Caste Study Syria 25-26
Summary Lectures and Literature
Lecture Notes:
WEEK 1 – SYRIA AS A MULTI-LEVEL, MULTI-ACTOR CONFLICT
The conflict in Syria cannot be traced to a single cause or starting point. Depending on the
analytical level, its origins can be located in the 2011 protests, the 2003 US invasion of Iraq,
or the colonial reordering of the Middle East under the Sykes–Picot Agreement. These layers
are not mutually exclusive but cumulative. Colonial borders disrupted historical trade routes
and political authority, post-independence state-building produced fragile institutions, and
regional power struggles intensified existing vulnerabilities.
Modern Syria emerged as a young state in an ancient region, struggling to bind diverse
populations into a coherent nation. Arab nationalism, pan-Syrian ideas, and Kurdish
nationalism competed for legitimacy, while repeated coups weakened institutions. This
instability ended with Hafez al-Assad’s seizure of power in 1970. His regime combined
repression with strategic inclusion: key military and security positions were filled with
loyalists, particularly from the Alawi community, while patronage networks, ideology, and
economic benefits created incentives for loyalty or at least neutrality.
Syria’s position in the Middle East was also shaped by Cold War dynamics and later by the
erosion of US hegemony after 2003. The Iraq War destabilized the region, intensified
sectarianism, empowered jihadist networks, and elevated Iran’s regional influence. Syria both
exploited and was threatened by these changes, allowing jihadists to transit into Iraq while
drawing closer to Iran under the banner of the “Axis of Resistance.”
By 2011, Syria was politically rigid, economically unequal, socially divided, and regionally
exposed. These structural conditions made the state highly vulnerable to crisis once protests
began.
WEEK 2 – FROM AUTHORITARIAN STABILITY TO UPRISING
Prior to 2011, Syria appeared stable on the surface. Bashar al-Assad cultivated an image of
reform and modernity, but power remained concentrated within a narrow elite. Economic
liberalization increased inequality, unemployment remained high, and rural areas were hit
hard by drought and state neglect. Political opposition was banned, civil society suppressed,
and dissent managed through fear.
The Arab Spring acted as a catalyst rather than a cause. Protests in Tunisia and Egypt
demonstrated that authoritarian regimes could fall, while social media and satellite television
spread information rapidly. In Syria, the arrest and torture of schoolboys in Daraa triggered
,localized protests that resonated with broader grievances. These protests were initially non-
sectarian and reformist.
The regime responded with a mix of repression and limited concessions. This apparent
inconsistency reflected internal divisions, tactical experimentation, and a long-standing
security logic that viewed repression as the default response. Crucially, the regime retained
sufficient loyalty and neutrality through multiple “buy-ins”: sectarian solidarity, patronage,
ideology, and fear. Unlike Egypt or Tunisia, Syria’s military and intelligence apparatus had
been extensively coup-proofed, ensuring compliance with orders to suppress protest.
As violence escalated, trust between regime and opposition collapsed. External actors began
to intervene politically and materially, transforming what might have remained a contained
uprising into an armed conflict.
WEEK 3 – CIVIL WAR AND PROXY WARFARE
The militarization of the Syrian uprising marked the transition to civil war. Opposition groups
fragmented quickly, lacking unified leadership and coherent strategy. Armed resistance
emerged unevenly, shaped by local grievances and access to external support. At the same
time, the regime framed all opposition as terrorism, justifying indiscriminate violence.
International involvement intensified and reshaped the conflict. Iran and Hezbollah intervened
to preserve a strategic ally and maintain regional influence. Russia provided diplomatic cover
and later direct military support, motivated by geopolitical competition, regional presence,
and regime survival. On the opposing side, the United States, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar
supported various rebel factions with differing objectives.
This produced a classic proxy war. External sponsors pursued coercion, disruption, or
transformation of the Syrian state while avoiding direct confrontation. However, proxy
warfare carried severe risks: sponsors lost control over armed groups, extremist factions
benefited disproportionately, and the conflict became prolonged and fragmented. External aid
exacerbated factionalism within the opposition and reduced incentives for compromise.
International institutions failed to halt escalation. UN Security Council paralysis reflected
power politics rather than normative consensus. Calls for Assad to step aside raised
expectations among opposition groups and their sponsors while hardening the resolve of
Russia and Iran. Diplomatic pressure without credible enforcement placed international actors
on an “escalator of pressure” they were unwilling or unable to complete.
