Reading weak 2: Democracy: Ins5tu5onal design and polariza5on
Summary
- This article explores whether the institutional design of democratic systems affects political polarization. The
authors compare consensus democracies (with proportional representation, multiparty coalitions, and
federalism) to majoritarian democracies (centralized power, winner-takes-all systems). They find that consensus
systems are linked to lower levels of identity-based and idea-based polarization, with federalism being the
strongest predictor. The findings support the idea that inclusive, power-sharing institutions help societies better
cope with polarization
Answers
1. What is the authors' main argument, and which approach in comparative politics do they follow? Can you list all
the mechanisms that support their argument?
o The authors argue that consensus democracies reduce political polarization more effectively than
majoritarian ones. They follow an institutionalist comparative politics approach, rooted in Lijphart’s
theory of democratic typologies.
Supporting mechanisms include:
§ Inclusive institutions build social connectedness and reduce conflict.
§ Broader institutional support among both winners and losers.
§ Less incentive for party bloc formation, reducing “us vs. them” dynamics.
§ Cross-cutting identities hinder affective sorting and polarization.
2. What are the counterarguments to the main claim?
o Federalism may entrench identities, reinforcing division (the paradox of federalism).
o Inclusion may dilute accountability, reduce responsiveness, and foster populism.
o Institutional complexity in consensus systems might undermine legitimacy and increase dissatisfaction.
3. What are dependent and independent variables? What variations exist in the variables, and how do they relate to
each other?
o Dependent variables:
§ Identity-based polarization (v2cacamps)
§ Idea-based polarization (v2smpolsoc)
o Independent variables:
§ Institutional design: electoral system (proportionality), federalism, coalition type,
bicameralism, etc.
o The study tests how variations in institutional design predict variation in polarization levels, using data
from 36 democracies (2000–2019).
4. What research design and methodology do the authors use?
o Cross-national panel study across 36 OECD democracies (2000–2019).
o Uses data from V-Dem and Comparative Political Dataset.
o Multivariate OLS regressions with five-year lagged dependent variables to test robustness and address
potential endogeneity.
5. What are the main findings? What is the strongest predictor of variation in the dependent variable?
o Consensus democracies show lower levels of both identity- and idea-based polarization.
o Federalism is the strongest and most consistent predictor of reduced polarization.
6. What arguments support classifying this paper as a comparative politics study?
o It compares political systems and institutions across countries.
o Uses empirical, cross-national data to test theoretical hypotheses.
o Engages with classic comparative politics theory (Lijphart, institutional design).
7. Which aims of comparative politics does the paper achieve, and how?
o Describe: Classifies democracies as consensus or majoritarian.
o Explain: Identifies institutional causes of polarization.
o Predict: Shows how consensus institutions correlate with lower polarization levels.
8. Can you identify any theoretical or methodological shortcomings in the paper? Consider alternative approaches in
comparative politics.
o Uses expert-coded polarization data instead of citizen surveys → less granular.
o Cannot pinpoint exact causal mechanisms (correlational, not experimental).
o Doesn't analyze how non-institutional factors (e.g. media, culture) interact with institutions.
9. Based on today's class, can you formulate expectations by turning the study’s dependent variable into an
independent variable? How would you apply the comparative method to test these expectations?
o Yes: You could treat polarization as an independent variable that influences democratic outcomes (e.g.
trust, institutional legitimacy).
, o You could apply the most-similar systems design: Compare countries with similar institutions but
different levels of polarization to see how polarization affects outcomes like protest levels or
democratic satisfaction.
Reading 3: autocracy
Summary
- The article introduces a new typology of inclusionary vs. exclusionary autocracies, arguing that how autocratic
regimes treat their citizens during their formative years has long-lasting effects on support for democracy. Using
survey data from over 1.3 million individuals across 70+ countries, the study finds that citizens socialized
in inclusionary autocracies are less supportive of democracy than those from exclusionary autocracies or
democracies. Inclusionary regimes, by distributing political and economic benefits widely, can
build loyalty and nostalgia, which weakens democratic preferences after the regime falls.
Answers
1. What is the article’s main argument?
o The main argument is that inclusionary autocracies (those providing broad polidcal and economic
benefits) leave behind stronger an5-democra5c legacies than exclusionary ones. Cidzens who grow up
in inclusionary autocracies are more likely to support the former regime and be more skep5cal of
democracy later in life
2. What theory does the article use?
The ardcle uses polidcal socializadon theory, which states that formadve experiences during youth shape long-
term political attitudes. It also draws from selectorate theory to explain how inlusion/exclusion decisions are
made by autocratic regime
3. What are the dependent (Y) and independent (X) variables in the article?
o Dependent variables (Y):
§ Satisfaction with democracy
§ Belief that democracy is the best form of government
o Independent variables (X):
§ Type of regime during socialization (inclusionary vs. exclusionary autocracy)
§ Degree of political and economic inclusion (measured via V-Dem)
4. Do the authors adopt a continuous or a categorical approach to autocracy?
Both:
o They use a categorical distinction between autocracy and democracy.
o They also use continuous measures of inclusion/exclusion within autocracies (e.g., scales of access to
power and public goods).
