Why are international institutions so unsuccessful at tackling climate change?
Climate change has been considered among the most urgent world-wide issues for decades
and has become increasingly more alarming within the 21st century. Despite years of
scientific understanding and increasing public concern, progress towards tackling climate
change has been lacklustre. Various international institutions including the
Intergovernmental panel on Climate Change (IPCC) or the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) have tried to offer a response, yet their efforts
seem to constantly fall short. Their unified efforts fail to hold commitments, enforce policies,
and attack the systemic changes necessary to stop global warming. Throughout this essay,
it will argue international institutions are unsuccessful at tackling climate change due to
conflicting national interests, structural limitations and the economic and political pressures
that accompany it. Whilst they can raise important awareness and conversation about this
important topic, their political pressures and institutional structures hugely undermine their
ability to operate efficiently and effectively.
Understanding the Role of International Climate Institutions
International institutions are organisations which support and facilitate bilateral engagements
between states. Within the topic of climate change, the most recognized and notable are the
UNFCCC and the IPCC. The UNFCCC, established at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, functions
as a basis for international governmental talks, while the IPCC integrates scientific research
to support policy decisions. Major benchmarks such as the Kyoto Protocol (1997) and the
Paris Agreement (2015) have arisen from this framework, paving the way for global
initiatives. However, most of these institutions lack the enforcement strategies which legal
systems hold. For example, within the Paris Agreement, ‘parties do not have an obligation to
achieve their nationally determined contributions (NDCs) to address climate change – thus,
in that respect, NDCs are not legally binding’ (Bodansky, 2016). Countries can set their own
nationally determined contributions without enforcing legal consequences for failure in
meeting targets, representing a trend in soft governance.
Structural Limitations
One of the key issues within international institutions lies in its inherent structural weakness.
Contrary to domestic governments, these institutions do not retain sovereignty and must
instead rely on voluntary compliance from member states. This problem often causes
ambition to fall ahead of political compromise, worsening climate change. The Paris
Agreement emphasises this issue, whilst celebrated as a diplomatic success, it contains no
binding enforcement for emissions targets and instead relies on transparency and peer
pressure to facilitate compliance. Countries are asked to submit and update NDC’s every
five years, but there remains no central authority to impose sanctions for non-compliance.
So, whilst this model adopts a more inclusive framework than the Kyoto Protocol, it sacrifices
accountability of actions for flexibility, failing to address the key problem. This uncoordinated
approach makes it tricky in implementing unified strategies, making it an unsuccessful
solution to addressing climate change.
Conflicting National Interests
Another significant challenge to tackling climate action lies in the conflicting national interests
of developed and developing countries due to the common but differentiated responsibilities.
This principle acknowledges that while climate change is a shared global responsibility to
tackle, some wealthier nations hold greater responsibility due to their early industrialization.
For example, ‘the United States has emitted more CO2 than any other country to date’ and
‘is responsible for 25% of historical emissions’ (Ritchie, 2019). This massive imbalance has
caused developing countries to argue for greater flexibility in emissions to allow for a
stronger focus on economic growth. This argument was hugely exposed in the 2009
, Copenhagen summit (COP15) which collapsed largely over the disagreements in
responsibility and financial commitments as ‘Irreconcilable differences between developed
and developing countries precluded a meaningful agreement” (Dimitrov, 2010). The Paris
Agreement which exhibits a compromise that evades binding obligations allows countries to
set their own climate targets, hence avoiding debates over differentiated responsibilities.
This agreement does not explain the difference in the responsibilities for developed and
developing nations to enable wider participation, however this ambiguity causes the key
problem of climate change as countries fail to act. Furthermore, the unfulfilled $100 billion
annual pledge from developed nations exacerbated mistrust. This gap just further
compromises trust and remains a core factor to why international institutions are
unsuccessful at tackling climate change.