WEEK 4 – ISIS, TERRORISM, AND GENDERED DIMENSIONS OF WAR
The rise of ISIS must be understood as a consequence of prolonged state collapse, sectarian
polarization, and regional instability rather than as an external aberration. ISIS combined
territorial control, governance, propaganda, and systematic terror to establish itself as a state-
,like actor. Terrorism functioned as a strategic tool within a broader military and political
campaign.
Foreign fighters joined ISIS through transnational networks facilitated by online propaganda
and regional instability. Terrorism is best understood as a tactic in asymmetric conflict rather
than as a fixed ideology. Definitions of terrorism remain politically contested, reinforcing its
instrumental use in international discourse.
Gender analysis complicates conventional narratives. Women within ISIS exercised agency,
participating in recruitment, governance, and enforcement, while also operating within
patriarchal constraints. At the same time, women across Syria experienced profound structural
violence: displacement, poverty, loss of healthcare, and social insecurity. These harms
persisted beyond active combat and shaped post-war realities.
The defeat of ISIS territorially did not eliminate its ideological appeal or address the
underlying conditions that enabled its rise.
WEEK 5 – DISPLACEMENT, SECURITIZATION, AND STRUCTURAL WAR
IMPACTS
War in Syria produced mass displacement on an unprecedented scale. Most Syrians fled
internally or to neighboring states, while a smaller proportion reached Europe. Despite this,
migration became heavily securitized in European political discourse. Refugees were framed
as threats to security, identity, and social cohesion, enabling exceptional and restrictive
policies.
Securitization theory explains how migration shifted from a humanitarian issue to a security
problem through discourse and institutional practices. In host countries such as Lebanon,
refugees were initially welcomed but increasingly portrayed as economic and security
burdens, legitimizing exclusion and coercion.
Inside Syria, the war caused structural economic collapse. Infrastructure destruction, inflation,
unemployment, and poverty became systemic rather than temporary. Property loss and
bureaucratic barriers prevented return and recovery. Cultural heritage destruction and
selective reconstruction further politicized memory and identity, privileging regime
legitimacy over inclusivity.
Reconstruction emerged as a deeply political process, constrained by sanctions, elite capture,
and unresolved conflict dynamics.
WEEK 6 – INTERNATIONAL LAW, USE OF FORCE, AND ACCOUNTABILITY
International law played a constrained but significant role in the Syrian conflict. The UN
Charter restricts the use of force to self-defense or Security Council authorization, yet
multiple actors intervened under contested legal justifications. Chemical weapons use exposed
, the fragility of international norms when enforcement is weak and geopolitical interests
dominate.
The erosion of the chemical weapons taboo illustrated how norms depend on credible
punishment. Legal mechanisms such as the ICC were blocked, shifting accountability efforts
to domestic courts through universal jurisdiction. These cases demonstrated that justice is
possible but fragmented, selective, and slow.
Law in Syria functioned within power politics rather than above them. Legal legitimacy and
political legitimacy often diverged, shaping intervention and accountability outcomes.
WEEK 7 – WAR TERMINATION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND FUTURE RISKS
Large-scale fighting in Syria has declined, but the conflict has not been resolved. The
outcome reflects neither decisive victory nor negotiated peace, but a fragile equilibrium
shaped by external actors. Reconstruction proceeded without reconciliation, prioritizing
control and stability over justice and inclusion.
Theories of war termination suggest that how wars end shapes long-term stability. Syria’s
unresolved grievances, selective justice, and exclusionary reconstruction increase the risk of
renewed violence. External actors continue to influence outcomes, limiting domestic agency.
The Syrian case illustrates the limits of militarized conflict management, the persistence of
structural violence, and the enduring consequences of international miscalculation.
Literature Week 1-7
WEEK 1 – INTRODUCTION & INTERDISCIPLINARITY
Syria LiveUAMap
LiveUAMap is included in the course to confront students with the empirical complexity of
the Syrian conflict. Rather than presenting a static narrative, the platform shows real-time
reporting on airstrikes, territorial changes, diplomatic developments, and clashes between a
wide range of actors. What becomes immediately visible is that Syria is not a single war but a
collection of overlapping conflicts taking place simultaneously in different regions. Control
shifts frequently, alliances are unstable, and multiple international and non-state actors operate
at once.
