Lecture 1
Interdisciplinary Approach
Theoretical Philosophy Practical Philosophy
Topics include Philosophy of Mind ("what the mind is Ethics, political philosophy, and issues often relevant to
and how we can think about the mind"), epistemology policymaking and social contexts.
(Greek origin, theories about knowledge and how it is
generated), and metaphysics (questions about exist-
ence, including consciousness and free will).
And these philosophical domains in relation to broader contexts,
particularly neuroscience, psychology, technology, and law.
The main function of philosophers in interdisciplinary fields is helping organize thinking about phenomena
that other sciences study. Philosophers are focused on conceptual organization, analysis, and development:
• They examine how terminology (around concepts such as consciousness, free will, mind) is used in various sciences.
• Philosophers ask what is actually meant by these terms when used in scientific discourse.
• Their work includes analyzing the language, revealing hidden assumptions, and addressing inconsistencies in the
terminology or theoretical frameworks.
Philosophers may synthesize or engineer new concepts if existing terms are insufficient for the sciences in-
volved. By doing so, they make explicit assumptions or propose new, more useful frameworks or concepts for
scientific practice.
Philosophers are the "annoying people in the group," always questioning what people mean, surfacing unstated as-
sumptions, and requiring rigor. Philosophers are persistent in asking “What do we mean by this?” and demanding clarity
in both discussion and methodology.
Philosophers focus on clearly defined arguments, reasoning from evidence (not just empirical evidence, but
also logical or conceptual). They ask: What arguments exist for a theory, what counts as evidence for it, and
what additional empirical data might support a position? It’s about interpreting and understanding data and
methods, not just collecting new data.
Philosophy is fundamental to the sciences, both as a guide and reflective discipline, but not a science in the
strict (English) sense.
Distinction is drawn between “science” in English (which usually means empirical sciences) and the broader Dutch
“wetenschap” which refers to any systematic field of study, including both the natural sciences (like physics and biolo-
gy) and the humanities (like history, philosophy, or linguistics). Philosophy does not generate empirical knowledge but
reflects on the sciences by guiding, analyzing, and interpreting their processes and results.
Philosophers help clarify the core questions of other disciplines, identify dogmas or unsupported assumptions,
and encourage critical thinking and deeper understanding. They do not answer the empirical questions of
those disciplines directly. Instead, they help define and frame what the important questions are.
Typically, no definitive answer is given as to which theory is correct. In philosophy (and often in humanities and some
social sciences), such consensus is rare or very limited (contrasts with natural sciences).
Philosophy operates both as a “guide” (before research starts) and as a “mirror” (reflecting on research results
and methods). While it doesn't always provide the answer, it equips students with the tools to reason critically
about which answers might be better supported.
Philosophy demands students use good arguments and critical reasoning to make their own informed opinions about
difficult questions (accepting a degree of uncertainty is part of the process).
, Philosophy of Mind
- Defining the Mind -
The uniqueness of studying the mind is that we use the mind to study itself (which is not common in science).
It is central to personhood and to ascriptions of responsibility and agency. Unlike other aspects of the human
organism (legs, lungs, even the brain as a physical object), studying the mind seems categorically different and
possibly more difficult.
Identifying what mind is essential for fields like law (e.g., responsibility, blame, and praise), neuroscience
(where mental states’ neural correlates are sought), and artificial intelligence (comparing human and machine
intelligence).
• Law: Deciding responsibility, free will.
• Neuroscience: Finding neural correlates or mechanisms of mental processes.
• Artificial Intelligence: Comparing human and machine intelligence or consciousness: definitions of mind im-
pact judgments about machines or animals having minds.
• The choice of definition affects:
• Criteria for “mindedness” in different entities (humans, infants, animals, machines).
• The kinds of scientific or philosophical questions one might ask, and which methods are regarded as appro-
priate.
E.g., immaterial soul: Mind as a non-material entity; only adult humans may possess it (animals and machines likely
lack minds).
E.g., brain activity: Mind identified with the functioning of organic brains; includes humans, maybe animals, but not
machines.
E.g., computer program: Mind as program-like information processing; possible to ascribe mind to machines if suffi-
ciently complex.
• The way you define the mind influences:
• Who (or what) is considered “minded.”
• What methods are suitable for studying the mind.
• What you expect different sciences to contribute (e.g., if mind = immaterial soul, then empirical methods
won’t suffice).
The term “mind” is an umbrella term for various mental states or processes, including:
• Perceptions (e.g., seeing, smelling, hearing)
• Bodily sensations (e.g., hunger, thirst, pain)
• Emotions (e.g., anger, love, grief)
• Beliefs (e.g., “Paris is the capital of France”)
• Desires (e.g., “I want ice cream”)
• Intentions (e.g., “I want to move to Amsterdam”)
• Reasoning (‘If X, then Y’)
• Memory & Imagination
The definition of mind is somewhat circular: “the mind is the collection of mental phenomena”, but what
makes them “mental”? Because they’re part of the mind. Philosophers seek to clarify what makes these phe-
nomena mental and what’s unique about them.
Many people think they aren’t “doing philosophy,” but when they make methodological decisions or assump-
tions about concepts in their discipline, they engage in philosophy (often without realizing it).
Mind-Body Problem
A foundational question for the entire field, the starting point for much philosophical inquiry into the nature of
consciousness and self.
The mind-body problem asks: How does the subjective, mental world relate to the objective, natural world?
,E.g., how do mental states fit into what science reveals about the physical world? Are they part of it, or somehow sep-
arate?
The problem rests on three premises:
The Three Key Premises of the Mind-Body Problem
We have a mind
The starting assumption is that humans possess a mind.
1
This seems obvious, but not universally accepted: some philosophers and scientists contest the
existence of the mind, or define it radically differently.
The mind-body problem is only relevant if one accepts that minds exist.
We have a body
2 This means accepting the existence of the physical body (a material entity made of flesh and
bone (“this soggy stuff in your skull”)).
Again, not all philosophers agree: some claim the material world doesn’t actually exist.
Mind and body are distinct
The core of the problem arises from the apparent difference in properties between mind and
3 body. The mind seems to possess characteristics that distinguish it from purely physical organs
such as the liver or bones and vice versa.
Philosophers seek to clarify which properties are special (e.g., subjectivity, consciousness, inten-
tionality), versus bodily properties (e.g., extension in space, physical composition).
Main Questions arising from the Mind-Body Problem
1. What is the real difference (if any) between mind and body, or mental and physical phenomena?
This involves characterizing the uniqueness of the mind compared to all other physical entities
studied in natural sciences.