5. Which of the five approaches in comparative politics (the 5 I’s) apply to this article?
o Institutions: Typology of regimes, V-Dem measures
o Ideas: Political values shaped by past regime experience
o Identities: Ethnic, class, and religious groups influence support
o Interests: Elite and mass-level incentives to support or resist regimes
o International environment: Less emphasized, but regime legacy may shape global alignment
6. How does the article relate to the three aims (describe, explain, predict) of comparative politics?
o Describe: Typology of autocracies (inclusionary/exclusionary)
o Explain: Why citizens from different regimes vary in democratic support
o Predict: Generational effects based on regime socialization
7. What limitations can you identify? (No wrong answers.)
o Uses indirect proxies for authoritarian support (via democratic satisfaction)
o Difficult to fully isolate causal effects due to confounding historical/economic factors
o Measures like “inclusion” are somewhat subjectively coded
o Survey limitations in autocratic settings may introduce bias
8. Can you propose an alternative hypothesis? (No wrong answers.)
o Exclusionary regimes might actually provoke resistance and greater support for democracy due to
negative lived experiences.
o Nostalgia for past regimes could be economically, not politically, driven.
o The current performance of democracy may have more impact than past regime experience.
9. How do the article’s findings connect to the real world today? (No wrong answers.)
o Helps explain post-Communist nostalgia (e.g., “Ostalgie” in East Germany).
o Sheds light on why some former autocracies face democratic backsliding.
o Useful for understanding polarization and legitimacy crises in new democracies where old regime
loyalty still exists.
, Reading week 4: legislature
Summary
- “Institutional Foundations of Legislative Speech” develops a theory of how and why political parties strategically
control access to legislative debates. It argues that party leaders manage floor time based on the electoral system
and party unity needs. In systems with centralized control (e.g. Germany), leaders limit access to dissenting
backbenchers, while in systems with more personal vote incentives (e.g. UK), MPs have greater freedom to speak.
This explains variation in speech patterns across countries and challenges the assumption that parliamentary
debates are neutral forums.
Answers
1. Why are legislative debates important for members of parliament (MPs)?
Debates allow MPs to:
o Signal positions to voters, parties, and the media.
o Build personal visibility and political careers.
o Influence public perception even if they don’t shape actual policy. As per Lecture 4 (Slide 22), debate is
central to the linkage and representation functions of legislatures, especially in systems with limited
legislative power.
2. How do legislative debates differ from legislative voting?
o Everyone votes, but not everyone speaks.
o Debates are selective and strategic, often controlled by party rules.
o Voting shows party unity; speeches may reflect individual views, especially in the UK. The reading
emphasizes this bottleneck in “floor access” and how it creates selection effects in who gets to speak.
3. Which factor (x) influences legislative debates (y)?
o X (independent variable): Institutional design and party control mechanisms (especially electoral
system).
o Y (dependent variable): Patterns of legislative speech — who speaks, how often, and how ideologically
aligned they are. In short: electoral incentives shape floor access rules.
4. What does this paper tell us about the independence of MPs? (See today’s lecture slides.)
o In Germany, MPs have less independence due to strong leadership control (Slide 31: centralized party
control reduces autonomy).
o In the UK, MPs are more independent, particularly backbenchers in single-member districts.
o Independence is shaped by candidate selection, party organization, and electoral system — all covered
in the lecture.
5. Which historical movement in comparative politics (see Lecture 1 slides) aligns with this study?
o Behavioralism: Focus on how individual MPs act based on strategic incentives.
o Also ties into new institutionalism, which looks at how rules structure political behavior.
6. Which other countries have legislative debate dynamics similar to Germany and the UK? Where would you place
the U.S. Congress?
o Germany: Similar to closed-list PR systems like Spain or the Netherlands (strong party control).
o UK: Similar to Westminster systems (Canada, Australia) — more MP independence.
o U.S. Congress: Resembles the UK — individualized debate, though party leaders do sometimes organize
message campaigns.
7. Are parliamentary debates still relevant in the age of social media? (No wrong answers.)
Yes:
o Speeches are broadcast, clipped, and used for online messaging.
o Debates can go viral, helping MPs gain recognition.
o However, debates might be more performative, and the informative value can be diluted in today’s fast-
paced media landscape.
