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Hard behaviourism
- ‘Hard behaviourism’ is a physicalist position and thus argues that everything
is physical or supervenes upon the physical
- ‘Hard behaviourism’ is the view that all propositions about mental states can
be analytically reduced without loss of meaning to propositions that
exclusively use the language of physics to talk about bodily states.
- Analytic reduction is the view that one set of statements or concepts can be
reduced to another purely by meaning, such that X = Y by definition.
- In this case, the terms involved are synonymous, so no information is lost
when translating from one to the other.
- This makes analytic reductions a priori, since they can be known through
conceptual analysis alone, without the need for a posteriori observation.
- For example, the proposition that “I am thirsty” is synonymous with “drinking
water when its available”
- This is known a priori - independently of sense experience
- It is also known by definition alone - it is analytically true, true in virtue of the
meanings of the two propositions; independent of how the world is
- Hard behaviourists such as Hempell argue that their theory makes
propositions about the mind cognitively meaningful because such
propositions are about empirically verifiable public observable behaviours as
opposed to privately, introspectively accessible mental states which are not
empirically verifiable
,Soft behaviourism
- ‘Soft behaviourism’ is a physicalist position and thus argues that everything is
physical or supervenes upon the physical
- Ryle argues that to talk about ‘the mind’ and ‘mental states’ is (at least often)
to talk about publicly observable overt behaviour or behavioural dispositions
which can be expressed in hypothetical and empirically verifiable ‘if-then’
sentences.
- ‘Soft behaviourism’ is the view that all propositions about mental states can
be analytically reduced without loss of meaning to propositions about these
publicly observable overt behavioural dispositions.
- Analytic reduction is the view that one set of statements or concepts can be
reduced to another purely by meaning, such that X = Y by definition.
- In this case, the terms involved are synonymous, so no information is lost
when translating from one to the other.
- This makes analytic reductions a priori, since they can be known through
conceptual analysis alone, without the need for a posteriori observation.
- For example, the proposition that “I am thirsty” is synonymous with “drinking
water when its available”
- This is known a priori - independently of sense experience
- It is also known by definition alone - it is analytically true, true in virtue of the
meanings of the two propositions; independent of how the world is
- A dispositional property of something is its liability or tendency to act in a
certain way if certain conditions are met
- For example, a dispositional property of sugar is its tendency to dissolve.
Sugar does not always dissolve but will in in the right conditions (e.g if its
placed in water)
- Thus, a behavioural disposition is a way someone tends to act if certain
conditions are met
- These behavioural dispositions are ‘multi-track’ in the sense that there are
indefinitely many complex ways in which one might behave when that fits a
given mental ascription
,Dualist argument against behaviorism
- P1: If physicalism is true, having complete knowledge of all the physical facts
about colour perception would be to have complete knowledge of all the
mental facts involved in colour perception
- P2: Mary has propositional knowledge of all the physical facts involved in
colour perception before her release
- “Mary is a brilliant scientist who…is forced to investigate the world
from a black and white room via a black and white television monitor”
- P3: When Mary sees colour (eg a red rose), she learns knew propositional
knowledge
- She learns the phenomenal fact of “what it is like” for both herself and
other people to see red
- She learns truths about qualia which are not deducible from physical
facts
- Qualia are intrinsic, phenomenal, non-intentional aspects of mental
states that are introspectively accessible
- P4: Mary learns a new fact so not all mental facts can be physical facts (since
Mary already knew all of these)
- C1: Therefore, there are non-physical facts about human colour vision
- P5: Non-physical facts are facts about non-physical phenomenal properties
- C2: Therefore, there are non-physical properties and physicalism is false
- P6: Behaviourism is a physicalist theory and thus argues that everything is
physical or supervenes upon the physical
- C3: Therefore, behaviourism is false
The issue of the distinctness of mental states from behaviour - Hilary Putnam's
Super-Spartans
- Putnam defines “X-worlders”/”Super-Super-Spartans” as people who feel pain
but suppress all pain behaviour and do not even talk about pain.
- They have suppressed the behavior for so long that they no longer even have
the first-order disposition to wince or groan. They feel pain without any
behavioral disposition whatsoever.
,- However, they may still think about their pain internally, recognising that it is
unpleasant and even imagining how they might react if they were allowed to
express it or discuss it.
- If ‘hard behaviourism’ is true then ‘x is in pain’ can be analytically reduced
without loss of meaning to a proposition that exclusively uses the language
of physics to talk about bodily states.
- Similarly, if ‘soft behaviourism’ is true then ‘x is in pain’ can be analytically
reduced without loss of meaning to a proposition about behavioural
dispositions.
- Therefore, if hard behaviourism is true it is not possible for ‘x is in pain’ to be
true but no statement about x’s bodily states to be true.
- Similarly, therefore, if soft behaviourism is true it is not possible for ‘x is in
pain’ to be true but no statement about x’s behavioural dispositions to be
true.
- A SSS is someone who is in pain but shows no pain behaviour (including
verbal behaviour) or behavioural dispositions (these individuals have
suppressed pain behaviors so deeply that they do not even talk about pain or
have the disposition to show it)
- So, a SSS is someone for whom ‘x is in pain’ is true but no corresponding
statement about x’s displaying pain behaviour or behavioral dispositions is
true.