From an analytical perspective, LiveUAMap demonstrates why linear explanations of the war
consistently fail. It visually reinforces key course themes: fragmentation, proxy warfare, and
Summary Lectures and Literature
Lecture Notes:
WEEK 1 – SYRIA AS A MULTI-LEVEL, MULTI-ACTOR CONFLICT
The conflict in Syria cannot be traced to a single cause or starting point. Depending on the
analytical level, its origins can be located in the 2011 protests, the 2003 US invasion of Iraq,
or the colonial reordering of the Middle East under the Sykes–Picot Agreement. These layers
are not mutually exclusive but cumulative. Colonial borders disrupted historical trade routes
and political authority, post-independence state-building produced fragile institutions, and
regional power struggles intensified existing vulnerabilities.
Modern Syria emerged as a young state in an ancient region, struggling to bind diverse
populations into a coherent nation. Arab nationalism, pan-Syrian ideas, and Kurdish
nationalism competed for legitimacy, while repeated coups weakened institutions. This
instability ended with Hafez al-Assad’s seizure of power in 1970. His regime combined
repression with strategic inclusion: key military and security positions were filled with
loyalists, particularly from the Alawi community, while patronage networks, ideology, and
economic benefits created incentives for loyalty or at least neutrality.
Syria’s position in the Middle East was also shaped by Cold War dynamics and later by the
erosion of US hegemony after 2003. The Iraq War destabilized the region, intensified
sectarianism, empowered jihadist networks, and elevated Iran’s regional influence. Syria both
exploited and was threatened by these changes, allowing jihadists to transit into Iraq while
drawing closer to Iran under the banner of the “Axis of Resistance.”
By 2011, Syria was politically rigid, economically unequal, socially divided, and regionally
exposed. These structural conditions made the state highly vulnerable to crisis once protests
began.
WEEK 2 – FROM AUTHORITARIAN STABILITY TO UPRISING
Prior to 2011, Syria appeared stable on the surface. Bashar al-Assad cultivated an image of
reform and modernity, but power remained concentrated within a narrow elite. Economic
liberalization increased inequality, unemployment remained high, and rural areas were hit
hard by drought and state neglect. Political opposition was banned, civil society suppressed,
and dissent managed through fear.
The Arab Spring acted as a catalyst rather than a cause. Protests in Tunisia and Egypt
demonstrated that authoritarian regimes could fall, while social media and satellite television
spread information rapidly. In Syria, the arrest and torture of schoolboys in Daraa triggered
,localized protests that resonated with broader grievances. These protests were initially non-
sectarian and reformist.
The regime responded with a mix of repression and limited concessions. This apparent
inconsistency reflected internal divisions, tactical experimentation, and a long-standing
security logic that viewed repression as the default response. Crucially, the regime retained
sufficient loyalty and neutrality through multiple “buy-ins”: sectarian solidarity, patronage,
ideology, and fear. Unlike Egypt or Tunisia, Syria’s military and intelligence apparatus had
been extensively coup-proofed, ensuring compliance with orders to suppress protest.
As violence escalated, trust between regime and opposition collapsed. External actors began
to intervene politically and materially, transforming what might have remained a contained
uprising into an armed conflict.
WEEK 3 – CIVIL WAR AND PROXY WARFARE
The militarization of the Syrian uprising marked the transition to civil war. Opposition groups
fragmented quickly, lacking unified leadership and coherent strategy. Armed resistance
emerged unevenly, shaped by local grievances and access to external support. At the same
time, the regime framed all opposition as terrorism, justifying indiscriminate violence.
International involvement intensified and reshaped the conflict. Iran and Hezbollah intervened
to preserve a strategic ally and maintain regional influence. Russia provided diplomatic cover
and later direct military support, motivated by geopolitical competition, regional presence,
and regime survival. On the opposing side, the United States, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar
supported various rebel factions with differing objectives.
This produced a classic proxy war. External sponsors pursued coercion, disruption, or
transformation of the Syrian state while avoiding direct confrontation. However, proxy
warfare carried severe risks: sponsors lost control over armed groups, extremist factions
benefited disproportionately, and the conflict became prolonged and fragmented. External aid
exacerbated factionalism within the opposition and reduced incentives for compromise.
International institutions failed to halt escalation. UN Security Council paralysis reflected
power politics rather than normative consensus. Calls for Assad to step aside raised
expectations among opposition groups and their sponsors while hardening the resolve of
Russia and Iran. Diplomatic pressure without credible enforcement placed international actors
on an “escalator of pressure” they were unwilling or unable to complete.