2. If mind and body are different, how do they relate?
The mind-body problem demands to know how these two seemingly distinct entities interact.
The connection appears clear:
• Physical actions affecting the body (e.g., smashing a hammer on a hand) produce mental experiences
(pain).
• Mental intentions (e.g., deciding to raise an arm) cause physical actions (the arm moves).
The close relation through causal interaction raises the puzzle: how can something mental influ-
ence the physical, and vice versa?
3. How can it really make sense to treat minds as just another physical thing in the universe?
The problem of explaining, if minds are really just a kind of physical thing, how that can be.
The mind-body problem is the main topic addressed by most theories in philosophy of mind.
Theories attempt to answer one or more of the mind-body problem’s main questions.
Substance Dualism
(the most famous answer)
,Philosophers often use vivid or even physically disturbing thought experiments to provoke deep reflection on
abstract concepts.
E.g., imagine an extreme scenario: their body, including their brain, being totally destroyed, dissolved in acid or lava,
with its molecules violently scattered:
If your body is destroyed totally, could you survive such an event?
This question hinges on identifying “you” with your mind rather than with your physical body.
If “you” are identical to your mind, and the mind is totally separate from your body, then, on one view, you could
survive physical destruction.
If you answered “yes,” you believe the mind could survive without the body and thus are thinking like a substance
dualist. This is a common, not strange or rare, philosophical position.
When questions about the mind-body relationship are posed to lay people (non-philosophers, public), experimental
philosophers have found most people naturally lean towards substance dualism.
Substance dualism (the belief that mind (or soul) and body are distinct entities) is often the default or common-
sense viewpoint in general society.
The widespread idea of survival after bodily death is common in religious thought (e.g., the mind, spirit, or
soul continues existing after the material body dies). To believe in survival of mind/soul after bodily death is, in
effect, to be a substance dualist.
In religious frameworks, the body and soul are distinct; when the body dies, the immaterial soul survives.
This dualist scenario is deeply embedded in religious teachings, rituals, and beliefs.
E.g., Egyptian Book of the Dead, an ancient Egyptian belief about the afterlife:
• Upon death, the soul is separated from the body.
• The soul travels to the underworld, where it is weighed against Ma'at, the goddess of truth, justice, and
cosmic order.
• The fate of the soul (good or bad, reward or punishment) is determined independently of the dead body.
Substance dualism is not only a philosophical position but is also deeply woven into cultural and religious
worldviews. The idea that the soul/mind can exist apart from the body is a nearly universal human intuition,
reflected in mythology, religious doctrine, and lay belief.
The idea that mind and body are distinct substances has deep roots, not only in religion or popular belief but
also in the core history of philosophical thought:
While many philosophers shared the dualistic view also found in religious traditions. Philosophers sought to produce
formal, rational arguments. They strive for:
• Conceptual rigor: Arguing for dualism through logic, not faith.
• Universal persuasion: Making the case for dualism on grounds accessible to anyone, regardless of religious belief
or background.
Plato, writing through the voice of Socrates, already theorized in antiquity about the
mind (or soul) and body as separate entities.
Plato
His view: after death, the body and soul separate; each exists “alone by itself” (the
(and Socrates)
body apart from soul, the soul apart from body).
Thus, it is possible in principle for the two to be separated.
Descartes is famous for furnishing a systematic philosophical argument for substance
dualism, making it a central idea in early modern philosophy.
Argues that humans are composed of two fundamentally different substances:
René Descartes (Cartesian dualism (or interactive dualism) holding that mind (res cogitans = the thinking
thing) and body (res extensa = the extended thing) are ontologically distinct but can causally
interact)
Immaterial soul/mind
, The basis of mental activities (e.g., thinking, believing, wanting, remembering, conceiving,
etc). Home to higher-order cognitive and affective processes.
Material body
The basis for sensorimotor and mechanical functions, things describable physically Re-
sponsible for physical processes (e.g., sensory input, movement, observable/mechanically
describable action (receptors, axons, molecules)).
These two building blocks or substances can, at least hypothetically, exist inde-
pendently. In principle, all the workings of mind and all the workings of body can be
considered as possibly proceeding without the other.
Descartes used a principle akin to Gottfried Leibniz’s Law (Law of the Identity of In-
discernible) to support his mind-body dualism: He argued that since the mind and
body have different properties, they must be distinct substances, not one.
Identity of Indiscernible: if two things are identical (X = Y), then they must have all the
same properties.
Discernibility: if X and Y have even a single different property, they cannot be identical
(they are distinct).
E.g., similar looking chairs: both chairs may be blue, made of the same material, used simi-
larly, and have nearly identical features. However, if they occupy different spatial loca-
tions (one is left of the other), this one differing property means they are not identical,
they are two specific objects.
If even one property of the mind doesn’t match any property of the body, they cannot be
the same thing (i.e., not identical, but distinct substances).
Philosophers attempt to distinguish mind and body by identifying properties unique
to each. Descartes provides the foundational list, but later philosophers expand on
these distinctions.
Spatial Location & Extension
Mind
Mental states and processes do not have a spatial location and extension.
The location of the mind is much less clear; you cannot objectively point to it.
There is no objective or agreed-upon location for the mind.
The experience that some people point to their head, heart, or lungs is culturally
dependent. Some cultures locate the mind in the chest, lungs, heart, or even
suggest it is in the surroundings.
1. Mental states and processes lack extension (your beliefs/desires are not “bigger”
or “smaller” in measurable ways; e.g., a belief isn't located spatially "south" of
another belief).
The mind cannot be described in terms of physical size or location, the language
simply doesn’t fit.
Body
Clearly has a spatial location (e.g., you can point to where your heart is).
Has spatial extension: it takes up space and has size relative to other objects
or organs (“my heart is here, south of my brain”).
Rationality
2.
Mind
, Mental states are characterized by rationality: they can be reasons for ac-
tions, related in rational ways.
E.g., an agent recognizes it will rain, desires to stay dry, and brings an umbrella.
These beliefs and desires are rationally connected.
Body
Bodily organs function according to physical processes and can be described
in terms of success or dysfunction (health or disease).
They are not “rational” or “irrational”. Rationality doesn’t apply.
Intentionality (Aboutness)
Mind
Mental states are intentional (they are “about” something).
They can refer to extra-mental entities.
Franz Brentano 3. E.g., your belief that Paris is the capital of France refers to Paris and France;
your anger is often directed at something (missing the bus).
