations are correlated with awareness
in a number of different modalities (e.g., the visual and
olfactory systems). They are therefore a mechanism for binding
information contents.
“Our basic idea is that consciousness depends crucially on
some form of rather short-term memory and also on some form
of serial attentional mechanism. This attentional mechanism
helps sets of the relevant neurons to dire in a coherent semi-
oscillatory way…”
Global Workspace Theory
Bernard Baars proposed the Global Workspace Theory. A global
workspace = a central processor that mediates communication
between a host of specialised nonconscious modules. When
these modules need to broadcast information to the rest of the
system, they send this information to the workspace, which
acts as a kind of ‘communal blackboard’ for the rest of the
system.
But how is it that certain information contents are widely
accessible within a system?
Why phenomenal consciousness cannot be explained this way
To explain a cognitive function, we need only specify a
mechanism that can perform the function.
“When it comes to conscious experience, this sort of
explanation fails. What makes the hard problem hard and
almost unique is that it goes beyond problems about the
Phenomenal Consciousness
Phenomenal consciousness is the subjective character of
experience. The fact that an organism has conscious
experience at all means, basically, that there is something it is
like to be that organism…fundamentally, an organism has
conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it
is to be that organism – something it is like for the organism.
Phenomenal consciousness is also known as ‘qualia’, which
refers to the qualitative aspects of consciousness. For example,
cold, warmth, pain, itch etc. It is difficult to define what
phenomenal consciousness or qualia is. However, it is possible
to do so by appealing to other phenomenally conscious
experiences.
Thomas Nagel has commented on qualia and functionalism:
“We may call this the subjective character of experience…It is
not analysable in terms of any explanatory system of functional
states, since these could be ascribed to robots or automata that
behaved like people though they experienced nothing.”
“Any shift to greater objectivity – that is, less attachment to a
specific viewpoint – does not take us nearer to the real nature
of the phenomenon: it takes us further away from it.”
The Zombie Argument
David Chalmers proposed the Zombie Argument, which says
that functionalism defines pleasure in causal terms: how it is
caused (eating ice cream), what it causes (‘mmm’ sounds), and
how it is related to other mental states (desire to have more).
But we haven’t explained the experience itself. It is logically
possible that a replica that is functionally identical would not
experience anything. This shows that functions alone do not
give us experience.
The ‘Hard Problem of Consciousness’
Chalmers has commented that ‘easy problems’ can be
functionalised. They can be explained by cognitive science i.e.,
in terms of computational or neural mechanisms. For example:
, - The ability to discriminate, categorise, and react to
environmental stimuli
- The integration of information by a cognitive system
- The reportability of mental states
- The ability of a system to access its own internal states
- The focus of attention
- The deliberate control of behaviour
- The difference between wakefulness and sleep
Crick and Koch have researched towards a neurobiological
theory of consciousness. Certain neural oscillations in the
cerebral cortex are hypothesised to be at the basis of
consciousness. The oscillations are correlated with awareness
in a number of different modalities (e.g., the visual and
olfactory systems). They are therefore a mechanism for binding
information contents.
“Our basic idea is that consciousness depends crucially on
some form of rather short-term memory and also on some form
of serial attentional mechanism. This attentional mechanism
helps sets of the relevant neurons to dire in a coherent semi-
oscillatory way…”
Global Workspace Theory
Bernard Baars proposed the Global Workspace Theory. A global
workspace = a central processor that mediates communication
between a host of specialised nonconscious modules. When
these modules need to broadcast information to the rest of the
system, they send this information to the workspace, which
acts as a kind of ‘communal blackboard’ for the rest of the
system.
But how is it that certain information contents are widely
accessible within a system?
Why phenomenal consciousness cannot be explained this way
To explain a cognitive function, we need only specify a
mechanism that can perform the function.
“When it comes to conscious experience, this sort of
explanation fails. What makes the hard problem hard and
almost unique is that it goes beyond problems about the
