A mixed-methods study investigating the effect of time pressure on moral
decision-making
Abstract
The present mixed-methods study aimed to investigate the effect of time pressure on moral
decision-making. In the first stage of the study, an experiment was conducted with an
independent-groups design. 11 undergraduate psychology students, recruited via
opportunity sampling, were presented with 9 moral dilemmas and asked to decide whether
the proposed actions were morally appropriate or not. The independent variable (IV) had 2
conditions; whether the participants’ decision time was unlimited (IV1- untimed) or limited
(IV2- timed). For the purpose of this study, participants’ yes answers were equated with
utilitarian and their no responses with deontological judgements. The dependent variable
(DV) was the number of utilitarian choices made in both groups. In the second stage, 4
participants, 2 from each condition, were interviewed to investigate their perceived
justifications for their ethical judgements. Based on previous research, it was hypothesized
that participants would be less likely to make utilitarian moral judgements when pressured
by time. Contrary to the prediction of the dual-process model, limiting decision time produced
no significant decrease in the number of utilitarian decisions made in the present study.
Introduction
Utilitarianism is a consequentialist ethical theory, which determines the moral worth of acts
solely by the state of affairs they bring about (Benn 1998, p. 61). Classical utilitarianism
maintains that an act is morally right if it increases happiness or decreases unhappiness
(either directly or indirectly) for the greatest number of living beings involved (Mill 1863/
2001). Besides being hedonistic, this doctrine is also egalitarian in nature, since it emphasizes
that the pleasures and pains of each individual affected must be taken equally (Jones, Cardinal
& Hayward 2006, p. 60). Unlike consequentialists, deontologists completely ignore the
consequences and only consider motives when assessing the moral worth of actions.
Kantianism is a prime example of a duty-based ethical theory, as it emphasizes obligation and
respect for the moral law arguing that certain moral decisions are always forbidden and
1
, unjustifiable, regardless of how much good they would bring about (Garvey & Stangroom
2012, p. 277).
Using fMRI data, Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley and Cohen (2004) reported that making
utilitarian moral judgements primarily engaged brain areas associated with cognitive control
such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), while making deontological decisions
mainly activated brain regions associated with social-emotional processing such as the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VFC). Consequentially, Greene’s dual-process theory of moral
judgement associates utilitarian judgements with logical reasoning and deliberative cognitive
processes, while deontological ones with intuitive, emotional responses.
In support of this model, several studies (Ciaramelli, Muccioli, Ladaras, & di Pellegrino,
2007; Koenings et al., 2007; Thomas, Croft & Tranel, 2011) reported that patients with VFC
damage were more likely to make utilitarian judgements compared to controls in high-conflict
personal moral dilemmas, which involve directly inflicting serious physical harm to a person,
in order to maximize aggregate happiness. However, Kahane and Shackel (2008) criticized the
stimuli materials used by Koenings et al., Ciaramelli et al. and Greene et al. The researchers
argued that when judged by professional moral philosophers, more than half of the dilemmas
used in the above studies were shown not to involve a clear choice between utilitarian and
deontological moral considerations.
In support of Greene’s theory’s prediction that inhibition of cognitive control reduces
utilitarian moral judgements, Conway and Gauronski (2013) reported that under cognitive
load their participants were less likely to make utilitarian decisions. Furthermore, Greene,
Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom and Cohen (2008) found that although cognitive load did not
decrease the overall number of utilitarian judgements, it did increase the response time
needed to arrive to those judgements. Additionally, restricting decision time has also been
shown to result in fewer utilitarian responses (Cummins & Cummins 2012). However, Tinghog
et al. (2016) conducted a large-scale, cross-cultural study utilizing manipulations of both
cognitive load and time pressure and found no support for Greene’s model.
The current study investigated the effect of time pressure on moral judgements. Based on
past research, it was predicted that participants with limited response time would be less
likely to make utilitarian moral decisions.
2
decision-making
Abstract
The present mixed-methods study aimed to investigate the effect of time pressure on moral
decision-making. In the first stage of the study, an experiment was conducted with an
independent-groups design. 11 undergraduate psychology students, recruited via
opportunity sampling, were presented with 9 moral dilemmas and asked to decide whether
the proposed actions were morally appropriate or not. The independent variable (IV) had 2
conditions; whether the participants’ decision time was unlimited (IV1- untimed) or limited
(IV2- timed). For the purpose of this study, participants’ yes answers were equated with
utilitarian and their no responses with deontological judgements. The dependent variable
(DV) was the number of utilitarian choices made in both groups. In the second stage, 4
participants, 2 from each condition, were interviewed to investigate their perceived
justifications for their ethical judgements. Based on previous research, it was hypothesized
that participants would be less likely to make utilitarian moral judgements when pressured
by time. Contrary to the prediction of the dual-process model, limiting decision time produced
no significant decrease in the number of utilitarian decisions made in the present study.
Introduction
Utilitarianism is a consequentialist ethical theory, which determines the moral worth of acts
solely by the state of affairs they bring about (Benn 1998, p. 61). Classical utilitarianism
maintains that an act is morally right if it increases happiness or decreases unhappiness
(either directly or indirectly) for the greatest number of living beings involved (Mill 1863/
2001). Besides being hedonistic, this doctrine is also egalitarian in nature, since it emphasizes
that the pleasures and pains of each individual affected must be taken equally (Jones, Cardinal
& Hayward 2006, p. 60). Unlike consequentialists, deontologists completely ignore the
consequences and only consider motives when assessing the moral worth of actions.
Kantianism is a prime example of a duty-based ethical theory, as it emphasizes obligation and
respect for the moral law arguing that certain moral decisions are always forbidden and
1
, unjustifiable, regardless of how much good they would bring about (Garvey & Stangroom
2012, p. 277).
Using fMRI data, Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley and Cohen (2004) reported that making
utilitarian moral judgements primarily engaged brain areas associated with cognitive control
such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), while making deontological decisions
mainly activated brain regions associated with social-emotional processing such as the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VFC). Consequentially, Greene’s dual-process theory of moral
judgement associates utilitarian judgements with logical reasoning and deliberative cognitive
processes, while deontological ones with intuitive, emotional responses.
In support of this model, several studies (Ciaramelli, Muccioli, Ladaras, & di Pellegrino,
2007; Koenings et al., 2007; Thomas, Croft & Tranel, 2011) reported that patients with VFC
damage were more likely to make utilitarian judgements compared to controls in high-conflict
personal moral dilemmas, which involve directly inflicting serious physical harm to a person,
in order to maximize aggregate happiness. However, Kahane and Shackel (2008) criticized the
stimuli materials used by Koenings et al., Ciaramelli et al. and Greene et al. The researchers
argued that when judged by professional moral philosophers, more than half of the dilemmas
used in the above studies were shown not to involve a clear choice between utilitarian and
deontological moral considerations.
In support of Greene’s theory’s prediction that inhibition of cognitive control reduces
utilitarian moral judgements, Conway and Gauronski (2013) reported that under cognitive
load their participants were less likely to make utilitarian decisions. Furthermore, Greene,
Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom and Cohen (2008) found that although cognitive load did not
decrease the overall number of utilitarian judgements, it did increase the response time
needed to arrive to those judgements. Additionally, restricting decision time has also been
shown to result in fewer utilitarian responses (Cummins & Cummins 2012). However, Tinghog
et al. (2016) conducted a large-scale, cross-cultural study utilizing manipulations of both
cognitive load and time pressure and found no support for Greene’s model.
The current study investigated the effect of time pressure on moral judgements. Based on
past research, it was predicted that participants with limited response time would be less
likely to make utilitarian moral decisions.
2