Body
Physical objects are not “about” anything.
E.g., your heart, a table, or a chair does not refer to or represent anything.
They just exist.
Phenomenal Character (Qualia)
Mind
Mental states have a subjective experiential quality (feel): the “what it’s
like” quality (qualia).
They are characterized by a certain phenomenal character (e.g., pain).
4. E.g., the feeling of seeing red, tasting chocolate, nostalgia from a smell, etc.
David Chalmers All subjective experiences unique to consciousness.
Body
Physical/Material objects have no subjective experience.
E.g., if you were shrunk and explored another person’s body/brain, you would
never see the subjective experience of redness or joy; it is not locatable as
a physical entity.
Today, almost no philosophers defend substance dualism in its traditional form; critiques have largely driven it
to the margins of serious academic debate:
Criticism of the Identified Differences between Mind and Body
((1) location and extension, (2) rationality, (3) intentionality, (4) phenomenal experience)
Identity theorists argue that the mind is the brain; mental states are nothing over and above
corresponding brain states.
(1)
If you accept this, the mind has a definite spatial location and size (it is wherever your brain is, inside
the skull).
, This enables you to link mental content (e.g., beliefs, perceptions) to physical regions of the brain
(e.g., prefrontal cortex: beliefs in the "front," visual processing in the "back").
Even concepts like size or extension become less problematic: emotions and beliefs might "take up
space" in the physical brain.
These classic dualist arguments ("the mind is nowhere in space") rely heavily on intuition,
but changing the conceptual framework (as with identity theory) can change those intuitions
too.
Redefinition Risk: If you define “mind” or “mental” not through unique human capacities
but as functions (as functionalist theories propose), then so-called "material" things, such as
computers or AI, can qualify as having minds.
(2)
& Rationality and intentionality may be reinterpreted: for instance, rational patterns in deci-
(3) sion-making could be ascribed to intelligent machines or even non-human animals.
This philosophy frequently involves redefining core terms, which can dissolve some classical
problems (by showing they result from definitions rather than facts).
The most stubborn distinction between mind and body is the reality of subjective experience
(e.g., what it's like to feel, see, smell, etc.)
Chalmers labeled this the hard problem of consciousness the challenge of explaining how
and why physical processes produce taste, color, emotion, pain, etc.
(4)
Even as definitions of mind and body shift, phenomenal consciousness remains hard to ex-
plain. Some philosophers try to deny phenomenal consciousness exists to dodge the prob-
lem, but this is an extreme and minority view. This issue often motivates continued support
for dualistic ideas.
There is an explicit trend among philosophers to avoid being labeled as substance dualists. The main reason is
the interaction problem. (Interactionism)
Substance dualism claims mind and body are two fundamentally different kinds of substances but also wants
to maintain that these can, and do, interact in everyday life.
Challenge: the interaction problem is not just whether interaction occurs, but how any interaction is possible
between the immaterial (mind) and the material (body):
If mind and body are entirely different in kind (one material, one immaterial), how can they interact at all?
Where and how does the causal influence cross over between immaterial and material realms?
Descartes believed not only that mind and body are separate but that they interact causally in the real world.
E.g., when a hammer strikes the hand (physical event), you feel pain (mental state).
E.g., the intention to move your arm (mental) results in the arm moving (physical action).
Descartes attempted to answer this problem through the idea of the pineal gland serving as the contact point between
mind and body.
E.g., the pineal gland in the brain. External stimulus (fire) activates a receptor (nose/foot). This sense signal is transmitted
up the nervous system to the brain. A special interaction point in the brain (pineal gland) then transfers these physical
signals to the non-physical mind (where sensations such as pain are experienced). The mind, in turn, can influence mat-
ter (intentions causing bodily movement) via this same medium.
Descartes aimed to capture both separation of substances (they can exist without one another in theory) and their ob-
vious interdependence in life. Substance dualism requires only theoretical independence, but practical interaction
and working together must be maintained.
Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia’s critique:
Descartes solution is highly speculative and not credible as a scientific explanation:
• There’s no scientific evidence (now or in Descartes’ time) showing that the pineal gland has any special role as a
, portal or contact point between mental and physical realms.
• Science may or may not eventually shed light on body-mind interaction, but the real issue is deeper than mere
scientific uncertainty.
Modern neuroscience knows the pineal gland regulates melatonin (sleep cycles), not mind-body interface.
• Descartes never explains how a non-physical thing can act upon or be acted on by a physical organ. All he does is
assign a location (the pineal gland), but this does not address the real difficulty: what is the process?
• Even if the location/mechanism were known, there’s a fundamental conceptual problem:
• Causation, as we understand it, typically involves contact or transfer between physical things (e.g., billiard balls
hitting: direct contact, transfer of energy/motion).
• For an immaterial thing (something with no spatial location, no extension, no physical properties) how could
there be any kind of contact?
• The mind, by substance dualist definition, is non-material, has no location, no extension, so no spatial or ener-
getic interface.
• The idea that something with no physical properties interacts with a physical object is, from this perspective, ut-
terly mysterious and lacking any plausible mechanism.
This interaction problem is so severe that most philosophers today reject substance dualism. Even scientists
avoid substance dualism for the same reason despite its intuitive appeal:
It fits the intuition that mind and body exist as real but very different things. Mind seems to have characteristics dif-
ficult to ground in physical objects: rationality, intentionality (“aboutness”), and phenomenal consciousness (qua-
lia). Dualism “picks up on this area of intuition,” but struggles with the interaction problem (i.e., how can mind and
matter, if they are completely different, interact at all?).
The urge to explain mind-body interaction is precisely what modern theories aim to address, not evade.
The theory’s intuitive appeal is ultimately outweighed by the lack of any coherent way to explain mind-body
causation.
Alternatives to Substance Dualism
Monism Dualism
The view that reality is fundamentally composed of only one type of substance. The view that there are two
fundamentally different types
If forced to pick between mind or matter as the foundational substance: of substance (traditionally
mind and body).
Idealism Materialism/Physicalism
(everything is mind, sometimes (everything is matter/physical)
called “only-mind”)
Materialism (in its traditional use) is the doc-
A minority position (everything trine that everything that exists is fundamental-
that exists is mind or mental in ly matter (that is, the kinds of things described
nature (there is no matter)). by classical physics (solids, liquids, gases, at-
oms, particles), things that have mass and oc-
cupy space).