Economic Pressures and Political Constraints
Another key issue to why international institutions are so unsuccessful at tackling climate
change is due to the country's national economic interests. Various governments are
hesitant to enforce strict climate policies that could potentially interfere with key industries
and raise energy prices. Fossil fuel dependency in various countries such as Russia, Saudi
Arabia and Australia obtain considerable revenue from oil, gas, and coal exports, which
causes their little incentive to tackle these major climate issues. Furthermore, embracing
these institutions often requires long term planning for countries. These huge investments
that climate politics require aren't felt in the short term, with the benefits only being gained in
the long term. This significant timescale mismatch, especially for developing countries,
discourages them from committing to these ambitious institutions as they can’t afford it in the
long run. The influence of corporate lobbying, particularly fossil fuel companies, further
exacerbates this problem. Investigative reporting has shown how influential energy
companies ‘lobbied to block federal and international action to control greenhouse gas
emissions’ and has ‘helped to erect a vast edifice of misinformation that stands to this day’
(Banerjee, 2015). This large political economy, which is extremely hesitant to act, is only just
reinforced by weak funding such as the promised $100 billion annually by developed
countries. Without these sufficient resources, climate change gets worse, further widening
global inequality.
Case Studies: Limited Success and Institutional Learning
Whilst international climate institutions do come with significant barriers and challenges,
there are important examples of partial success that portray the potential of a well-executed
governance framework. One of the most prolific and common examples of this, is the
Montreal Protocol (1987) which targeted ozone depleting substances and greenhouse
gases. Its success stemmed from a few key features: the existence of viable economic
options, widespread scientific agreement and most importantly, legally binding commitments
supported by trade sanctions and non-compliance. According to the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP), “the Montreal Protocol is saving an estimated two million
people each year by 2030 from skin cancer” (UNEP, 2017). This demonstrates how binding
legal authority and economically sensible strategies can contribute to tackling climate
change.
A recent successful example which has emerged as a core leader is the European Green
Deal and Emissions Trading System (ETS). Established in 2005, it was the world's first
carbon market, covering around 40% of the EU’s emissions. It functions on a cap and trade
principle where emission allowances are allocated or auctioned which can be traded,
providing market-based incentives to better emission reductions. The reason the EU is
praised for its success is due to its initiative to integrate its climate targets with binding
legislation and to set up international institutions with the authority to supervise and enforce
rules. ‘"The EU has sought to position itself as a leader in international climate policy by
demonstrating its ability to reconcile environmental protection with economic growth and
Climate change has been considered among the most urgent world-wide issues for decades
and has become increasingly more alarming within the 21st century. Despite years of
scientific understanding and increasing public concern, progress towards tackling climate
change has been lacklustre. Various international institutions including the
Intergovernmental panel on Climate Change (IPCC) or the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) have tried to offer a response, yet their efforts
seem to constantly fall short. Their unified efforts fail to hold commitments, enforce policies,
and attack the systemic changes necessary to stop global warming. Throughout this essay,
it will argue international institutions are unsuccessful at tackling climate change due to
conflicting national interests, structural limitations and the economic and political pressures
that accompany it. Whilst they can raise important awareness and conversation about this
important topic, their political pressures and institutional structures hugely undermine their
ability to operate efficiently and effectively.
Understanding the Role of International Climate Institutions
International institutions are organisations which support and facilitate bilateral engagements
between states. Within the topic of climate change, the most recognized and notable are the
UNFCCC and the IPCC. The UNFCCC, established at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, functions
as a basis for international governmental talks, while the IPCC integrates scientific research
to support policy decisions. Major benchmarks such as the Kyoto Protocol (1997) and the
Paris Agreement (2015) have arisen from this framework, paving the way for global
initiatives. However, most of these institutions lack the enforcement strategies which legal
systems hold. For example, within the Paris Agreement, ‘parties do not have an obligation to
achieve their nationally determined contributions (NDCs) to address climate change – thus,
in that respect, NDCs are not legally binding’ (Bodansky, 2016). Countries can set their own
nationally determined contributions without enforcing legal consequences for failure in
meeting targets, representing a trend in soft governance.
Structural Limitations
One of the key issues within international institutions lies in its inherent structural weakness.
Contrary to domestic governments, these institutions do not retain sovereignty and must
instead rely on voluntary compliance from member states. This problem often causes
ambition to fall ahead of political compromise, worsening climate change. The Paris
Agreement emphasises this issue, whilst celebrated as a diplomatic success, it contains no
binding enforcement for emissions targets and instead relies on transparency and peer
pressure to facilitate compliance. Countries are asked to submit and update NDC’s every
five years, but there remains no central authority to impose sanctions for non-compliance.
