Metaphysics of God revision notes
Attributes of God: The concept and nature of God
The God of philosophy has three main attributes, omnipotence, omnibenevolent and omniscience
(we will also consider God’s relationship with time – either being eternal or everlasting).
Omnipotence refers to being all powerful and in this case being all powerful is the ability to bring
about all logical possibilities. God is perfectly powerful, there is nothing else in this universe which
can surpass the power in which God possesses. Omniscience refers to being all knowing, God knows
all true propositions, he knows everything that can be known. Omnibenevolence refers to supreme
goodness, in a metaphysical sense this means supremely perfect. God’s perfectness aligns with
moral goodness as well, God is a perfect being who’s will always aligns with what is morally good.
Criticism of omnipotence
Many philosophers find that these attributes cannot be accepted because they all face contradictions leading to
the question of whether a being like God can truly exits. The first problem is the issue of God’s omnipotence.
This is known as the paradox of the stone:
1. P1. Either God can create a stone that he cannot lift, or he cannot create a stone that he cannot lift.
2. P2. If God can create a stone that he cannot lift, then he is not omnipotent (as there is at least one thing he
cannot do which is to lift the stone)
3. P3. If God cannot create a stone which he cannot lift, then he is not omnipotent (as there
is at least one thing he cannot do, which is to create the stone)
4. C1. Therefore, in any case there is at least one thing God cannot do.
5. C2. Therefore, God is not omnipotent. (and the concept of God as an omnipotent being
is incoherent).
Issue: If the concept of an omnipotent being is self-contradictory, then an omnipotent being cannot exist. This
implies that the very concept of omnipotence and an omnipotent being is logically contradictory.
Solution: Despite this, Aquinas argued that this was not a valid argument against God’s omnipotence; he argued
that this is not a restriction on God’s power, essentially; if it can be done, then God can do it. But, in the case, it
cannot be done because it is metaphysically impossible, God cannot make a square circle or change the laws of
mathematics.
Mavrodes further develops Aquinas’ argument and argues that the paradox of the stone makes a faulty
assumption:
• He explains that the paradox of the stone is a logical impossibility, it presupposes the existence of the
something that is logically impossible (note that logical possibilities reflect the way the world could have
been), there is no possible world where there is a stone “too heavy” for an omnipotent God to lift.
• In normal circumstances it would not be contradictory to argue that someone could create a stone too heavy
for them to lift, however it becomes a self-contradiction when that someone is an omnipotent being.
• A stone too heavy for God is logically impossible, it does not exist, and it describes nothing.
• Therefore, ‘the power to create a stone an omnipotent being cannot lift’ is not a possible power. If God lacks
it, God still doesn’t lack any possible power.
Criticism of omnibenevolence
The Euthyphro dilemma examines the nature of God’s omnibenevolence by presenting two questions: 1) If the
good is loved by God because it is good, what does that mean for God’s omnipotence? 2) If the good is good
because it is loved by God, what does that mean for God’s goodness?
, The first horn: God wills what is good because it is good:
• This implies that morality is independent of God/what God wills. From this it follows that
God could not make what is wrong be right (and vice versa).
• This challenges the notion that God is omnipotent – that God could do anything.
• This also seems to contradict any notion that there is an essential connection between
God’s will and moral goodness, with the former conforming to (rather than dictating) the latter.
The second horn: What is good is good because God wills it:
• If good is whatever God wills, the content of morality appears arbitrary: there is no reason why God wills as
God does, and there is no criteria for moral goodness. The claim ‘good is whatever God wills’ doesn’t say
anything substantive about moral goodness– it is a tautology, empty of ethical content.
• If good is whatever God wills, then praising God cannot be an acknowledgement of moral achievement on
God’s part, since any exercise of the divine will constitutes goodness under this option.
• If good is whatever God wills, then God could possibly will things that our moral intuitions would classify
as evil.
Issue: The Euthyphro dilemma suggests that the good being what God wills trivialises the idea of
omnibenevolence because you cannot be praised for something that is intrinsic to your being e.g. praising
someone who was born with brown eyes for having brown eyes.