Physicalism is a broader, more modern term
that holds that everything that exists is physi-
cal, but “physical” is defined to include all enti-
ties and properties postulated by contempo-
rary physics, not just matter in the classical
sense, but also fields, energies, forces (like
gravity and electromagnetism), dark matter
etc.
Modern philosophers often use “physicalism”
to avoid the outdated matter-only implication
of “materialism.”
But the terms are often used interchangeably
, in older philosophy of mind.
Not popular among scientists. Popular among scientists.
Instead of positing two substances (mind and matter), physicalism (or materialism) claims there is just one
fundamental substance.
By reducing mind and body to a single kind of thing, physicalism side-steps the interaction problem (you don’t
have to explain mind–body interaction if everything is, ultimately, the same kind of stuff). (its assumptions):
• There is only one kind of thing that exists: physical stuff.
• There’s no additional “soul” or independent mind substance.
• The mind is thus part of the physical world: there’s nothing over and above the physical.
• Human mental life arises from physical matter (brains, neurons, etc.) not from any special “extra ingredient.”
• Rejection of any magical or supernatural element (soul, spirit, immaterial mind), mental processes are wholly
physical. Everything that exists is composed of physical particles that constitute the fundamental parts of our
universe. Physicalists believe the mind can be completely described and explained in scientific terms. There is
nothing left over that defies scientific explanation. To understand the mind, we just need to study the arrange-
ment and interaction of physical particles (atoms, molecules, neural circuits, etc.).
Barbara Montero: the emergence of the mind is not a magical addition to matter, but is akin to the emergence of
rivers, trees, mountains, etc. all explained by physical ingredients and their arrangements. Mind is built from the
same basic physical components: oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, carbon, calcium, phosphorus. The difference is not
the ingredients, but the complexity and arrangement (the “recipe”).
Just as a fancy dinner uses ordinary ingredients (eggs, bread), the human mind results from a complex “cooking” of
those basic ingredients. This demystifies the mind, treating it as a product of physical world processes, even if its
properties look unique, the fundamental elements are the same.
• While a small minority deny the mind exists at all (extreme eliminativists), the majority of physicalists accept
the existence of mind, aiming to find its place in the big picture of the physical world. Their project is not to
dismiss the mind, but to explain it using scientific and naturalistic frameworks.
Jaegwon Kim systematically examines all major mind-body positions (dualism, identity theory, non-reductive
physicalism, functionalism) and challenges their ability to solve the mind-body problem and explain mental
causation. He proposes that the only workable physicalism is reductive physicalism: mental events must be
physically reducible, or else they are epiphenomenal (causally inert).
Reductive physicalism is the position that all mental events and properties can ultimately be explained fully in terms of
physical events and properties.
E.g., a feeling of pain is nothing over and above a specific brain process, it’s identical to, or reducible to, that process.
In this view, mental states must be strictly reducible to physical (brain/body) states; that is, neuroscience should be
able to tell us exactly what physical process is the same thing as (or fully explains) what we call pain, belief, desire, etc.
Kim argues that if mental events are not reducible to physical events, they cannot have true causal power in the phys-
ical world, so if they're something “extra” then, they become epiphenomenal.
Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental events exist, but they have no causal impact on the physical world.
They are causally inert: mere byproducts, like the whistle of a boiling kettle, which doesn’t play a role in the boiling itself.
For Kim, this is unsatisfactory: it conflicts with our intuitions (and science’s evidence) that our thoughts, emotions, and in-
tentions actually lead to real actions in the world.
Physicalism is overwhelmingly the dominant theory today within both philosophy (particularly analytic philos-
ophy) and the sciences.
The move from dualism to physicalism/materialism is motivated by both philosophical coherence (solving the interac-
tion problem) and alignment with scientific worldview (everything describable by physics).
The main issue for physicalist theory is how to explicitly fit the mind’s unique properties (e.g., consciousness,
rationality) into the physical world. The solution for the mind-body problem, for physicalists, is to show what
specific physical phenomena or objects the mind actually is or is identical to.
There are multiple flavors of physicalism, each with its approach to identifying what the mind is in physical terms:
identity theory, one prominent version.
, Identity Theory
(a type of reductive physicalism)
Locate the mind in the physical world by equating it strictly with brain states.
According to identity theory, mental states are identical to physical states of the brain.
J. J. C. Smart holds that mental states are identical to brain states. The mind exists, the body exists, but the
mind is just identical with the brain’s activity. Mental states are not an additional entity over and above brain
states, they are just brain states seen from a particular (mental) perspective.
Causation
Identity
Causation occurs when one distinct event or
thing brings about another. Identity means that two descriptions
refer to the very same thing, there isn’t
E.g., heat from a stove causes water to boil.
any “extra thing” or separate event.
Here, “heat from the stove” is one physi-
cal thing/state. “Water boiling” is anoth- E.g., boiling water is identical to the
er, separate physical process. The heat movement of H₂O molecules. When
acts on the water, raising its temperature we talk about “water boiling,” we’re
until it boils. describing the same process as “rapid
movement of H₂O molecules”, just at
These are two distinct things or events (heat different levels of description.
and boiling) connected in a sequence: one
Macro level
comes after the other because of the first.
vs Bubbles rise; liquid temperature
is high; water changes state.
Correlation
Micro level
Correlation means there’s a regular relation- Molecules vibrate quickly and es-
ship or pattern between two phenomena, but cape into the air (as steam).
neither necessarily causes the other. There is not one thing causing or cor-
related with the other, they are two
E.g., raising stove temperature is correlated with
views of the same underlying reality.
water boiling. Every time the temperature
goes up, boiling often follows, but it could In identity, you aren’t linking or relating
just be a pattern or association, not direct two different things. You’re just talking
cause. about one thing, using two different lan-
Again, two different things (stove tempera- guages or perspectives.
ture and boiling), but now they just go to-
gether in a predictable way.
The identity theory claims that the relationship between mind and brain is not definitional, it’s a brute fact of
nature, discoverable by science (in particular, neuroscience).
E.g., a definition (e.g., "bachelor" = "unmarried man") is set by language and requires no science.
E.g., an identity (e.g., "water is H2O") is a fact about the world, discovered empirically, not by linguistic stipulation.
The idea is that mental states (like pain, belief) are natural kinds, identical to specific brain states/activities.
Whenever you have the brain state, you have the mental state, and vice versa, just as with water and H 2O.
Thus, identity theory solves the mind-body problem by making “mental” and “physical” refer to the same
process/kind.
