Revision checklist: Epistemology
Key philosophical knowledge
3.1.1 What is knowledge?
I can explain the distinction between acquaintance knowledge,
ability knowledge and propositional knowledge.
I can explain the definition of knowledge (including Linda
Zagzebski) and how propositional knowledge may be
analysed/defined.
I can explain the Tripartite view that propositional knowledge is
defined as justified true belief:
S knows that p if and only if:
1. S is justified in believing that p,
2. p is true and
3. S believes that p (individually necessary and jointly
sufficient conditions)
I can explain criticisms of the Tripartite View, including the ideas
that:
● the conditions are not individually necessary
● the conditions are not sufficient – cases of lucky true beliefs
(including Edmund Gettier’s original two counter-examples)
I can counter these criticisms with responses, including alternative
post-Gettier analyses/definitions of knowledge, such as:
● strengthen the justification condition (ie infallibilism)
● add a 'no false lemmas' condition (J+T+B+N)
● replace 'justified' with 'reliably formed' (R+T+B) (ie reliabilism)
● replace 'justified' with an account of epistemic virtue
(V+T+B).
3.1.2 Perception as a source of knowledge
I can explain Direct realism, the immediate objects of perception
are mind-independent objects and their properties.
I can explain issues with Direct realism including:
● the argument from illusion
● the argument from perceptual variation
● the argument from hallucination
● the time-lag argument
and responses to these issues.
I can explain Indirect realism, including the idea that the immediate
objects of perception are mind-dependent objects (sense-data) that
are caused by and represent mind-independent objects.
I can explain John Locke's primary/secondary quality distinction.
, I can explain issues with indirect realism, including the argument
that it leads to scepticism about the existence of mind-independent
objects.
I can counter issues with indirect realism, including:
● Locke's argument from the involuntary nature of our
experience
● the argument from the coherence of various kinds of
experience, as developed by Locke and Catharine Trotter
Cockburn (attrib)
● Bertrand Russell's response that the external world is the
'best hypothesis'
● the argument from George Berkeley that we cannot know
the nature of mind-independent objects because
mind-dependent ideas cannot be like mind-independent
objects.
I can explain Berkeley’s idealism:
● The immediate objects of perception (ie ordinary objects
such as tables, chairs, etc) are mind dependent
objects.
● Arguments for idealism including Berkeley's attack on the
primary/secondary quality distinction and his 'Master'
argument.
I can explain Issues with Berkeley’s idealism, including:
● arguments from illusion and hallucination
● idealism leads to solipsism
● problems with the role played by God in Berkeley's Idealism
(including how can Berkeley claim that our ideas exist within
God's mind given that he believes that God cannot feel pain
or have sensations?)
and responses to these issues.
3.1.3 Reason as a source of knowledge
I can explain Innatism, including:
● Arguments from Plato (ie the 'slave boy' argument)
● Gottfried Leibniz (his argument based on necessary truths).
I can explain Empiricist responses to innatism including:
● Locke's arguments against innatism
● the mind as a 'tabula rasa' (the nature of impressions and
ideas, simple and complex concepts)
and issues with these responses.
I can explain the intuition and deduction thesis:
● The meaning of ‘intuition’ and ‘deduction’ and the distinction
between them.
● René Descartes’ notion of ‘clear and distinct ideas’.
● His cogito as an example of an a priori intuition.
● His arguments for the existence of God and his proof of the
external world as examples of a
Key philosophical knowledge
3.1.1 What is knowledge?
I can explain the distinction between acquaintance knowledge,
ability knowledge and propositional knowledge.
I can explain the definition of knowledge (including Linda
Zagzebski) and how propositional knowledge may be
analysed/defined.
I can explain the Tripartite view that propositional knowledge is
defined as justified true belief:
S knows that p if and only if:
1. S is justified in believing that p,
2. p is true and
3. S believes that p (individually necessary and jointly
sufficient conditions)
I can explain criticisms of the Tripartite View, including the ideas
that:
● the conditions are not individually necessary
● the conditions are not sufficient – cases of lucky true beliefs
(including Edmund Gettier’s original two counter-examples)
I can counter these criticisms with responses, including alternative
post-Gettier analyses/definitions of knowledge, such as:
● strengthen the justification condition (ie infallibilism)
● add a 'no false lemmas' condition (J+T+B+N)
● replace 'justified' with 'reliably formed' (R+T+B) (ie reliabilism)
● replace 'justified' with an account of epistemic virtue
(V+T+B).
3.1.2 Perception as a source of knowledge
I can explain Direct realism, the immediate objects of perception
are mind-independent objects and their properties.
I can explain issues with Direct realism including:
● the argument from illusion
● the argument from perceptual variation
● the argument from hallucination
● the time-lag argument
and responses to these issues.
I can explain Indirect realism, including the idea that the immediate
objects of perception are mind-dependent objects (sense-data) that
are caused by and represent mind-independent objects.
I can explain John Locke's primary/secondary quality distinction.
, I can explain issues with indirect realism, including the argument
that it leads to scepticism about the existence of mind-independent
objects.
I can counter issues with indirect realism, including:
● Locke's argument from the involuntary nature of our
experience
● the argument from the coherence of various kinds of
experience, as developed by Locke and Catharine Trotter
Cockburn (attrib)
● Bertrand Russell's response that the external world is the
'best hypothesis'
● the argument from George Berkeley that we cannot know
the nature of mind-independent objects because
mind-dependent ideas cannot be like mind-independent
objects.
I can explain Berkeley’s idealism:
● The immediate objects of perception (ie ordinary objects
such as tables, chairs, etc) are mind dependent
objects.
● Arguments for idealism including Berkeley's attack on the
primary/secondary quality distinction and his 'Master'
argument.
I can explain Issues with Berkeley’s idealism, including:
● arguments from illusion and hallucination
● idealism leads to solipsism
● problems with the role played by God in Berkeley's Idealism
(including how can Berkeley claim that our ideas exist within
God's mind given that he believes that God cannot feel pain
or have sensations?)
and responses to these issues.
3.1.3 Reason as a source of knowledge
I can explain Innatism, including:
● Arguments from Plato (ie the 'slave boy' argument)
● Gottfried Leibniz (his argument based on necessary truths).
I can explain Empiricist responses to innatism including:
● Locke's arguments against innatism
● the mind as a 'tabula rasa' (the nature of impressions and
ideas, simple and complex concepts)
and issues with these responses.
I can explain the intuition and deduction thesis:
● The meaning of ‘intuition’ and ‘deduction’ and the distinction
between them.
● René Descartes’ notion of ‘clear and distinct ideas’.
● His cogito as an example of an a priori intuition.
● His arguments for the existence of God and his proof of the
external world as examples of a