Solution: One response to this is drawing a distinction between concepts and properties. It is arguable that ‘good
is what God wills’ is not a tautology because they are two distinct concepts. It is not an analytic truth that
goodness is what God wills. However, goodness is the same property as what God wills. It’s like saying H20 is
water, they are two concepts which describe one property. H20 refers to the chemical structure of water, whilst
water refers to H20 in it’s liquid form. Morality is dependent on God. This is a metaphysical truth (about what
exists) but not a conceptual truth about morality.
Criticism of omniscience
The issue with omniscience is that if God knows all the truths about the future and so far, any such true
proposition p, are we powerless to have made it false that p, or to have done other than what we will to do? In
which case we are not free. Freedom refers to a human’s counter-factual ability to have done otherwise than
what they do.
1. P1. God is omniscient iff God knows all true propositions.
2. P2. There are true propositions about the future.
3. P3. God is omniscient iff God knows all true future propositions.
4. P4. If God knows all true future propositions, including those about my future actions, then it is impossible
for those propositions about my future actions to be false.
5. P5. If it is impossible for these propositions about my future actions to be false, then it is impossible for me
to do otherwise than the action specified in those propositions, and so I am free.
6. C. Therefore, if God is omniscient, I am not free.
We could simply conclude that God is omniscient, and we are not free. However, this seems unsatisfactory
because if God is a supremely good being, he would want to our lives to be morally significant and meaningful,
ultimately wishing for us to have free will.
Solution: We could conclude that God is eternal (a temporal – existing outside of time), God sees all time (past,
present and future) simultaneously in the ‘eternal present’. God’s eternal omniscience does not interfere with
our free will – he simply sees the results of our free choices in our future in his eternal present. God’s knowledge
is not ‘foreknowledge’ – it does not exist ‘prior’ to our action as it exists outside of time. God’s omniscience
makes our knowledge conditionally necessary; they can fail to exist or occur.
Or God could be everlasting (temporal existing within time), once the universe had been created then time began
to unfold moment by moment – both for creation and for God. God thus knows what we have done in the past
and what we are doing in the present. However, regarding the future, God only knows the logically possible
Attributes of God: The concept and nature of God
The God of philosophy has three main attributes, omnipotence, omnibenevolent and omniscience
(we will also consider God’s relationship with time – either being eternal or everlasting).
Omnipotence refers to being all powerful and in this case being all powerful is the ability to bring
about all logical possibilities. God is perfectly powerful, there is nothing else in this universe which
can surpass the power in which God possesses. Omniscience refers to being all knowing, God knows
all true propositions, he knows everything that can be known. Omnibenevolence refers to supreme
goodness, in a metaphysical sense this means supremely perfect. God’s perfectness aligns with
moral goodness as well, God is a perfect being who’s will always aligns with what is morally good.
Criticism of omnipotence
Many philosophers find that these attributes cannot be accepted because they all face contradictions leading to
the question of whether a being like God can truly exits. The first problem is the issue of God’s omnipotence.
This is known as the paradox of the stone:
1. P1. Either God can create a stone that he cannot lift, or he cannot create a stone that he cannot lift.
2. P2. If God can create a stone that he cannot lift, then he is not omnipotent (as there is at least one thing he
cannot do which is to lift the stone)
3. P3. If God cannot create a stone which he cannot lift, then he is not omnipotent (as there
is at least one thing he cannot do, which is to create the stone)
4. C1. Therefore, in any case there is at least one thing God cannot do.
5. C2. Therefore, God is not omnipotent. (and the concept of God as an omnipotent being
is incoherent).
Issue: If the concept of an omnipotent being is self-contradictory, then an omnipotent being cannot exist. This
implies that the very concept of omnipotence and an omnipotent being is logically contradictory.
Solution: Despite this, Aquinas argued that this was not a valid argument against God’s omnipotence; he argued
that this is not a restriction on God’s power, essentially; if it can be done, then God can do it. But, in the case, it
cannot be done because it is metaphysically impossible, God cannot make a square circle or change the laws of
mathematics.