So, whilst this model adopts a more inclusive framework than the Kyoto Protocol, it sacrifices
accountability of actions for flexibility, failing to address the key problem. This uncoordinated
approach makes it tricky in implementing unified strategies, making it an unsuccessful
solution to addressing climate change.
Conflicting National Interests
Another significant challenge to tackling climate action lies in the conflicting national interests
of developed and developing countries due to the common but differentiated responsibilities.
This principle acknowledges that while climate change is a shared global responsibility to
tackle, some wealthier nations hold greater responsibility due to their early industrialization.
For example, ‘the United States has emitted more CO2 than any other country to date’ and
‘is responsible for 25% of historical emissions’ (Ritchie, 2019). This massive imbalance has
caused developing countries to argue for greater flexibility in emissions to allow for a
stronger focus on economic growth. This argument was hugely exposed in the 2009
, Copenhagen summit (COP15) which collapsed largely over the disagreements in
responsibility and financial commitments as ‘Irreconcilable differences between developed
and developing countries precluded a meaningful agreement” (Dimitrov, 2010). The Paris
Agreement which exhibits a compromise that evades binding obligations allows countries to
set their own climate targets, hence avoiding debates over differentiated responsibilities.
This agreement does not explain the difference in the responsibilities for developed and
developing nations to enable wider participation, however this ambiguity causes the key
problem of climate change as countries fail to act. Furthermore, the unfulfilled $100 billion
annual pledge from developed nations exacerbated mistrust. This gap just further
compromises trust and remains a core factor to why international institutions are
unsuccessful at tackling climate change.
Economic Pressures and Political Constraints
Another key issue to why international institutions are so unsuccessful at tackling climate
change is due to the country's national economic interests. Various governments are
hesitant to enforce strict climate policies that could potentially interfere with key industries
and raise energy prices. Fossil fuel dependency in various countries such as Russia, Saudi
Arabia and Australia obtain considerable revenue from oil, gas, and coal exports, which
causes their little incentive to tackle these major climate issues. Furthermore, embracing
these institutions often requires long term planning for countries. These huge investments
that climate politics require aren't felt in the short term, with the benefits only being gained in
the long term. This significant timescale mismatch, especially for developing countries,
discourages them from committing to these ambitious institutions as they can’t afford it in the
long run. The influence of corporate lobbying, particularly fossil fuel companies, further
exacerbates this problem. Investigative reporting has shown how influential energy
companies ‘lobbied to block federal and international action to control greenhouse gas
emissions’ and has ‘helped to erect a vast edifice of misinformation that stands to this day’
(Banerjee, 2015). This large political economy, which is extremely hesitant to act, is only just
reinforced by weak funding such as the promised $100 billion annually by developed
countries. Without these sufficient resources, climate change gets worse, further widening
global inequality.
Case Studies: Limited Success and Institutional Learning
Whilst international climate institutions do come with significant barriers and challenges,
there are important examples of partial success that portray the potential of a well-executed
governance framework. One of the most prolific and common examples of this, is the
Montreal Protocol (1987) which targeted ozone depleting substances and greenhouse
gases. Its success stemmed from a few key features: the existence of viable economic
options, widespread scientific agreement and most importantly, legally binding commitments
supported by trade sanctions and non-compliance. According to the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP), “the Montreal Protocol is saving an estimated two million
people each year by 2030 from skin cancer” (UNEP, 2017). This demonstrates how binding
legal authority and economically sensible strategies can contribute to tackling climate
change.
A recent successful example which has emerged as a core leader is the European Green
Deal and Emissions Trading System (ETS). Established in 2005, it was the world's first
carbon market, covering around 40% of the EU’s emissions. It functions on a cap and trade
principle where emission allowances are allocated or auctioned which can be traded,
providing market-based incentives to better emission reductions. The reason the EU is
praised for its success is due to its initiative to integrate its climate targets with binding
legislation and to set up international institutions with the authority to supervise and enforce
rules. ‘"The EU has sought to position itself as a leader in international climate policy by
demonstrating its ability to reconcile environmental protection with economic growth and