- If SSSs are conceivable then it is possible for ‘x is in pain’ to be true and for no
corresponding statement about x’s bodily movements / behavioural
dispositions to be true
- If SSS are conceivable then propositions about pain cannot be reduced
without loss of meaning [ie analytically reduced] to propositions that
exclusively use the language of physics to talk about bodily states
- Similarly, If SSS are conceivable then propositions about pain cannot be
reduced without loss of meaning [ie analytically reduced] to propositions
about behavioural dispositions
- Therefore, if SSS are conceivable, hard and soft philosophical behaviourism
are false
- SSS are conceivable.
- Therefore, hard and soft behaviourism are false
, The issue of the distinctness of mental states from behaviour - Hilary Putnam's
perfect actors
- Putnam defines “Perfect Actors” as people who do not feel pain but who
behave exactly as if they are experiencing a specific mental state.
- If ‘hard behaviourism’ is true then ‘x is in pain’ can be analytically reduced
without loss of meaning to a proposition that exclusively uses the language
of physics to talk about bodily states.
- Similarly, if ‘soft behaviourism’ is true then ‘x is in pain’ can be analytically
reduced without loss of meaning to a proposition about behavioural
dispositions.
- Therefore, if hard behaviourism is true it is not possible for ‘x is in pain’ to be
false but a corresponding statement about x’s bodily states to be true.
- Similarly, therefore, if soft behaviourism is true it is not possible for ‘x is in
pain’ to be false but a corresponding statement about x’s behavioural
dispositions to be true.
- A PA is someone who is not in pain but shows pain behaviour and
behavioural dispositions
- So, a PA is someone for whom ‘x is in pain’ is false but a corresponding
statement about x’s displaying pain behaviour or behavioral dispositions is
true.
- If PA are conceivable then it is possible for ‘x is in pain’ to be false and for a
corresponding statement about x’s bodily movements / behavioural
dispositions to be true
- If PA are conceivable then propositions about pain cannot be reduced
without loss of meaning [ie analytically reduced] to propositions that
exclusively use the language of physics to talk about bodily states
- Similarly, If PA are conceivable then propositions about pain cannot be
reduced without loss of meaning [ie analytically reduced] to propositions
about behavioural dispositions
- Therefore, if PA are conceivable, hard and soft philosophical behaviourism
are false
- PA are conceivable.
- Therefore, hard and soft behaviourism are false
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3/
Hard behaviourism
- ‘Hard behaviourism’ is a physicalist position and thus argues that everything
is physical or supervenes upon the physical
- ‘Hard behaviourism’ is the view that all propositions about mental states can
be analytically reduced without loss of meaning to propositions that
exclusively use the language of physics to talk about bodily states.
- Analytic reduction is the view that one set of statements or concepts can be
reduced to another purely by meaning, such that X = Y by definition.
- In this case, the terms involved are synonymous, so no information is lost
when translating from one to the other.
- This makes analytic reductions a priori, since they can be known through
conceptual analysis alone, without the need for a posteriori observation.
- For example, the proposition that “I am thirsty” is synonymous with “drinking
water when its available”
- This is known a priori - independently of sense experience
- It is also known by definition alone - it is analytically true, true in virtue of the
meanings of the two propositions; independent of how the world is
- Hard behaviourists such as Hempell argue that their theory makes
propositions about the mind cognitively meaningful because such
propositions are about empirically verifiable public observable behaviours as
opposed to privately, introspectively accessible mental states which are not
empirically verifiable
,Soft behaviourism
- ‘Soft behaviourism’ is a physicalist position and thus argues that everything is
physical or supervenes upon the physical
- Ryle argues that to talk about ‘the mind’ and ‘mental states’ is (at least often)
to talk about publicly observable overt behaviour or behavioural dispositions
which can be expressed in hypothetical and empirically verifiable ‘if-then’
sentences.
- ‘Soft behaviourism’ is the view that all propositions about mental states can
be analytically reduced without loss of meaning to propositions about these
publicly observable overt behavioural dispositions.
- Analytic reduction is the view that one set of statements or concepts can be
reduced to another purely by meaning, such that X = Y by definition.
- In this case, the terms involved are synonymous, so no information is lost
when translating from one to the other.
- This makes analytic reductions a priori, since they can be known through
conceptual analysis alone, without the need for a posteriori observation.
- For example, the proposition that “I am thirsty” is synonymous with “drinking
water when its available”
- This is known a priori - independently of sense experience
- It is also known by definition alone - it is analytically true, true in virtue of the
meanings of the two propositions; independent of how the world is
- A dispositional property of something is its liability or tendency to act in a
certain way if certain conditions are met
- For example, a dispositional property of sugar is its tendency to dissolve.
