Week 1_________________________________________________________________________ 2
Watts, "A Sociologist’s Apology" _______________________________________________ 2
Coleman - The Micro-macro Link _______________________________________________ 4
Week 2_________________________________________________________________________ 5
Networks, crowds and markets ________________________________________________ 5
Week 3_________________________________________________________________________ 7
Axelrod: The Evolution of Cooperation in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma__________ 7
Fehr & Gächter: Altruistic Punishment in Humans ______________________________ 10
Baldassarri, "Cooperative Networks" __________________________________________ 12
Week 4________________________________________________________________________ 16
Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms (Elinor Ostrom, 2000) ________ 16
Rationality, Social Preferences, and Strategic Decision-making from a Behavioral
Economics Perspective (Simon Gächter, 2013) _________________________________ 18
Week 5________________________________________________________________________ 20
Macy and Willer (2002): Computational Sociology and Agent-Based Modeling_____ 20
Schelling (1969): Models of Segregation _______________________________________ 21
Schelling (1978): Sorting and Mixing ___________________________________________ 22
Week 6________________________________________________________________________ 23
Threshold Models of Collective Behavior (Mark Granovetter, 1978) _______________ 23
Week 7________________________________________________________________________ 27
Game-Theoretical Perspectives on the Emergence of Social Norms (Thomas Voss) 27
Emergence of and Compliance with New Social Norms (Andreas Diekmann, 2022) 29
,Week 1
Watts, "A Sociologist’s Apology"
This text argues that social science is challenging precisely because its core subject matter
(human behavior) is corrupted by the pervasive influence of common sense, leading to the
Paradox of Common Sense.
I. The Critique of Social Science by Hard Scientists
The field of social science, particularly sociology, faces consistent criticism, often asserting
that its findings are obvious or that its problems are easily solvable by other disciplines.
1. The Gribbin Critique (1998):
• Physicist and science writer John Gribbin reviewed Howard Becker's Tricks of
the Trade.
• Gribbin dismissed Becker’s sociological insights as "self-evident checks that 'real
scientists learn in the cradle'".
• He called social science "something of an oxymoron".
• Gribbin suggested that any physicist facing funding cuts could solve social
science problems "in a trice".
2. Political Skepticism:
• This skepticism extends to government funding.
• Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-Texas) proposed cutting the entire social and
behavioral sciences budget of the National Science Foundation (NSF) in 2006.
She felt social research was not a worthy recipient of NSF resources, despite
advocating for doubling medical science funds.
• Senator Tom Coburn (Oklahoma) made a similar proposal, arguing that theories
on political behavior are "best left to CNN, pollsters, pundits, historians,
candidates, political parties, and the voters". These views suggest social problems
are not considered "scientific problems".
II. The Failure of the Hard Science Intervention
Following Gribbin’s remarks, a major intervention occurred, challenging the notion that
social science problems are easy.
1. The Experiment: The author, who held a PhD in engineering (with training in
physics and mathematics) and moved into sociology, felt he was personally
"embarking on a miniature version of Gribbin’s proposed experiment".
2. Massive Effort: Over the next twelve years, hundreds, if not thousands, of "hard"
scientists (physicists, computer scientists, mathematicians) took interest in traditional
social science questions (e.g., social networks, group dynamics, information spread,
evolution of markets).
3. New Fields: This led to the creation of ambitious fields like "network science" and
"econophysics".
4. Result: Despite analyzing immense datasets, proposing countless models, and
publishing thousands of papers in leading journals (Science, Nature), the author
, concludes that we are "not much" closer to answering the biggest questions of social
science (e.g., the nature of deviant behavior, solving humanitarian disasters in Haiti or
New Orleans, policing Wall Street).
5. The Unlearned Lesson: The effort proved that social science problems are hard not
just for sociologists, but for physicists as well, yet "this lesson... has not been
learned".
III. Lazarsfeld and the Fallacy of Obviousness
Sociologist Paul Lazarsfeld (sixty years prior) preempted the argument that social science
merely confirms what intelligent people already know.
1. The Study: Lazarsfeld discussed findings from The American Soldier, a study of over
600,000 servicemen from World War II.
2. The Technique: He presented six claims, such as: "rural men... were happier during
their Army life than soldiers from city backgrounds".
3. The Rationalization: The imagined reader easily rationalized this using common
sense (e.g., rural men were accustomed to harsher living standards and physical
labor).
4. The Twist: Lazarsfeld revealed that all six presented "findings" were the exact
opposite of what the study found (e.g., city men, not rural men, were happier).
5. The Core Point: The reader could have just as easily rationalized the real finding
(e.g., city men are more used to chains of command, strict standards, and corporate
settings).
6. Conclusion: Lazarsfeld stated that when "every answer and its opposite appears
equally obvious," then "something is wrong with the entire argument of
'obviousness'".
IV. The Paradox of Common Sense
The central argument of the book is that common sense, while useful daily, is the primary
reason why complex social problems seem simple.
• The Difficulty: Problems involving people are arguably "much harder" than rocket
science, yet they seem simple because of reliance on common sense.