Advantages of Identity Theory
Identity theory does not deny the mind’s existence. Mental states are treated as real and significant,
Interdisciplinary Approach
Theoretical Philosophy Practical Philosophy
Topics include Philosophy of Mind ("what the mind is Ethics, political philosophy, and issues often relevant to
and how we can think about the mind"), epistemology policymaking and social contexts.
(Greek origin, theories about knowledge and how it is
generated), and metaphysics (questions about exist-
ence, including consciousness and free will).
And these philosophical domains in relation to broader contexts,
particularly neuroscience, psychology, technology, and law.
The main function of philosophers in interdisciplinary fields is helping organize thinking about phenomena
that other sciences study. Philosophers are focused on conceptual organization, analysis, and development:
• They examine how terminology (around concepts such as consciousness, free will, mind) is used in various sciences.
• Philosophers ask what is actually meant by these terms when used in scientific discourse.
• Their work includes analyzing the language, revealing hidden assumptions, and addressing inconsistencies in the
terminology or theoretical frameworks.
Philosophers may synthesize or engineer new concepts if existing terms are insufficient for the sciences in-
volved. By doing so, they make explicit assumptions or propose new, more useful frameworks or concepts for
scientific practice.
Philosophers are the "annoying people in the group," always questioning what people mean, surfacing unstated as-
sumptions, and requiring rigor. Philosophers are persistent in asking “What do we mean by this?” and demanding clarity
in both discussion and methodology.
Philosophers focus on clearly defined arguments, reasoning from evidence (not just empirical evidence, but
also logical or conceptual). They ask: What arguments exist for a theory, what counts as evidence for it, and
what additional empirical data might support a position? It’s about interpreting and understanding data and
methods, not just collecting new data.
Philosophy is fundamental to the sciences, both as a guide and reflective discipline, but not a science in the
strict (English) sense.
Distinction is drawn between “science” in English (which usually means empirical sciences) and the broader Dutch
“wetenschap” which refers to any systematic field of study, including both the natural sciences (like physics and biolo-
gy) and the humanities (like history, philosophy, or linguistics). Philosophy does not generate empirical knowledge but
reflects on the sciences by guiding, analyzing, and interpreting their processes and results.
Philosophers help clarify the core questions of other disciplines, identify dogmas or unsupported assumptions,
and encourage critical thinking and deeper understanding. They do not answer the empirical questions of
those disciplines directly. Instead, they help define and frame what the important questions are.
Typically, no definitive answer is given as to which theory is correct. In philosophy (and often in humanities and some
social sciences), such consensus is rare or very limited (contrasts with natural sciences).
Philosophy operates both as a “guide” (before research starts) and as a “mirror” (reflecting on research results
and methods). While it doesn't always provide the answer, it equips students with the tools to reason critically
about which answers might be better supported.
Philosophy demands students use good arguments and critical reasoning to make their own informed opinions about
difficult questions (accepting a degree of uncertainty is part of the process).
, Philosophy of Mind
- Defining the Mind -
The uniqueness of studying the mind is that we use the mind to study itself (which is not common in science).
It is central to personhood and to ascriptions of responsibility and agency. Unlike other aspects of the human
organism (legs, lungs, even the brain as a physical object), studying the mind seems categorically different and
possibly more difficult.
Identifying what mind is essential for fields like law (e.g., responsibility, blame, and praise), neuroscience
(where mental states’ neural correlates are sought), and artificial intelligence (comparing human and machine
intelligence).
• Law: Deciding responsibility, free will.
• Neuroscience: Finding neural correlates or mechanisms of mental processes.
• Artificial Intelligence: Comparing human and machine intelligence or consciousness: definitions of mind im-
pact judgments about machines or animals having minds.
• The choice of definition affects:
• Criteria for “mindedness” in different entities (humans, infants, animals, machines).
• The kinds of scientific or philosophical questions one might ask, and which methods are regarded as appro-
priate.
E.g., immaterial soul: Mind as a non-material entity; only adult humans may possess it (animals and machines likely
lack minds).
E.g., brain activity: Mind identified with the functioning of organic brains; includes humans, maybe animals, but not
machines.
E.g., computer program: Mind as program-like information processing; possible to ascribe mind to machines if suffi-
ciently complex.
• The way you define the mind influences:
• Who (or what) is considered “minded.”
• What methods are suitable for studying the mind.
• What you expect different sciences to contribute (e.g., if mind = immaterial soul, then empirical methods
won’t suffice).
The term “mind” is an umbrella term for various mental states or processes, including:
• Perceptions (e.g., seeing, smelling, hearing)
• Bodily sensations (e.g., hunger, thirst, pain)
• Emotions (e.g., anger, love, grief)
• Beliefs (e.g., “Paris is the capital of France”)
• Desires (e.g., “I want ice cream”)
• Intentions (e.g., “I want to move to Amsterdam”)
• Reasoning (‘If X, then Y’)
• Memory & Imagination
The definition of mind is somewhat circular: “the mind is the collection of mental phenomena”, but what
makes them “mental”? Because they’re part of the mind. Philosophers seek to clarify what makes these phe-
nomena mental and what’s unique about them.
Many people think they aren’t “doing philosophy,” but when they make methodological decisions or assump-
tions about concepts in their discipline, they engage in philosophy (often without realizing it).
Mind-Body Problem
A foundational question for the entire field, the starting point for much philosophical inquiry into the nature of
consciousness and self.
The mind-body problem asks: How does the subjective, mental world relate to the objective, natural world?
,E.g., how do mental states fit into what science reveals about the physical world? Are they part of it, or somehow sep-
arate?
The problem rests on three premises:
The Three Key Premises of the Mind-Body Problem
We have a mind
The starting assumption is that humans possess a mind.
1
This seems obvious, but not universally accepted: some philosophers and scientists contest the
existence of the mind, or define it radically differently.
The mind-body problem is only relevant if one accepts that minds exist.
We have a body
2 This means accepting the existence of the physical body (a material entity made of flesh and
bone (“this soggy stuff in your skull”)).
Again, not all philosophers agree: some claim the material world doesn’t actually exist.
Mind and body are distinct
The core of the problem arises from the apparent difference in properties between mind and
3 body. The mind seems to possess characteristics that distinguish it from purely physical organs
such as the liver or bones and vice versa.
Philosophers seek to clarify which properties are special (e.g., subjectivity, consciousness, inten-
tionality), versus bodily properties (e.g., extension in space, physical composition).
Main Questions arising from the Mind-Body Problem
1. What is the real difference (if any) between mind and body, or mental and physical phenomena?
This involves characterizing the uniqueness of the mind compared to all other physical entities
studied in natural sciences.