WEEK 4 – ISIS, TERRORISM, AND GENDERED DIMENSIONS OF WAR
The rise of ISIS must be understood as a consequence of prolonged state collapse, sectarian
polarization, and regional instability rather than as an external aberration. ISIS combined
territorial control, governance, propaganda, and systematic terror to establish itself as a state-
,like actor. Terrorism functioned as a strategic tool within a broader military and political
campaign.
Foreign fighters joined ISIS through transnational networks facilitated by online propaganda
and regional instability. Terrorism is best understood as a tactic in asymmetric conflict rather
than as a fixed ideology. Definitions of terrorism remain politically contested, reinforcing its
instrumental use in international discourse.
Gender analysis complicates conventional narratives. Women within ISIS exercised agency,
participating in recruitment, governance, and enforcement, while also operating within
patriarchal constraints. At the same time, women across Syria experienced profound structural
violence: displacement, poverty, loss of healthcare, and social insecurity. These harms
persisted beyond active combat and shaped post-war realities.
The defeat of ISIS territorially did not eliminate its ideological appeal or address the
underlying conditions that enabled its rise.
WEEK 5 – DISPLACEMENT, SECURITIZATION, AND STRUCTURAL WAR
IMPACTS
War in Syria produced mass displacement on an unprecedented scale. Most Syrians fled
internally or to neighboring states, while a smaller proportion reached Europe. Despite this,
migration became heavily securitized in European political discourse. Refugees were framed
as threats to security, identity, and social cohesion, enabling exceptional and restrictive
policies.
Securitization theory explains how migration shifted from a humanitarian issue to a security
problem through discourse and institutional practices. In host countries such as Lebanon,
refugees were initially welcomed but increasingly portrayed as economic and security
burdens, legitimizing exclusion and coercion.
Inside Syria, the war caused structural economic collapse. Infrastructure destruction, inflation,
unemployment, and poverty became systemic rather than temporary. Property loss and
bureaucratic barriers prevented return and recovery. Cultural heritage destruction and
selective reconstruction further politicized memory and identity, privileging regime
legitimacy over inclusivity.
Reconstruction emerged as a deeply political process, constrained by sanctions, elite capture,
and unresolved conflict dynamics.
WEEK 6 – INTERNATIONAL LAW, USE OF FORCE, AND ACCOUNTABILITY
International law played a constrained but significant role in the Syrian conflict. The UN
Charter restricts the use of force to self-defense or Security Council authorization, yet
multiple actors intervened under contested legal justifications. Chemical weapons use exposed
, the fragility of international norms when enforcement is weak and geopolitical interests
dominate.
The erosion of the chemical weapons taboo illustrated how norms depend on credible
punishment. Legal mechanisms such as the ICC were blocked, shifting accountability efforts
to domestic courts through universal jurisdiction. These cases demonstrated that justice is
possible but fragmented, selective, and slow.
Law in Syria functioned within power politics rather than above them. Legal legitimacy and
political legitimacy often diverged, shaping intervention and accountability outcomes.
WEEK 7 – WAR TERMINATION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND FUTURE RISKS
Large-scale fighting in Syria has declined, but the conflict has not been resolved. The
outcome reflects neither decisive victory nor negotiated peace, but a fragile equilibrium
shaped by external actors. Reconstruction proceeded without reconciliation, prioritizing
control and stability over justice and inclusion.
Theories of war termination suggest that how wars end shapes long-term stability. Syria’s
unresolved grievances, selective justice, and exclusionary reconstruction increase the risk of
renewed violence. External actors continue to influence outcomes, limiting domestic agency.
The Syrian case illustrates the limits of militarized conflict management, the persistence of
structural violence, and the enduring consequences of international miscalculation.
Literature Week 1-7
WEEK 1 – INTRODUCTION & INTERDISCIPLINARITY
Syria LiveUAMap
LiveUAMap is included in the course to confront students with the empirical complexity of
the Syrian conflict. Rather than presenting a static narrative, the platform shows real-time
reporting on airstrikes, territorial changes, diplomatic developments, and clashes between a
wide range of actors. What becomes immediately visible is that Syria is not a single war but a
collection of overlapping conflicts taking place simultaneously in different regions. Control
shifts frequently, alliances are unstable, and multiple international and non-state actors operate
at once.
From an analytical perspective, LiveUAMap demonstrates why linear explanations of the war
consistently fail. It visually reinforces key course themes: fragmentation, proxy warfare, and