Mavrodes further develops Aquinas’ argument and argues that the paradox of the stone makes a faulty
assumption:
• He explains that the paradox of the stone is a logical impossibility, it presupposes the existence of the
something that is logically impossible (note that logical possibilities reflect the way the world could have
been), there is no possible world where there is a stone “too heavy” for an omnipotent God to lift.
• In normal circumstances it would not be contradictory to argue that someone could create a stone too heavy
for them to lift, however it becomes a self-contradiction when that someone is an omnipotent being.
• A stone too heavy for God is logically impossible, it does not exist, and it describes nothing.
• Therefore, ‘the power to create a stone an omnipotent being cannot lift’ is not a possible power. If God lacks
it, God still doesn’t lack any possible power.
Criticism of omnibenevolence
The Euthyphro dilemma examines the nature of God’s omnibenevolence by presenting two questions: 1) If the
good is loved by God because it is good, what does that mean for God’s omnipotence? 2) If the good is good
because it is loved by God, what does that mean for God’s goodness?
, The first horn: God wills what is good because it is good:
• This implies that morality is independent of God/what God wills. From this it follows that
God could not make what is wrong be right (and vice versa).
• This challenges the notion that God is omnipotent – that God could do anything.
• This also seems to contradict any notion that there is an essential connection between
God’s will and moral goodness, with the former conforming to (rather than dictating) the latter.
The second horn: What is good is good because God wills it:
• If good is whatever God wills, the content of morality appears arbitrary: there is no reason why God wills as
God does, and there is no criteria for moral goodness. The claim ‘good is whatever God wills’ doesn’t say
anything substantive about moral goodness– it is a tautology, empty of ethical content.
• If good is whatever God wills, then praising God cannot be an acknowledgement of moral achievement on
God’s part, since any exercise of the divine will constitutes goodness under this option.
• If good is whatever God wills, then God could possibly will things that our moral intuitions would classify
as evil.
Issue: The Euthyphro dilemma suggests that the good being what God wills trivialises the idea of
omnibenevolence because you cannot be praised for something that is intrinsic to your being e.g. praising
someone who was born with brown eyes for having brown eyes.
Solution: One response to this is drawing a distinction between concepts and properties. It is arguable that ‘good
is what God wills’ is not a tautology because they are two distinct concepts. It is not an analytic truth that
goodness is what God wills. However, goodness is the same property as what God wills. It’s like saying H20 is
water, they are two concepts which describe one property. H20 refers to the chemical structure of water, whilst
water refers to H20 in it’s liquid form. Morality is dependent on God. This is a metaphysical truth (about what
exists) but not a conceptual truth about morality.
Criticism of omniscience
The issue with omniscience is that if God knows all the truths about the future and so far, any such true
proposition p, are we powerless to have made it false that p, or to have done other than what we will to do? In
which case we are not free. Freedom refers to a human’s counter-factual ability to have done otherwise than
what they do.
1. P1. God is omniscient iff God knows all true propositions.
2. P2. There are true propositions about the future.
3. P3. God is omniscient iff God knows all true future propositions.
4. P4. If God knows all true future propositions, including those about my future actions, then it is impossible
for those propositions about my future actions to be false.
5. P5. If it is impossible for these propositions about my future actions to be false, then it is impossible for me
to do otherwise than the action specified in those propositions, and so I am free.
6. C. Therefore, if God is omniscient, I am not free.
We could simply conclude that God is omniscient, and we are not free. However, this seems unsatisfactory
because if God is a supremely good being, he would want to our lives to be morally significant and meaningful,
ultimately wishing for us to have free will.
Solution: We could conclude that God is eternal (a temporal – existing outside of time), God sees all time (past,
present and future) simultaneously in the ‘eternal present’. God’s eternal omniscience does not interfere with
our free will – he simply sees the results of our free choices in our future in his eternal present. God’s knowledge
is not ‘foreknowledge’ – it does not exist ‘prior’ to our action as it exists outside of time. God’s omniscience
makes our knowledge conditionally necessary; they can fail to exist or occur.
Or God could be everlasting (temporal existing within time), once the universe had been created then time began
to unfold moment by moment – both for creation and for God. God thus knows what we have done in the past
and what we are doing in the present. However, regarding the future, God only knows the logically possible