• Adaptation: Common sense is "exquisitely adapted" to handle the complexity of
everyday situations.
• Failure: It systematically misleads us when dealing with complex, large-scale
systems such as corporations, cultures, markets, nation-states, and global
institutions.
• Manifestation (Hindsight Bias): The flaws of common sense are rarely recognized
at the time. They appear in retrospect as "things we didn’t know at the time" but
which seem obvious in hindsight.
• The Paradox: Common sense helps us make sense of the world, but it "can actively
undermine our ability to understand it".
V. Illusory Superiority
, People consistently make the error of believing the flaws of common sense apply only to
others.
• Definition: This phenomenon is known as "illusory superiority".
• Examples: Around 90 percent of Americans believe they are better-than-average
drivers. An "incredible 25 percent" of respondents rated themselves in the top 1
percent in leadership ability.
• The Lake Wobegone Effect: The effect is colloquially known by this name,
referencing Garrison Keillor’s fictional town where "all the children are above
average".
• The Path Forward: The uncomfortable reality is that the fallacies of everyday
thinking apply to our own deeply held beliefs. The solution is to hold our beliefs "up
to a spotlight and regard them with suspicion".
• Sociology’s Goal: Learning to think like a sociologist means learning to "question
precisely your instincts about how things work, and possibly to unlearn them
altogether".
Coleman - The Micro-macro Link
This short excerpt outlines methodological goals concerning the relationship between
individual action (micro) and large-scale social outcomes (macro).
The goals focus on developing models and research to properly execute the micro-to-macro
transition:
1. Rational Behavior without Markets: To show that the micro-to-macro transition
can be modeled based on individual rational behavior. This is applicable in specific
domains that do not involve markets or exchange mechanisms, such as escape panics
and the placement of trust.
2. Data Requirements: To begin specifying the required data for proper execution of
the micro-to-macro transition.
• Example Problem: Analyzing the effect of the educational level of a society (or a
subgroup) on macro outcomes like income distribution or unemployment.
3. Institutional Defects in Collective Decisions: To demonstrate that comparable
micro-to-macro problems exist in areas concerning collective decisions that use a
formal decision rule.
• Key Distinction: In this specific case, the flaw or "defect" in the transition lies in
the institution itself, rather than in the social scientist's theoretical model of the
transition.
4. General Direction: The author asserts confidence that general directions exist for
developing appropriate models and research designs, suggested by previous
discussions (not detailed here) involving examples like marriage markets, panic,
placement of trust, and occupational mobility.
Watts, "A Sociologist’s Apology" _______________________________________________ 2
Coleman - The Micro-macro Link _______________________________________________ 4
Week 2_________________________________________________________________________ 5
Networks, crowds and markets ________________________________________________ 5
Week 3_________________________________________________________________________ 7
Axelrod: The Evolution of Cooperation in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma__________ 7
Fehr & Gächter: Altruistic Punishment in Humans ______________________________ 10
Baldassarri, "Cooperative Networks" __________________________________________ 12
Week 4________________________________________________________________________ 16
Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms (Elinor Ostrom, 2000) ________ 16
Rationality, Social Preferences, and Strategic Decision-making from a Behavioral
Economics Perspective (Simon Gächter, 2013) _________________________________ 18
Week 5________________________________________________________________________ 20
Macy and Willer (2002): Computational Sociology and Agent-Based Modeling_____ 20
Schelling (1969): Models of Segregation _______________________________________ 21
Schelling (1978): Sorting and Mixing ___________________________________________ 22
Week 6________________________________________________________________________ 23
Threshold Models of Collective Behavior (Mark Granovetter, 1978) _______________ 23
Week 7________________________________________________________________________ 27
Game-Theoretical Perspectives on the Emergence of Social Norms (Thomas Voss) 27
Emergence of and Compliance with New Social Norms (Andreas Diekmann, 2022) 29
,Week 1
Watts, "A Sociologist’s Apology"
This text argues that social science is challenging precisely because its core subject matter
(human behavior) is corrupted by the pervasive influence of common sense, leading to the
Paradox of Common Sense.
I. The Critique of Social Science by Hard Scientists
The field of social science, particularly sociology, faces consistent criticism, often asserting
that its findings are obvious or that its problems are easily solvable by other disciplines.
1. The Gribbin Critique (1998):
• Physicist and science writer John Gribbin reviewed Howard Becker's Tricks of
the Trade.
• Gribbin dismissed Becker’s sociological insights as "self-evident checks that 'real
scientists learn in the cradle'".
• He called social science "something of an oxymoron".
• Gribbin suggested that any physicist facing funding cuts could solve social
science problems "in a trice".
2. Political Skepticism:
• This skepticism extends to government funding.
• Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-Texas) proposed cutting the entire social and
behavioral sciences budget of the National Science Foundation (NSF) in 2006.
She felt social research was not a worthy recipient of NSF resources, despite
advocating for doubling medical science funds.
