Can the problem of evil be solved? (25 marks)
The problem of evil argues that the existence of evil is enough to prove that the God of classical
theism does not exist. To solve this, the response would have to either prove that the two can co-
exist or suggest that God doesn’t need to create such a world without evil. I believe that Hick’s
theodicy is the most capable of solving the problem of evil, the logical version in particular. x
Two different strains of this argument approach the problem in different ways: the logical problem
of evil is a deductive argument, which argues that God and evil co-existing is logically impossible.
Mackie’s inconsistent triad highlights that His attributes are incompatible with the existence of evil.
If God is omnipotent He has the power to stop evil and if He is omnibenevolent He would not want
us to suffer, therefore evil wouldn’t exist. However, we know that evil does exist so the conclusion
here is that God doesn’t exist. The evidential problem (inductive) is less definitive, and says God’s
existence is possible but unlikely because of the amount, kind and distribution of evil. When
discussing evil, there are two types: moral and natural. Moral evil is intentional harm caused
deliberately by free agents (humans) such as murder. Natural evil is non-intentional harm caused by
a natural process such as a hurricane.
A defence’s aim is to provide reasons as to why God allows evil, and that they can co-exist. Plantinga
argues that defeating the problem of evil isn’t necessary, and that we need to show that the
existence of evil isn’t logically inconsistent with God’s attributes. His defence says that a morally
significant action is one that is either morally good or bad and a morally significant being is one that
has the freedom to do or refrain from morally significant actions. It has already been stated that
moral evil results from significantly free agents intentionally causing harm or suffering. If God
created a being that could only do morally good (non-evil) actions, they wouldn’t be significantly
free. Here, God would have to remove free will itself to remove moral evil done by free beings. Free
will is inherently good and since God is all-loving, He would not be prepared to remove our freedom
as a world without free will would be less good than our current one with evil.
A very notable criticism of this defence is that freewill is not valuable enough to justify terrible evils
such as genocide. These awful events cannot be defended by saying that free will is worth this cost.
Another criticism of Plantinga’s defence is that it only addresses moral evil. This criticism is very
important. It fails to explain why people suffer in natural disasters which have no relation to our free
will. For example, we cannot blame earthquakes on intentional suffering caused by significantly free
beings because they are caused by natural processes.
Plantinga’s first response is that we shouldn’t attempt to justify the cost of our free will. Also, if we
want our morally good actions to have meaning and value, it’s important that our morally bad
actions also have consequences. This places responsibility on our morality. In relation to the second
criticism, Plantinga argues that natural evil is actually a moral evil. His response uses the bible to
argue that what we call natural evil is actually a combination of morally bad actions committed by
rebellious angels and Satan. In explaining that natural evil is moral evil done by non-human agents,
Plantinga manages to move these acts of harm and suffering into the category of moral evil.
Neither of Plantinga’s responses are able to successfully defend the co-existence of God and evil,
and therefore cannot solve the problem of evil. The criticism weighing up the value of our freewill
versus some of the world’s most terrible evils cannot be solved by Plantinga’s response. Also, his
reliance on a conventional biblical account to defend the natural evil criticism is immediately
disregarded by atheists, as well as implausible for some theists. For these reasons Plantinga’s
freewill defence cannot solve either the evidential or logical problem of evil.
The problem of evil argues that the existence of evil is enough to prove that the God of classical
theism does not exist. To solve this, the response would have to either prove that the two can co-
exist or suggest that God doesn’t need to create such a world without evil. I believe that Hick’s
theodicy is the most capable of solving the problem of evil, the logical version in particular. x
Two different strains of this argument approach the problem in different ways: the logical problem
of evil is a deductive argument, which argues that God and evil co-existing is logically impossible.
Mackie’s inconsistent triad highlights that His attributes are incompatible with the existence of evil.
If God is omnipotent He has the power to stop evil and if He is omnibenevolent He would not want
us to suffer, therefore evil wouldn’t exist. However, we know that evil does exist so the conclusion
here is that God doesn’t exist. The evidential problem (inductive) is less definitive, and says God’s
existence is possible but unlikely because of the amount, kind and distribution of evil. When
discussing evil, there are two types: moral and natural. Moral evil is intentional harm caused
deliberately by free agents (humans) such as murder. Natural evil is non-intentional harm caused by
a natural process such as a hurricane.
A defence’s aim is to provide reasons as to why God allows evil, and that they can co-exist. Plantinga
argues that defeating the problem of evil isn’t necessary, and that we need to show that the
existence of evil isn’t logically inconsistent with God’s attributes. His defence says that a morally
significant action is one that is either morally good or bad and a morally significant being is one that
has the freedom to do or refrain from morally significant actions. It has already been stated that
moral evil results from significantly free agents intentionally causing harm or suffering. If God
created a being that could only do morally good (non-evil) actions, they wouldn’t be significantly
free. Here, God would have to remove free will itself to remove moral evil done by free beings. Free
will is inherently good and since God is all-loving, He would not be prepared to remove our freedom
as a world without free will would be less good than our current one with evil.
A very notable criticism of this defence is that freewill is not valuable enough to justify terrible evils
such as genocide. These awful events cannot be defended by saying that free will is worth this cost.
Another criticism of Plantinga’s defence is that it only addresses moral evil. This criticism is very
important. It fails to explain why people suffer in natural disasters which have no relation to our free
will. For example, we cannot blame earthquakes on intentional suffering caused by significantly free
beings because they are caused by natural processes.
Plantinga’s first response is that we shouldn’t attempt to justify the cost of our free will. Also, if we
want our morally good actions to have meaning and value, it’s important that our morally bad
actions also have consequences. This places responsibility on our morality. In relation to the second
criticism, Plantinga argues that natural evil is actually a moral evil. His response uses the bible to
argue that what we call natural evil is actually a combination of morally bad actions committed by
rebellious angels and Satan. In explaining that natural evil is moral evil done by non-human agents,
Plantinga manages to move these acts of harm and suffering into the category of moral evil.
Neither of Plantinga’s responses are able to successfully defend the co-existence of God and evil,
and therefore cannot solve the problem of evil. The criticism weighing up the value of our freewill
versus some of the world’s most terrible evils cannot be solved by Plantinga’s response. Also, his
reliance on a conventional biblical account to defend the natural evil criticism is immediately
disregarded by atheists, as well as implausible for some theists. For these reasons Plantinga’s
freewill defence cannot solve either the evidential or logical problem of evil.
