The Tripartite View- ‘what is knowledge?’ Practice Questions
1. What is the tripartite view of propositional knowledge? (3)
2. What is an epistemological virtue? (3)
3. What is propositional knowledge? (3)
4. What is knowledge by acquaintance? (3)
5. What is one reason why truth is a necessary condition for knowledge? (3)
6. Explain why it may not be possible to give a definition of knowledge, according to Zagzebski. (5)
7. Outline the reasons why justification is a necessary condition for knowledge. (5)
8. Outline and explain the tripartite view of knowledge (‘Justified True Belief’). (5)
9. Explain what knowledge is, according to reliabilism. (5)
10. Explain the definition of knowledge given by the ‘no false lemmas’ view. (5)
11. Outline virtue epistemology’s definition of knowledge and explain how it is supposed to avoid Gettier-style
problems. (5)
1. The tripartite view of propositional knowledge defines it as no more than a justified true
belief. Plato considered knowledge to be any true belief accompanied by a rational
account. So these conditions for knowledge are individually necessary but jointly
sufficient.
2. Virtue epistemology answers the question of what knowledge is, by defining it as true
beliefs, caused because of epistemological virtues. These are intellectual virtues,
concerned with epistemological good, so are likely to cause true beliefs. An example is
memory. If you can remember certain facts you can apply them better to gain new
knowledge.
3. Propositional knowledge is the content of an assertoric statement, in that it is declaring
something. This is opposed to simply being observational. In other words it is ‘knowledge
that…’. For example, knowing that Paris is in France.
4. Knowledge by acquaintance refers to ‘knowledge of…’. This refers to having direct
experiential/empirical access to objects and perceptions. For example, knowing of any
person, place, etc. This type of knowledge is observational.
5. The tripartite definition of knowledge is that it is no more than a justified true belief.
These three conditions are individually necessary in providing knowledge, in that you
need each of them or you will not have knowledge. Truth is a necessary condition
because if a proposition is false then you did not have knowledge of it. False
propositions are not facts, hence cannot be known.
6. In defining certain terms, we are actually referring to their essences. For example water
is defined by being H2O and this is what separates it from anything else. If you take
‘weeds’ and try to define them it becomes difficult- they do not have an essence to truly
differentiate them from other plants (at least not something existing within the weed itself
that separates it). According to Zabzeski knowledge is perhaps like this. We do not
necessarily know the underlying quality that makes knowledge knowledge. Given it does
not have a real essence, knowledge would be indefinable. Throughout history what
societies have considered knowledge has varied, implying there is maybe a socially
constructed essence of knowledge. Zagzebski thinks though, that we ought to carry on
treating knowledge as if it has a ‘real essence’, so that we can seek a true definition. In
doing this however, there are particular ‘pitfalls’ she says ought to be avoided. For
1. What is the tripartite view of propositional knowledge? (3)
2. What is an epistemological virtue? (3)
3. What is propositional knowledge? (3)
4. What is knowledge by acquaintance? (3)
5. What is one reason why truth is a necessary condition for knowledge? (3)
6. Explain why it may not be possible to give a definition of knowledge, according to Zagzebski. (5)
7. Outline the reasons why justification is a necessary condition for knowledge. (5)
8. Outline and explain the tripartite view of knowledge (‘Justified True Belief’). (5)
9. Explain what knowledge is, according to reliabilism. (5)
10. Explain the definition of knowledge given by the ‘no false lemmas’ view. (5)
11. Outline virtue epistemology’s definition of knowledge and explain how it is supposed to avoid Gettier-style
problems. (5)
1. The tripartite view of propositional knowledge defines it as no more than a justified true
belief. Plato considered knowledge to be any true belief accompanied by a rational
account. So these conditions for knowledge are individually necessary but jointly
sufficient.
2. Virtue epistemology answers the question of what knowledge is, by defining it as true
beliefs, caused because of epistemological virtues. These are intellectual virtues,
concerned with epistemological good, so are likely to cause true beliefs. An example is
memory. If you can remember certain facts you can apply them better to gain new
knowledge.
3. Propositional knowledge is the content of an assertoric statement, in that it is declaring
something. This is opposed to simply being observational. In other words it is ‘knowledge
that…’. For example, knowing that Paris is in France.
4. Knowledge by acquaintance refers to ‘knowledge of…’. This refers to having direct
experiential/empirical access to objects and perceptions. For example, knowing of any
person, place, etc. This type of knowledge is observational.
5. The tripartite definition of knowledge is that it is no more than a justified true belief.
These three conditions are individually necessary in providing knowledge, in that you
need each of them or you will not have knowledge. Truth is a necessary condition
because if a proposition is false then you did not have knowledge of it. False
propositions are not facts, hence cannot be known.
6. In defining certain terms, we are actually referring to their essences. For example water
is defined by being H2O and this is what separates it from anything else. If you take
‘weeds’ and try to define them it becomes difficult- they do not have an essence to truly
differentiate them from other plants (at least not something existing within the weed itself
that separates it). According to Zabzeski knowledge is perhaps like this. We do not
necessarily know the underlying quality that makes knowledge knowledge. Given it does
not have a real essence, knowledge would be indefinable. Throughout history what
societies have considered knowledge has varied, implying there is maybe a socially
constructed essence of knowledge. Zagzebski thinks though, that we ought to carry on
treating knowledge as if it has a ‘real essence’, so that we can seek a true definition. In
doing this however, there are particular ‘pitfalls’ she says ought to be avoided. For
