BSAD 180 Midterm Detailed Concept
Questions and Answers Exam 2026
Agency Problems Who owns a corporation? Describe the process whereby the owners
control the firm's management. What is the main reason that an agency relationship
exists in the corporate form of organization? In this context, what kinds of problems can
arise? - In the corporate form of ownership, the shareholders are the owners of the firm.
The shareholders elect the directors of the corporation, who in turn appoint the firm's
management. This separation of ownership from control in the corporate form of
organization is what causes agency problems to exist. Management may act in its own
or someone else's best interests, rather than those of the shareholders. If such events
occur, they may contradict the goal of maximizing the share price of the equity of the
firm.
Not-for-Profit Firm Goals Suppose you were the financial manager of a not-for-profit
business (a not-for-profit hospital, perhaps). What kinds of goals do you think would be
appropriate? - 2. Such organizations frequently pursue social or political missions, so
many different goals are conceivable. One goal that is often cited is revenue
minimization; i.e., provide whatever goods and services are offered at the lowest
possible cost to society. A better approach might be to observe that even a not-for-profit
business has equity. Thus, one answer is that the appropriate goal is to maximize the
value of the equity.
Goal of the Firm Evaluate the following statement: Managers should not focus on the
current stock value because doing so will lead to an overemphasis on short-term profits
at the expense of long-term profits. - 3. Presumably, the current stock value reflects the
risk, timing, and magnitude of all future cash flows, both short-term and long-term. If this
is correct, then the statement is false.
Ethics and Firm Goals Can the goal of maximizing the value of the stock conflict with
other goals, such as avoiding unethical or illegal behavior? In particular, do you think
subjects like customer and employee safety, the environment, and the general good of
society fit into this framework, or are they essentially ignored? Think of some specific
scenarios to illustrate your answer. - 4. An argument can be made either way. At the
one extreme, we could argue that in a market economy, all of these things are priced.
There is thus an optimal level of, for example, ethical and/or illegal behavior, and the
framework of stock valuation explicitly includes these. At the other extreme, we could
argue that these are non-economic phenomena and are best handled through the
political process. A classic (and highly relevant) thought question that illustrates this
debate goes something like this: "A firm has estimated that the cost of improving the
safety of one of its products is $30 million. However, the firm believes that improving the
safety of the product will only save $20 million in product liability claims. What should
the firm do?"
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International Firm Goal Would the goal of maximizing the value of the stock differ for
financial management in a foreign country? Why or why not? - 5. The goal will be the
same, but the best course of action toward that goal may be different because of
differing social, political, and economic institutions.
Agency Problems Suppose you own stock in a company. The current price per share is
$25. Another company has just announced that it wants to buy your company and will
pay $35 per share to acquire all the outstanding stock. Your company's management
immediately begins fighting off this hostile bid. Is management acting in the
shareholders' best interests? Why or why not? - 6. The goal of management should be
to maximize the share price for the current shareholders. If management believes that it
can improve the profitability of the firm so that the share price will exceed $35, then they
should fight the offer from the outside company. If management believes that this
bidder, or other unidentified bidders, will actually pay more than $35 per share to
acquire the company, then they should still fight the offer. However, if the current
management cannot increase the value of the firm beyond the bid price, and no other
higher bids come in, then management is not acting in the interests of the shareholders
by fighting the offer. Since current managers often lose their jobs when the corporation
is acquired, poorly monitored managers have an incentive to fight corporate takeovers
in situations such as this.
Agency Problems and Corporate Ownership Corporate ownership varies around the
world. Historically, individuals have owned the majority of shares in public corporations
in the United States. In Germany and Japan, however, banks, other large financial
institutions, and other companies own most of the stock in public corporations. Do you
think agency problems are likely to be more or less severe in Germany and Japan than
in the United States? - 7. We would expect agency problems to be less severe in other
countries, primarily due to the relatively small percentage of individual ownership. Fewer
individual owners should reduce the number of diverse opinions concerning corporate
goals. The high percentage of institutional ownership might lead to a higher degree of
agreement between owners and managers on decisions concerning risky projects. In
addition, institutions may be better able to implement effective monitoring mechanisms
on managers than can individual owners, based on the institutions' deeper resources
and experiences with their own management.
Agency Problems and Corporate Ownership In recent years, large financial institutions
such as mutual funds and pension funds have become the dominant owners of stock in
the United States, and these institutions are becoming more active in corporate affairs.
What are the implications of this trend for agency problems and corporate control? - 8.
The increase in institutional ownership of stock in the United States and the growing
activism of these large shareholder groups may lead to a reduction in agency problems
for U.S. corporations and a more efficient market for corporate control. However, this
may not always be the case. If the managers of the mutual fund or pension plan are not
concerned with the interests of the investors, the agency problem could potentially
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