Sugar does not always dissolve but will in in the right conditions (e.g if its
placed in water)
- Thus, a behavioural disposition is a way someone tends to act if certain
conditions are met
- These behavioural dispositions are ‘multi-track’ in the sense that there are
indefinitely many complex ways in which one might behave when that fits a
given mental ascription
,Dualist argument against behaviorism
- P1: If physicalism is true, having complete knowledge of all the physical facts
about colour perception would be to have complete knowledge of all the
mental facts involved in colour perception
- P2: Mary has propositional knowledge of all the physical facts involved in
colour perception before her release
- “Mary is a brilliant scientist who…is forced to investigate the world
from a black and white room via a black and white television monitor”
- P3: When Mary sees colour (eg a red rose), she learns knew propositional
knowledge
- She learns the phenomenal fact of “what it is like” for both herself and
other people to see red
- She learns truths about qualia which are not deducible from physical
facts
- Qualia are intrinsic, phenomenal, non-intentional aspects of mental
states that are introspectively accessible
- P4: Mary learns a new fact so not all mental facts can be physical facts (since
Mary already knew all of these)
- C1: Therefore, there are non-physical facts about human colour vision
- P5: Non-physical facts are facts about non-physical phenomenal properties
- C2: Therefore, there are non-physical properties and physicalism is false
- P6: Behaviourism is a physicalist theory and thus argues that everything is
physical or supervenes upon the physical
- C3: Therefore, behaviourism is false
The issue of the distinctness of mental states from behaviour - Hilary Putnam's
Super-Spartans
- Putnam defines “X-worlders”/”Super-Super-Spartans” as people who feel pain
but suppress all pain behaviour and do not even talk about pain.
- They have suppressed the behavior for so long that they no longer even have
the first-order disposition to wince or groan. They feel pain without any
behavioral disposition whatsoever.
,- However, they may still think about their pain internally, recognising that it is
unpleasant and even imagining how they might react if they were allowed to
express it or discuss it.
- If ‘hard behaviourism’ is true then ‘x is in pain’ can be analytically reduced
without loss of meaning to a proposition that exclusively uses the language
of physics to talk about bodily states.
- Similarly, if ‘soft behaviourism’ is true then ‘x is in pain’ can be analytically
reduced without loss of meaning to a proposition about behavioural
dispositions.
- Therefore, if hard behaviourism is true it is not possible for ‘x is in pain’ to be
true but no statement about x’s bodily states to be true.
- Similarly, therefore, if soft behaviourism is true it is not possible for ‘x is in
pain’ to be true but no statement about x’s behavioural dispositions to be
true.
- A SSS is someone who is in pain but shows no pain behaviour (including
verbal behaviour) or behavioural dispositions (these individuals have
suppressed pain behaviors so deeply that they do not even talk about pain or
have the disposition to show it)
- So, a SSS is someone for whom ‘x is in pain’ is true but no corresponding
statement about x’s displaying pain behaviour or behavioral dispositions is
true.
- If SSSs are conceivable then it is possible for ‘x is in pain’ to be true and for no
corresponding statement about x’s bodily movements / behavioural
dispositions to be true
- If SSS are conceivable then propositions about pain cannot be reduced
without loss of meaning [ie analytically reduced] to propositions that
exclusively use the language of physics to talk about bodily states
- Similarly, If SSS are conceivable then propositions about pain cannot be
reduced without loss of meaning [ie analytically reduced] to propositions
about behavioural dispositions
- Therefore, if SSS are conceivable, hard and soft philosophical behaviourism
are false
- SSS are conceivable.
- Therefore, hard and soft behaviourism are false
, The issue of the distinctness of mental states from behaviour - Hilary Putnam's
perfect actors
- Putnam defines “Perfect Actors” as people who do not feel pain but who
behave exactly as if they are experiencing a specific mental state.
- If ‘hard behaviourism’ is true then ‘x is in pain’ can be analytically reduced
without loss of meaning to a proposition that exclusively uses the language
of physics to talk about bodily states.
- Similarly, if ‘soft behaviourism’ is true then ‘x is in pain’ can be analytically
reduced without loss of meaning to a proposition about behavioural
dispositions.
- Therefore, if hard behaviourism is true it is not possible for ‘x is in pain’ to be
false but a corresponding statement about x’s bodily states to be true.
- Similarly, therefore, if soft behaviourism is true it is not possible for ‘x is in
pain’ to be false but a corresponding statement about x’s behavioural
dispositions to be true.
- A PA is someone who is not in pain but shows pain behaviour and
behavioural dispositions
- So, a PA is someone for whom ‘x is in pain’ is false but a corresponding
statement about x’s displaying pain behaviour or behavioral dispositions is
true.
- If PA are conceivable then it is possible for ‘x is in pain’ to be false and for a
corresponding statement about x’s bodily movements / behavioural
dispositions to be true
- If PA are conceivable then propositions about pain cannot be reduced
without loss of meaning [ie analytically reduced] to propositions that
exclusively use the language of physics to talk about bodily states
- Similarly, If PA are conceivable then propositions about pain cannot be
reduced without loss of meaning [ie analytically reduced] to propositions
about behavioural dispositions
- Therefore, if PA are conceivable, hard and soft philosophical behaviourism
are false
- PA are conceivable.
- Therefore, hard and soft behaviourism are false