2. If mind and body are different, how do they relate?
The mind-body problem demands to know how these two seemingly distinct entities interact.
The connection appears clear:
• Physical actions affecting the body (e.g., smashing a hammer on a hand) produce mental experiences
(pain).
• Mental intentions (e.g., deciding to raise an arm) cause physical actions (the arm moves).
The close relation through causal interaction raises the puzzle: how can something mental influ-
ence the physical, and vice versa?
3. How can it really make sense to treat minds as just another physical thing in the universe?
The problem of explaining, if minds are really just a kind of physical thing, how that can be.
The mind-body problem is the main topic addressed by most theories in philosophy of mind.
Theories attempt to answer one or more of the mind-body problem’s main questions.
Substance Dualism
(the most famous answer)
,Philosophers often use vivid or even physically disturbing thought experiments to provoke deep reflection on
abstract concepts.
E.g., imagine an extreme scenario: their body, including their brain, being totally destroyed, dissolved in acid or lava,
with its molecules violently scattered:
If your body is destroyed totally, could you survive such an event?
This question hinges on identifying “you” with your mind rather than with your physical body.
If “you” are identical to your mind, and the mind is totally separate from your body, then, on one view, you could
survive physical destruction.
If you answered “yes,” you believe the mind could survive without the body and thus are thinking like a substance
dualist. This is a common, not strange or rare, philosophical position.
When questions about the mind-body relationship are posed to lay people (non-philosophers, public), experimental
philosophers have found most people naturally lean towards substance dualism.
Substance dualism (the belief that mind (or soul) and body are distinct entities) is often the default or common-
sense viewpoint in general society.
The widespread idea of survival after bodily death is common in religious thought (e.g., the mind, spirit, or
soul continues existing after the material body dies). To believe in survival of mind/soul after bodily death is, in
effect, to be a substance dualist.
In religious frameworks, the body and soul are distinct; when the body dies, the immaterial soul survives.
This dualist scenario is deeply embedded in religious teachings, rituals, and beliefs.
E.g., Egyptian Book of the Dead, an ancient Egyptian belief about the afterlife:
• Upon death, the soul is separated from the body.
• The soul travels to the underworld, where it is weighed against Ma'at, the goddess of truth, justice, and
cosmic order.
• The fate of the soul (good or bad, reward or punishment) is determined independently of the dead body.
Substance dualism is not only a philosophical position but is also deeply woven into cultural and religious
worldviews. The idea that the soul/mind can exist apart from the body is a nearly universal human intuition,
reflected in mythology, religious doctrine, and lay belief.
The idea that mind and body are distinct substances has deep roots, not only in religion or popular belief but
also in the core history of philosophical thought:
While many philosophers shared the dualistic view also found in religious traditions. Philosophers sought to produce
formal, rational arguments. They strive for:
• Conceptual rigor: Arguing for dualism through logic, not faith.
• Universal persuasion: Making the case for dualism on grounds accessible to anyone, regardless of religious belief
or background.
Plato, writing through the voice of Socrates, already theorized in antiquity about the
mind (or soul) and body as separate entities.
Plato
His view: after death, the body and soul separate; each exists “alone by itself” (the
(and Socrates)
body apart from soul, the soul apart from body).
Thus, it is possible in principle for the two to be separated.
Descartes is famous for furnishing a systematic philosophical argument for substance
dualism, making it a central idea in early modern philosophy.
Argues that humans are composed of two fundamentally different substances:
René Descartes (Cartesian dualism (or interactive dualism) holding that mind (res cogitans = the thinking
thing) and body (res extensa = the extended thing) are ontologically distinct but can causally
interact)
Immaterial soul/mind
, The basis of mental activities (e.g., thinking, believing, wanting, remembering, conceiving,
etc). Home to higher-order cognitive and affective processes.
Material body
The basis for sensorimotor and mechanical functions, things describable physically Re-
sponsible for physical processes (e.g., sensory input, movement, observable/mechanically
describable action (receptors, axons, molecules)).
These two building blocks or substances can, at least hypothetically, exist inde-
pendently. In principle, all the workings of mind and all the workings of body can be
considered as possibly proceeding without the other.
Descartes used a principle akin to Gottfried Leibniz’s Law (Law of the Identity of In-
discernible) to support his mind-body dualism: He argued that since the mind and
body have different properties, they must be distinct substances, not one.
Identity of Indiscernible: if two things are identical (X = Y), then they must have all the
same properties.
Discernibility: if X and Y have even a single different property, they cannot be identical
(they are distinct).
E.g., similar looking chairs: both chairs may be blue, made of the same material, used simi-
larly, and have nearly identical features. However, if they occupy different spatial loca-
tions (one is left of the other), this one differing property means they are not identical,
they are two specific objects.
If even one property of the mind doesn’t match any property of the body, they cannot be
the same thing (i.e., not identical, but distinct substances).
Philosophers attempt to distinguish mind and body by identifying properties unique
to each. Descartes provides the foundational list, but later philosophers expand on
these distinctions.
Spatial Location & Extension
Mind
Mental states and processes do not have a spatial location and extension.
The location of the mind is much less clear; you cannot objectively point to it.
There is no objective or agreed-upon location for the mind.
The experience that some people point to their head, heart, or lungs is culturally
dependent. Some cultures locate the mind in the chest, lungs, heart, or even
suggest it is in the surroundings.
1. Mental states and processes lack extension (your beliefs/desires are not “bigger”
or “smaller” in measurable ways; e.g., a belief isn't located spatially "south" of
another belief).
The mind cannot be described in terms of physical size or location, the language
simply doesn’t fit.
Body
Clearly has a spatial location (e.g., you can point to where your heart is).
Has spatial extension: it takes up space and has size relative to other objects
or organs (“my heart is here, south of my brain”).
Rationality
2.
Mind
, Mental states are characterized by rationality: they can be reasons for ac-
tions, related in rational ways.
E.g., an agent recognizes it will rain, desires to stay dry, and brings an umbrella.
These beliefs and desires are rationally connected.
Body
Bodily organs function according to physical processes and can be described
in terms of success or dysfunction (health or disease).
They are not “rational” or “irrational”. Rationality doesn’t apply.
Intentionality (Aboutness)
Mind
Mental states are intentional (they are “about” something).
They can refer to extra-mental entities.
Franz Brentano 3. E.g., your belief that Paris is the capital of France refers to Paris and France;
your anger is often directed at something (missing the bus).