• Senator Tom Coburn (Oklahoma) made a similar proposal, arguing that theories
on political behavior are "best left to CNN, pollsters, pundits, historians,
candidates, political parties, and the voters". These views suggest social problems
are not considered "scientific problems".
II. The Failure of the Hard Science Intervention
Following Gribbin’s remarks, a major intervention occurred, challenging the notion that
social science problems are easy.
1. The Experiment: The author, who held a PhD in engineering (with training in
physics and mathematics) and moved into sociology, felt he was personally
"embarking on a miniature version of Gribbin’s proposed experiment".
2. Massive Effort: Over the next twelve years, hundreds, if not thousands, of "hard"
scientists (physicists, computer scientists, mathematicians) took interest in traditional
social science questions (e.g., social networks, group dynamics, information spread,
evolution of markets).
3. New Fields: This led to the creation of ambitious fields like "network science" and
"econophysics".
4. Result: Despite analyzing immense datasets, proposing countless models, and
publishing thousands of papers in leading journals (Science, Nature), the author
, concludes that we are "not much" closer to answering the biggest questions of social
science (e.g., the nature of deviant behavior, solving humanitarian disasters in Haiti or
New Orleans, policing Wall Street).
5. The Unlearned Lesson: The effort proved that social science problems are hard not
just for sociologists, but for physicists as well, yet "this lesson... has not been
learned".
III. Lazarsfeld and the Fallacy of Obviousness
Sociologist Paul Lazarsfeld (sixty years prior) preempted the argument that social science
merely confirms what intelligent people already know.
1. The Study: Lazarsfeld discussed findings from The American Soldier, a study of over
600,000 servicemen from World War II.
2. The Technique: He presented six claims, such as: "rural men... were happier during
their Army life than soldiers from city backgrounds".
3. The Rationalization: The imagined reader easily rationalized this using common
sense (e.g., rural men were accustomed to harsher living standards and physical
labor).
4. The Twist: Lazarsfeld revealed that all six presented "findings" were the exact
opposite of what the study found (e.g., city men, not rural men, were happier).
5. The Core Point: The reader could have just as easily rationalized the real finding
(e.g., city men are more used to chains of command, strict standards, and corporate
settings).
6. Conclusion: Lazarsfeld stated that when "every answer and its opposite appears
equally obvious," then "something is wrong with the entire argument of
'obviousness'".
IV. The Paradox of Common Sense
The central argument of the book is that common sense, while useful daily, is the primary
reason why complex social problems seem simple.
• The Difficulty: Problems involving people are arguably "much harder" than rocket
science, yet they seem simple because of reliance on common sense.
• Adaptation: Common sense is "exquisitely adapted" to handle the complexity of
everyday situations.
• Failure: It systematically misleads us when dealing with complex, large-scale
systems such as corporations, cultures, markets, nation-states, and global
institutions.
• Manifestation (Hindsight Bias): The flaws of common sense are rarely recognized
at the time. They appear in retrospect as "things we didn’t know at the time" but
which seem obvious in hindsight.
• The Paradox: Common sense helps us make sense of the world, but it "can actively
undermine our ability to understand it".
V. Illusory Superiority
, People consistently make the error of believing the flaws of common sense apply only to
others.
• Definition: This phenomenon is known as "illusory superiority".
• Examples: Around 90 percent of Americans believe they are better-than-average
drivers. An "incredible 25 percent" of respondents rated themselves in the top 1
percent in leadership ability.
• The Lake Wobegone Effect: The effect is colloquially known by this name,
referencing Garrison Keillor’s fictional town where "all the children are above
average".
• The Path Forward: The uncomfortable reality is that the fallacies of everyday
thinking apply to our own deeply held beliefs. The solution is to hold our beliefs "up
to a spotlight and regard them with suspicion".
• Sociology’s Goal: Learning to think like a sociologist means learning to "question
precisely your instincts about how things work, and possibly to unlearn them
altogether".
Coleman - The Micro-macro Link
This short excerpt outlines methodological goals concerning the relationship between
individual action (micro) and large-scale social outcomes (macro).
The goals focus on developing models and research to properly execute the micro-to-macro
transition:
1. Rational Behavior without Markets: To show that the micro-to-macro transition
can be modeled based on individual rational behavior. This is applicable in specific
domains that do not involve markets or exchange mechanisms, such as escape panics
and the placement of trust.
2. Data Requirements: To begin specifying the required data for proper execution of
the micro-to-macro transition.
• Example Problem: Analyzing the effect of the educational level of a society (or a
subgroup) on macro outcomes like income distribution or unemployment.
3. Institutional Defects in Collective Decisions: To demonstrate that comparable
micro-to-macro problems exist in areas concerning collective decisions that use a
formal decision rule.
• Key Distinction: In this specific case, the flaw or "defect" in the transition lies in
the institution itself, rather than in the social scientist's theoretical model of the
transition.
4. General Direction: The author asserts confidence that general directions exist for
developing appropriate models and research designs, suggested by previous
discussions (not detailed here) involving examples like marriage markets, panic,
placement of trust, and occupational mobility.
