WGU C845 VUN1 Task 1| Passed on First Attempt |Latest Update with Complete Solution

WGU C845 VUN1Task 1 | Passed on FirstAttempt ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x.




|Latest Update with Complete Solution
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VUN1 — VUN1 Task 1: Managing Security Operations and Access Controls
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Information Systems Security - C845
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A. Apply an Access Control Model ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x.




A.1. Chosen Access Control Model ,x . ,x. , x.




Ihavechosen the Role-BasedAccess Control (RBAC)model.Theprinciples ofRBAC are:
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• Role Assignment: A user is assigned to a role based on their job function (e.g., "Finance
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Analyst").
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• Permission Assignment:Permissionstoperformoperations onsystemsareassignedto roles, not
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to individual users.
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• Session Management: Auser activates a role to gainthe associated permissionsfor a session.
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• Least Privilege: Users should only have the minimum level of access necessary toperform their job
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duties.
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The organization's access control structure, as seen in the user matrix, is implicitly role-based (e.g.,
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"Financemanager," "HRcoordinator"). Applyinga formalRBACmodelwouldstreamlinethisbyensuring
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permissions are strictly tied to business functions, reducing complexity and the potential for user error
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when assigning permissions.
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A.2. Four Misalignments with RBAC Principles , x . , x . , x . , x .




1. Misalignment 1: Privilege Escalation Beyond Role Scope ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x.




• Description: The "Juniorsystem admin" (J.Lopez) has"Domainadmin" privileges.A ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x.




junior role should not have the highest level of access in a Windows environment.
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• Conflict with RBAC: Thisviolates the principle of least privilege. The role "Junior system ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x.




admin"implies asubsetofadministrativeduties,not unrestricteddomain-widecontrol.
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2. Misalignment 2: Unnecessary Access Across Departments ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x.




• Description: The "Finance analyst" (L. Cheng) has "Full access" to the CRM, a system ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x. ,x.

, primarily for Sales and Support. A finance role typically does not require full modification
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rights in a customer relationship system.
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• Conflict with RBAC: This violates least privilege and separation of duties. It allows for
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potential data manipulation outside the user's core business function.
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3. Misalignment 3: Violation of User-Role Assignment Post-Termination
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• Description: The "HR assistant" (P. Ellis), who was terminated on 2025-05-20, has an
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"Active" account status and successfully logged in on 2025-06-29.
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• Conflict with RBAC: RBAC requires timely revocation of role assignments upon a change in
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employment status. An active session for a terminated user completely bypasses the
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security provided by the role structure.
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4. Misalignment 4: Overly Broad Privileged Access
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• Description: The "IT administrator" (T. Miller) has "Full admin" access to "All internal
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systems," and the log shows they made a firewall rule change without a ticket_id.
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• ConflictwithRBAC:Whilesomeaccessisnecessary,blanket"Fulladmin" access
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violates least privilege and impedes accountability. It does not segment duties within the IT
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department itself.
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