Body
Physical objects are not “about” anything.
E.g., your heart, a table, or a chair does not refer to or represent anything.
They just exist.
Phenomenal Character (Qualia)
Mind
Mental states have a subjective experiential quality (feel): the “what it’s
like” quality (qualia).
They are characterized by a certain phenomenal character (e.g., pain).
4. E.g., the feeling of seeing red, tasting chocolate, nostalgia from a smell, etc.
David Chalmers All subjective experiences unique to consciousness.
Body
Physical/Material objects have no subjective experience.
E.g., if you were shrunk and explored another person’s body/brain, you would
never see the subjective experience of redness or joy; it is not locatable as
a physical entity.
Today, almost no philosophers defend substance dualism in its traditional form; critiques have largely driven it
to the margins of serious academic debate:
Criticism of the Identified Differences between Mind and Body
((1) location and extension, (2) rationality, (3) intentionality, (4) phenomenal experience)
Identity theorists argue that the mind is the brain; mental states are nothing over and above
corresponding brain states.
(1)
If you accept this, the mind has a definite spatial location and size (it is wherever your brain is, inside
the skull).
, This enables you to link mental content (e.g., beliefs, perceptions) to physical regions of the brain
(e.g., prefrontal cortex: beliefs in the "front," visual processing in the "back").
Even concepts like size or extension become less problematic: emotions and beliefs might "take up
space" in the physical brain.
These classic dualist arguments ("the mind is nowhere in space") rely heavily on intuition,
but changing the conceptual framework (as with identity theory) can change those intuitions
too.
Redefinition Risk: If you define “mind” or “mental” not through unique human capacities
but as functions (as functionalist theories propose), then so-called "material" things, such as
computers or AI, can qualify as having minds.
(2)
& Rationality and intentionality may be reinterpreted: for instance, rational patterns in deci-
(3) sion-making could be ascribed to intelligent machines or even non-human animals.
This philosophy frequently involves redefining core terms, which can dissolve some classical
problems (by showing they result from definitions rather than facts).
The most stubborn distinction between mind and body is the reality of subjective experience
(e.g., what it's like to feel, see, smell, etc.)
Chalmers labeled this the hard problem of consciousness the challenge of explaining how
and why physical processes produce taste, color, emotion, pain, etc.
(4)
Even as definitions of mind and body shift, phenomenal consciousness remains hard to ex-
plain. Some philosophers try to deny phenomenal consciousness exists to dodge the prob-
lem, but this is an extreme and minority view. This issue often motivates continued support
for dualistic ideas.
There is an explicit trend among philosophers to avoid being labeled as substance dualists. The main reason is
the interaction problem. (Interactionism)
Substance dualism claims mind and body are two fundamentally different kinds of substances but also wants
to maintain that these can, and do, interact in everyday life.
Challenge: the interaction problem is not just whether interaction occurs, but how any interaction is possible
between the immaterial (mind) and the material (body):
If mind and body are entirely different in kind (one material, one immaterial), how can they interact at all?
Where and how does the causal influence cross over between immaterial and material realms?
Descartes believed not only that mind and body are separate but that they interact causally in the real world.
E.g., when a hammer strikes the hand (physical event), you feel pain (mental state).
E.g., the intention to move your arm (mental) results in the arm moving (physical action).
Descartes attempted to answer this problem through the idea of the pineal gland serving as the contact point between
mind and body.
E.g., the pineal gland in the brain. External stimulus (fire) activates a receptor (nose/foot). This sense signal is transmitted
up the nervous system to the brain. A special interaction point in the brain (pineal gland) then transfers these physical
signals to the non-physical mind (where sensations such as pain are experienced). The mind, in turn, can influence mat-
ter (intentions causing bodily movement) via this same medium.
Descartes aimed to capture both separation of substances (they can exist without one another in theory) and their ob-
vious interdependence in life. Substance dualism requires only theoretical independence, but practical interaction
and working together must be maintained.
Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia’s critique:
Descartes solution is highly speculative and not credible as a scientific explanation:
• There’s no scientific evidence (now or in Descartes’ time) showing that the pineal gland has any special role as a
, portal or contact point between mental and physical realms.
• Science may or may not eventually shed light on body-mind interaction, but the real issue is deeper than mere
scientific uncertainty.
Modern neuroscience knows the pineal gland regulates melatonin (sleep cycles), not mind-body interface.
• Descartes never explains how a non-physical thing can act upon or be acted on by a physical organ. All he does is
assign a location (the pineal gland), but this does not address the real difficulty: what is the process?
• Even if the location/mechanism were known, there’s a fundamental conceptual problem:
• Causation, as we understand it, typically involves contact or transfer between physical things (e.g., billiard balls
hitting: direct contact, transfer of energy/motion).
• For an immaterial thing (something with no spatial location, no extension, no physical properties) how could
there be any kind of contact?
• The mind, by substance dualist definition, is non-material, has no location, no extension, so no spatial or ener-
getic interface.
• The idea that something with no physical properties interacts with a physical object is, from this perspective, ut-
terly mysterious and lacking any plausible mechanism.
This interaction problem is so severe that most philosophers today reject substance dualism. Even scientists
avoid substance dualism for the same reason despite its intuitive appeal:
It fits the intuition that mind and body exist as real but very different things. Mind seems to have characteristics dif-
ficult to ground in physical objects: rationality, intentionality (“aboutness”), and phenomenal consciousness (qua-
lia). Dualism “picks up on this area of intuition,” but struggles with the interaction problem (i.e., how can mind and
matter, if they are completely different, interact at all?).
The urge to explain mind-body interaction is precisely what modern theories aim to address, not evade.
The theory’s intuitive appeal is ultimately outweighed by the lack of any coherent way to explain mind-body
causation.
Alternatives to Substance Dualism
Monism Dualism
The view that reality is fundamentally composed of only one type of substance. The view that there are two
fundamentally different types
If forced to pick between mind or matter as the foundational substance: of substance (traditionally
mind and body).
Idealism Materialism/Physicalism
(everything is mind, sometimes (everything is matter/physical)
called “only-mind”)
Materialism (in its traditional use) is the doc-
A minority position (everything trine that everything that exists is fundamental-
that exists is mind or mental in ly matter (that is, the kinds of things described
nature (there is no matter)). by classical physics (solids, liquids, gases, at-
oms, particles), things that have mass and oc-
cupy space).
