Strategy notes

Contents I General Materials 7 II Chapter-Specic Materials 12 1 Introduction 13 2 The Extensive Form 15 3 Strategies and the Normal Form 18 4 Beliefs, Mixed Strategies, and Expected Payos 21 5 General Assumptions and Methodology 23 6 Dominance and Best Response 24 7 Rationalizability and Iterated Dominance 27 8 Location, Partnership, and Social Unrest 29 9 Nash Equilibrium 32 10 Oligopoly, Taris, Crime, and Voting 34 11 Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium 35 12 Strictly Competitive Games and Secu...

Contents I General Materials 7 II Chapter-Specic Materials 12 1 Introduction 13 2 The Extensive Form 15 3 Strategies and the Normal Form 18 4 Beliefs, Mixed Strategies, and Expected Payos 21 5 General Assumptions and Methodology 23 6 Dominance and Best Response 24 7 Rationalizability and Iterated Dominance 27 8 Location, Partnership, and Social Unrest 29 9 Nash Equilibrium 32 10 Oligopoly, Taris, Crime, and Voting 34 11 Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium 35 12 Strictly Competitive Games and Secu...