Summary
- This article explores whether the institutional design of democratic systems affects political polarization. The
authors compare consensus democracies (with proportional representation, multiparty coalitions, and
federalism) to majoritarian democracies (centralized power, winner-takes-all systems). They find that consensus
systems are linked to lower levels of identity-based and idea-based polarization, with federalism being the
strongest predictor. The findings support the idea that inclusive, power-sharing institutions help societies better
cope with polarization
Answers
1. What is the authors' main argument, and which approach in comparative politics do they follow? Can you list all
the mechanisms that support their argument?
o The authors argue that consensus democracies reduce political polarization more effectively than
majoritarian ones. They follow an institutionalist comparative politics approach, rooted in Lijphart’s
theory of democratic typologies.
Supporting mechanisms include:
§ Inclusive institutions build social connectedness and reduce conflict.
§ Broader institutional support among both winners and losers.
§ Less incentive for party bloc formation, reducing “us vs. them” dynamics.
§ Cross-cutting identities hinder affective sorting and polarization.
2. What are the counterarguments to the main claim?
o Federalism may entrench identities, reinforcing division (the paradox of federalism).
o Inclusion may dilute accountability, reduce responsiveness, and foster populism.
o Institutional complexity in consensus systems might undermine legitimacy and increase dissatisfaction.
3. What are dependent and independent variables? What variations exist in the variables, and how do they relate to
each other?
o Dependent variables:
§ Identity-based polarization (v2cacamps)
§ Idea-based polarization (v2smpolsoc)
o Independent variables:
§ Institutional design: electoral system (proportionality), federalism, coalition type,
bicameralism, etc.
o The study tests how variations in institutional design predict variation in polarization levels, using data
from 36 democracies (2000–2019).
4. What research design and methodology do the authors use?
o Cross-national panel study across 36 OECD democracies (2000–2019).
o Uses data from V-Dem and Comparative Political Dataset.
o Multivariate OLS regressions with five-year lagged dependent variables to test robustness and address
potential endogeneity.
5. What are the main findings? What is the strongest predictor of variation in the dependent variable?
o Consensus democracies show lower levels of both identity- and idea-based polarization.
o Federalism is the strongest and most consistent predictor of reduced polarization.
6. What arguments support classifying this paper as a comparative politics study?
o It compares political systems and institutions across countries.
o Uses empirical, cross-national data to test theoretical hypotheses.
o Engages with classic comparative politics theory (Lijphart, institutional design).
7. Which aims of comparative politics does the paper achieve, and how?
o Describe: Classifies democracies as consensus or majoritarian.
o Explain: Identifies institutional causes of polarization.
o Predict: Shows how consensus institutions correlate with lower polarization levels.
8. Can you identify any theoretical or methodological shortcomings in the paper? Consider alternative approaches in
comparative politics.
o Uses expert-coded polarization data instead of citizen surveys → less granular.
o Cannot pinpoint exact causal mechanisms (correlational, not experimental).
o Doesn't analyze how non-institutional factors (e.g. media, culture) interact with institutions.
9. Based on today's class, can you formulate expectations by turning the study’s dependent variable into an
independent variable? How would you apply the comparative method to test these expectations?
o Yes: You could treat polarization as an independent variable that influences democratic outcomes (e.g.
trust, institutional legitimacy).
, o You could apply the most-similar systems design: Compare countries with similar institutions but
different levels of polarization to see how polarization affects outcomes like protest levels or
democratic satisfaction.
Reading 3: autocracy
Summary
- The article introduces a new typology of inclusionary vs. exclusionary autocracies, arguing that how autocratic
regimes treat their citizens during their formative years has long-lasting effects on support for democracy. Using
survey data from over 1.3 million individuals across 70+ countries, the study finds that citizens socialized
in inclusionary autocracies are less supportive of democracy than those from exclusionary autocracies or
democracies. Inclusionary regimes, by distributing political and economic benefits widely, can
build loyalty and nostalgia, which weakens democratic preferences after the regime falls.
Answers
1. What is the article’s main argument?
o The main argument is that inclusionary autocracies (those providing broad polidcal and economic
benefits) leave behind stronger an5-democra5c legacies than exclusionary ones. Cidzens who grow up
in inclusionary autocracies are more likely to support the former regime and be more skep5cal of
democracy later in life
2. What theory does the article use?
The ardcle uses polidcal socializadon theory, which states that formadve experiences during youth shape long-
term political attitudes. It also draws from selectorate theory to explain how inlusion/exclusion decisions are
made by autocratic regime
3. What are the dependent (Y) and independent (X) variables in the article?
o Dependent variables (Y):
§ Satisfaction with democracy
§ Belief that democracy is the best form of government
o Independent variables (X):
§ Type of regime during socialization (inclusionary vs. exclusionary autocracy)
§ Degree of political and economic inclusion (measured via V-Dem)
4. Do the authors adopt a continuous or a categorical approach to autocracy?
Both:
o They use a categorical distinction between autocracy and democracy.
o They also use continuous measures of inclusion/exclusion within autocracies (e.g., scales of access to
power and public goods).