Physicalism is a broader, more modern term
that holds that everything that exists is physi-
cal, but “physical” is defined to include all enti-
ties and properties postulated by contempo-
rary physics, not just matter in the classical
sense, but also fields, energies, forces (like
gravity and electromagnetism), dark matter
etc.
Modern philosophers often use “physicalism”
to avoid the outdated matter-only implication
of “materialism.”
But the terms are often used interchangeably
, in older philosophy of mind.
Not popular among scientists. Popular among scientists.
Instead of positing two substances (mind and matter), physicalism (or materialism) claims there is just one
fundamental substance.
By reducing mind and body to a single kind of thing, physicalism side-steps the interaction problem (you don’t
have to explain mind–body interaction if everything is, ultimately, the same kind of stuff). (its assumptions):
• There is only one kind of thing that exists: physical stuff.
• There’s no additional “soul” or independent mind substance.
• The mind is thus part of the physical world: there’s nothing over and above the physical.
• Human mental life arises from physical matter (brains, neurons, etc.) not from any special “extra ingredient.”
• Rejection of any magical or supernatural element (soul, spirit, immaterial mind), mental processes are wholly
physical. Everything that exists is composed of physical particles that constitute the fundamental parts of our
universe. Physicalists believe the mind can be completely described and explained in scientific terms. There is
nothing left over that defies scientific explanation. To understand the mind, we just need to study the arrange-
ment and interaction of physical particles (atoms, molecules, neural circuits, etc.).
Barbara Montero: the emergence of the mind is not a magical addition to matter, but is akin to the emergence of
rivers, trees, mountains, etc. all explained by physical ingredients and their arrangements. Mind is built from the
same basic physical components: oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, carbon, calcium, phosphorus. The difference is not
the ingredients, but the complexity and arrangement (the “recipe”).
Just as a fancy dinner uses ordinary ingredients (eggs, bread), the human mind results from a complex “cooking” of
those basic ingredients. This demystifies the mind, treating it as a product of physical world processes, even if its
properties look unique, the fundamental elements are the same.
• While a small minority deny the mind exists at all (extreme eliminativists), the majority of physicalists accept
the existence of mind, aiming to find its place in the big picture of the physical world. Their project is not to
dismiss the mind, but to explain it using scientific and naturalistic frameworks.
Jaegwon Kim systematically examines all major mind-body positions (dualism, identity theory, non-reductive
physicalism, functionalism) and challenges their ability to solve the mind-body problem and explain mental
causation. He proposes that the only workable physicalism is reductive physicalism: mental events must be
physically reducible, or else they are epiphenomenal (causally inert).
Reductive physicalism is the position that all mental events and properties can ultimately be explained fully in terms of
physical events and properties.
E.g., a feeling of pain is nothing over and above a specific brain process, it’s identical to, or reducible to, that process.
In this view, mental states must be strictly reducible to physical (brain/body) states; that is, neuroscience should be
able to tell us exactly what physical process is the same thing as (or fully explains) what we call pain, belief, desire, etc.
Kim argues that if mental events are not reducible to physical events, they cannot have true causal power in the phys-
ical world, so if they're something “extra” then, they become epiphenomenal.
Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental events exist, but they have no causal impact on the physical world.
They are causally inert: mere byproducts, like the whistle of a boiling kettle, which doesn’t play a role in the boiling itself.
For Kim, this is unsatisfactory: it conflicts with our intuitions (and science’s evidence) that our thoughts, emotions, and in-
tentions actually lead to real actions in the world.
Physicalism is overwhelmingly the dominant theory today within both philosophy (particularly analytic philos-
ophy) and the sciences.
The move from dualism to physicalism/materialism is motivated by both philosophical coherence (solving the interac-
tion problem) and alignment with scientific worldview (everything describable by physics).
The main issue for physicalist theory is how to explicitly fit the mind’s unique properties (e.g., consciousness,
rationality) into the physical world. The solution for the mind-body problem, for physicalists, is to show what
specific physical phenomena or objects the mind actually is or is identical to.
There are multiple flavors of physicalism, each with its approach to identifying what the mind is in physical terms:
identity theory, one prominent version.
, Identity Theory
(a type of reductive physicalism)
Locate the mind in the physical world by equating it strictly with brain states.
According to identity theory, mental states are identical to physical states of the brain.
J. J. C. Smart holds that mental states are identical to brain states. The mind exists, the body exists, but the
mind is just identical with the brain’s activity. Mental states are not an additional entity over and above brain
states, they are just brain states seen from a particular (mental) perspective.
Causation
Identity
Causation occurs when one distinct event or
thing brings about another. Identity means that two descriptions
refer to the very same thing, there isn’t
E.g., heat from a stove causes water to boil.
any “extra thing” or separate event.
Here, “heat from the stove” is one physi-
cal thing/state. “Water boiling” is anoth- E.g., boiling water is identical to the
er, separate physical process. The heat movement of H₂O molecules. When
acts on the water, raising its temperature we talk about “water boiling,” we’re
until it boils. describing the same process as “rapid
movement of H₂O molecules”, just at
These are two distinct things or events (heat different levels of description.
and boiling) connected in a sequence: one
Macro level
comes after the other because of the first.
vs Bubbles rise; liquid temperature
is high; water changes state.
Correlation
Micro level
Correlation means there’s a regular relation- Molecules vibrate quickly and es-
ship or pattern between two phenomena, but cape into the air (as steam).
neither necessarily causes the other. There is not one thing causing or cor-
related with the other, they are two
E.g., raising stove temperature is correlated with
views of the same underlying reality.
water boiling. Every time the temperature
goes up, boiling often follows, but it could In identity, you aren’t linking or relating
just be a pattern or association, not direct two different things. You’re just talking
cause. about one thing, using two different lan-
Again, two different things (stove tempera- guages or perspectives.
ture and boiling), but now they just go to-
gether in a predictable way.
The identity theory claims that the relationship between mind and brain is not definitional, it’s a brute fact of
nature, discoverable by science (in particular, neuroscience).
E.g., a definition (e.g., "bachelor" = "unmarried man") is set by language and requires no science.
E.g., an identity (e.g., "water is H2O") is a fact about the world, discovered empirically, not by linguistic stipulation.
The idea is that mental states (like pain, belief) are natural kinds, identical to specific brain states/activities.
Whenever you have the brain state, you have the mental state, and vice versa, just as with water and H 2O.
Thus, identity theory solves the mind-body problem by making “mental” and “physical” refer to the same
process/kind.
Advantages of Identity Theory
Identity theory does not deny the mind’s existence. Mental states are treated as real and significant,
