Does functionalism give a convincing account of mental states?
In this essay, I will argue that functionalism does not give a convincing account of mental
states. I will discuss and reject some of the main arguments for functionalism, that being that
the theory avoids both circularity and multiple realisability, and instead conclude that a true
understanding of the mind would recognise that there is more to mental states than
functions.
Functionalism identifies mental states with functional roles that they play within the cognitive
system of inputs and outputs, rather than analysing them ontologically in terms of what they
are made of. To define something in terms of its functional role is to define it in terms of what
it does or the role that it plays in causal interplay with other things. To be a particular mental
state just is to be whatever it is that plays a specific causal role of this sort. It is this claim
that mental states are simply ‘functions’ that I will argue prevents functionalism from being
successful. The theory acknowledges that functions should be understood within the context
of the entire mind, so the function of pain isn't simply to cause behavioural dispositions (as
behaviourism claims) but also to cause other mental states. However, it fails to recognise the
non-physical qualities of the mind such as ‘qualia’ (the what-is-it-like aspect of experience)
and thus does not provide a complete definition of the mind.
It could be argued that a strength of functionalism is that it avoids some of the problems
which behaviourism - a theory which argues that everything, even the mind, is physical or
supervenes on the physical - faces such as multiple realisability and circularity.
Behaviourism, because it denies mental states a causal role in our behaviour, leads into the
problem that we cannot analyse a particular mental state independently of other mental
states. Functionalism, in contrast, recognises the causal role mental states have with respect
to other mental states as well as behaviour. The function of mental states is more than
simply to cause behaviours - mental states can also cause other mental states. This accords
with the common-sense view. It also gives mental states an explanatory role in
understanding behaviour. We act as we do because our mental states cause us to act. For
example, my mental state of pain, say, could serve the function of causing other mental
states such as a belief that I am in pain and a desire for the pain to stop. My mental state of
pain serves this function even if that mental state ends up having no effect on my behaviour.
Further, the behaviour my mental state causes depends on my other mental states. Unlike
behaviourism, functionalism doesn't face the circularity objection because it avoids tying
mental states to specific behaviours, and thus doesn't end up having to give circular
explanations of how a person can be in pain when their behaviour says otherwise, as
behaviourism does. Instead, it embraces the fact that a particular mental state cannot be
defined independently of its causal relationship to other mental states.
However, I would argue that the fact that functionalism is a stronger theory than
behaviourism does not mean that it is the correct theory of the mind as it still faces the
possibility of a functional duplicate with inverted qualia. Two functionally identical beings or
systems could have 'inverted qualia' with respect to each other - with 'qualia' being the
private, subjective 'what-is-it-like' aspect of experience. For example, if two people have
functionally identical visual systems, meaning they react in the same sorts of ways to the
electromagnetic spectrum that impacts on our eyes, then according to functionalism they
must have the same mental states when they experience colours. However, it is conceivable
In this essay, I will argue that functionalism does not give a convincing account of mental
states. I will discuss and reject some of the main arguments for functionalism, that being that
the theory avoids both circularity and multiple realisability, and instead conclude that a true
understanding of the mind would recognise that there is more to mental states than
functions.
Functionalism identifies mental states with functional roles that they play within the cognitive
system of inputs and outputs, rather than analysing them ontologically in terms of what they
are made of. To define something in terms of its functional role is to define it in terms of what
it does or the role that it plays in causal interplay with other things. To be a particular mental
state just is to be whatever it is that plays a specific causal role of this sort. It is this claim
that mental states are simply ‘functions’ that I will argue prevents functionalism from being
successful. The theory acknowledges that functions should be understood within the context
of the entire mind, so the function of pain isn't simply to cause behavioural dispositions (as
behaviourism claims) but also to cause other mental states. However, it fails to recognise the
non-physical qualities of the mind such as ‘qualia’ (the what-is-it-like aspect of experience)
and thus does not provide a complete definition of the mind.
It could be argued that a strength of functionalism is that it avoids some of the problems
which behaviourism - a theory which argues that everything, even the mind, is physical or
supervenes on the physical - faces such as multiple realisability and circularity.
Behaviourism, because it denies mental states a causal role in our behaviour, leads into the
problem that we cannot analyse a particular mental state independently of other mental
states. Functionalism, in contrast, recognises the causal role mental states have with respect
to other mental states as well as behaviour. The function of mental states is more than
simply to cause behaviours - mental states can also cause other mental states. This accords
with the common-sense view. It also gives mental states an explanatory role in
understanding behaviour. We act as we do because our mental states cause us to act. For
example, my mental state of pain, say, could serve the function of causing other mental
states such as a belief that I am in pain and a desire for the pain to stop. My mental state of
pain serves this function even if that mental state ends up having no effect on my behaviour.
Further, the behaviour my mental state causes depends on my other mental states. Unlike
behaviourism, functionalism doesn't face the circularity objection because it avoids tying
mental states to specific behaviours, and thus doesn't end up having to give circular
explanations of how a person can be in pain when their behaviour says otherwise, as
behaviourism does. Instead, it embraces the fact that a particular mental state cannot be
defined independently of its causal relationship to other mental states.
However, I would argue that the fact that functionalism is a stronger theory than
behaviourism does not mean that it is the correct theory of the mind as it still faces the
possibility of a functional duplicate with inverted qualia. Two functionally identical beings or
systems could have 'inverted qualia' with respect to each other - with 'qualia' being the
private, subjective 'what-is-it-like' aspect of experience. For example, if two people have
functionally identical visual systems, meaning they react in the same sorts of ways to the
electromagnetic spectrum that impacts on our eyes, then according to functionalism they
must have the same mental states when they experience colours. However, it is conceivable