5. Which of the five approaches in comparative politics (the 5 I’s) apply to this article?
o Institutions: Typology of regimes, V-Dem measures
o Ideas: Political values shaped by past regime experience
o Identities: Ethnic, class, and religious groups influence support
o Interests: Elite and mass-level incentives to support or resist regimes
o International environment: Less emphasized, but regime legacy may shape global alignment
6. How does the article relate to the three aims (describe, explain, predict) of comparative politics?
o Describe: Typology of autocracies (inclusionary/exclusionary)
o Explain: Why citizens from different regimes vary in democratic support
o Predict: Generational effects based on regime socialization
7. What limitations can you identify? (No wrong answers.)
o Uses indirect proxies for authoritarian support (via democratic satisfaction)
o Difficult to fully isolate causal effects due to confounding historical/economic factors
o Measures like “inclusion” are somewhat subjectively coded
o Survey limitations in autocratic settings may introduce bias
8. Can you propose an alternative hypothesis? (No wrong answers.)
o Exclusionary regimes might actually provoke resistance and greater support for democracy due to
negative lived experiences.
o Nostalgia for past regimes could be economically, not politically, driven.
o The current performance of democracy may have more impact than past regime experience.
9. How do the article’s findings connect to the real world today? (No wrong answers.)
o Helps explain post-Communist nostalgia (e.g., “Ostalgie” in East Germany).
o Sheds light on why some former autocracies face democratic backsliding.
o Useful for understanding polarization and legitimacy crises in new democracies where old regime
loyalty still exists.
, Reading week 4: legislature
Summary
- “Institutional Foundations of Legislative Speech” develops a theory of how and why political parties strategically
control access to legislative debates. It argues that party leaders manage floor time based on the electoral system
and party unity needs. In systems with centralized control (e.g. Germany), leaders limit access to dissenting
backbenchers, while in systems with more personal vote incentives (e.g. UK), MPs have greater freedom to speak.
This explains variation in speech patterns across countries and challenges the assumption that parliamentary
debates are neutral forums.
Answers
1. Why are legislative debates important for members of parliament (MPs)?
Debates allow MPs to:
o Signal positions to voters, parties, and the media.
o Build personal visibility and political careers.
o Influence public perception even if they don’t shape actual policy. As per Lecture 4 (Slide 22), debate is
central to the linkage and representation functions of legislatures, especially in systems with limited
legislative power.
2. How do legislative debates differ from legislative voting?
o Everyone votes, but not everyone speaks.
o Debates are selective and strategic, often controlled by party rules.
o Voting shows party unity; speeches may reflect individual views, especially in the UK. The reading
emphasizes this bottleneck in “floor access” and how it creates selection effects in who gets to speak.
3. Which factor (x) influences legislative debates (y)?
o X (independent variable): Institutional design and party control mechanisms (especially electoral
system).
o Y (dependent variable): Patterns of legislative speech — who speaks, how often, and how ideologically
aligned they are. In short: electoral incentives shape floor access rules.
4. What does this paper tell us about the independence of MPs? (See today’s lecture slides.)
o In Germany, MPs have less independence due to strong leadership control (Slide 31: centralized party
control reduces autonomy).
o In the UK, MPs are more independent, particularly backbenchers in single-member districts.
o Independence is shaped by candidate selection, party organization, and electoral system — all covered
in the lecture.
5. Which historical movement in comparative politics (see Lecture 1 slides) aligns with this study?
o Behavioralism: Focus on how individual MPs act based on strategic incentives.
o Also ties into new institutionalism, which looks at how rules structure political behavior.
6. Which other countries have legislative debate dynamics similar to Germany and the UK? Where would you place
the U.S. Congress?
o Germany: Similar to closed-list PR systems like Spain or the Netherlands (strong party control).
o UK: Similar to Westminster systems (Canada, Australia) — more MP independence.
o U.S. Congress: Resembles the UK — individualized debate, though party leaders do sometimes organize
message campaigns.
7. Are parliamentary debates still relevant in the age of social media? (No wrong answers.)
Yes:
o Speeches are broadcast, clipped, and used for online messaging.
o Debates can go viral, helping MPs gain recognition.
o However, debates might be more performative, and the informative value can be diluted in today’s fast-
paced media landscape.
